Phillips v. Youth Development Program, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 12 district · 53 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 68 later decisions — most recently February 2019 · most notably Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc. (1984), Corum v. University of North Carolina (1992)
3 federal appellate · 12 district · 53 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics · Parratt v. Taylor · Paul v. Davis · Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. · Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“a person whose constitutional rights have been interfered with may be entitled to judicial relief even in the absence of a statute providing a procedural vehicle for obtaining relief”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“It seems uncontroverted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a statutory vehicle for the enforcement of State constitutional rights. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 , 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-701 , 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160-1161 , 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). There was, therefore, no statutory vehicle available, at the time of her discharge, pursuant to which the plaintiff could seek redress for the alleged violation of her State constitutional rights. The absence of a statutory remedy for the violation of constitutional rights cannot absolutely and in all cases bar judicial protection of those rights. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized this principle and, in the absence of special factors or an explicit alternative statutory remedy, has allowed direct actions to protect rights under the Federal Constitution. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 , 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471 , 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-243 , 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2275-2276 , 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-397 , 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2004-2005 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“this court may fashion its own concepts of due process of law under the Constitution of the Commonwealth and apply them within the permissible limits of the Constitution of the United States. . . . Thus, in determining what is State action for State due process of law purposes, we need not define State action as the Supreme Court of the United States has defined State action for Fourteenth Amendment and §1983 purposes.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.