Grandison v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On November 1, 1990, Grandison filed a petition, pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1987 ReplVol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County seeking post conviction relief. On July 31, 1992, the circuit court granted such relief, ordering a new capital sentencing proceeding on Grandison’s convictions of first degree murder. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), the circuit court granted the requested relief on the grounds that the sentencing form and related jury instructions employed at Grandison’s first sentencing proceeding offended the dictates of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that the death penalty not be imposed where there are mitigating factors which may call for a less severe penalty. The circuit court also decided that Grandison was entitled to retroactive application of the Mills decision. The State applied to this Court for leave to appeal from the circuit court’s grant of post conviction relief as to the death sentences, and Grandison filed a cross-application seeking review of the circuit court’s denial of collateral relief on the underlying convictions. We denied both applications. Grandison v. State, Misc. No. 29, Sept. Term 1992 (order filed October 28, 1992). The Supreme Court denied a petition and cross-petition for writ of certiorari on March 22, 1993. Maryland v. Grandison, 507 U.S. 985 , 113 S.Ct. 1581 , 123 ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grandison v. State

2. “The issue of whether Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, Section 413(h) violates due process by permitting the jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating factors found by the jury outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist has been addressed and resolved by this Court on numerous occasions, beginning with Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-34 , 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980), and ending most recently in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 , 124 S.Ct. 2084 , 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004). We have consistently determined that the weighing process based on a preponderance of the evidence does not violate due process. The actual holding of Apprendi is that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, an jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 , 147 L.Ed.2d at 455 . In Ring , the Supreme Court stated that “[bjecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 576-77 (internal citations omitted). As we stated in Oleen, it is clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion that Ring only applies to the “eligibility phase of the sentencing process.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Miles v. State

3. “Relying on the Court’s holding in Blakely , the [Booker ] Court explained that its “precedents ... make clear ‘that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ ” [Booker, 543 U.S. at 232 , 125 S.Ct. 738 ] (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi : “Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at [244, 125 S.Ct. 738 ],”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 185 Md. App. 399 - Parker v. State