Daniels v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The constitutional requirement of announcement serves basically three purposes: (1) the prevention of violence or physical injury to the police and to innocent persons who may also be present on the premises, (2) avoidance of unexpected exposure of the occupant’s private activities, and (3) prevention of property damage resulting from a forced entry. 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 6.3 (2d ed.1979); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.8 (1978). Yet, at the same time, there exists the countervailing concern to preserve surprise, and thereby prevent escape and the possible destruction of evidence. As a result, both state and federal courts have held that the exigencies of any given situation must be considered in balancing the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s corresponding interest in the prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals. 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 91 (1973). In executing a search warrant, circumstances may exist which justify an unannounced and immediate entry. See e.g., United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir.1971); United States v. Garcia, 437 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.1971); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.1966); see generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.Fed. 820 (1974). Likewise, exigencies may justify a forcible entry after waiting only a brief time after announcement. See e.g., United States v. Al lende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Cruz, 265 ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 895 So. 2d 366 - Walker v. State

2. ““... In executing a search warrant, circumstances may exist which justify an unannounced and immediate entry. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir.1971); United States v. Garcia, 437 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.1971); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.1966); see generally, Annot., 21 A.L. R.Fed. 820 (1974). Likewise, exigencies may justify a forcible entry after waiting only a brief time after announcement. See, e.g., United States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Cruz, 265 F.Supp. 15 (W.D.Tex.1967); United States v. Poppit, 227 F.Supp. 73 (D.Del.1964). Therefore, what constitutes a sufficient compliance with the announcement statute is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances confronting the executing officer. Laffitte v. State, 370 So.2d 1108 (Ala.Cr. App.1979)....””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gannaway v. State

3. ““The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American Law, has declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual’s right to privacy in his house. Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the house.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McReynolds v. State