Williams v. Polgar’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “By the common law, as we interpret it, the owner of real estate could only utilize an abstract as an argument to reinforce his own assertions concerning the state of his title. It might be persuasive, but was without legal efficacy. He may now use it as evidence in an action to enforce the specific performance of a contract of sale, and in every other form of action in which the validity of his title or the existence or non-existence of liens or incumbrances are questions directly or collaterally involved. The right to use an abstract as evidence is not even limited to the person to whom it is issued. Any one may use it, and any one against whom it is employed may be injured in consequence of the certificate being false. Having thus widened the abstract's sphere of action, it was quite natural that the legislature should also widen the abstracter's liability.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1ST AMERICAN TITLE INS. v. 1st Title Serv. Co. · National Pastime Sports, LLC v. CSI Insurance Group

2. “C. Privity Conclusion Michigan’s own jurisprudence records the categorical elimination of privity. This Court had previously extended abstracter liability consonant with the historical growth in reliance and use of abstracts and the corresponding changes in the law to known relying third-parties. Confronted now as of first impression with the question of abstracter liability to foreseeable relying third-parties, we have but to apply our own persuasive precedent of categorical elimination of privity to an analogous situation and we do so. * * * * * * On the basis of Three Rivers and a plethora of jurisdictions in the United States a good case is made for abolishing contractual privity and permitting suit in “negligence or implied warranty” by any foreseeable third-party who would and does rely on the abstract. Williams v. Polgar, supra at 18, 215 N.W.2d at 154 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reid v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

3. ““Under these standards, is there a tort cause of action accruing before plaintiff has knowledge, or should have knowledge, of the negligent misrepresentation? We think not. “General tort law principles in Michigan as discussed supra, support our determination that the statute of limitations does not begin running until the point where plaintiff knows or should have known of this negligent misrepresentation. At that point, the four elements in Connelly, supra, are satisfied: a legal duty exists, such duty is breached, a proximate causal relation is established (if plaintiff can show reliance on the abstract), and the plaintiff then is, or should be, aware of any resultant damages.” (Footnotes omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 487 F. Supp. 486 - Bonney v. Upjohn Co.