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391 So. 2d 760

Docket No. 80-230.

State v. Hunt

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Louis C. HUNT, Jr., Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided December 24, 1980.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1980-12-24

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently May 1994

14 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1979), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer may initiate a stop of a person based upon a founded suspicion. A founded suspicion is something less than probable cause, but something more than a mere suspicion. It is a reasonable suspicion that requires further investigation. Lewis v. State, 337 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); State v. Othen, 300 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). It is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the surrounding circumstances observed by the officer, when those situations are interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge. State v. Spurting, 385 So.2d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Stevens, 354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Spence v. State, 219 N.J. Super. 352 - Allen v. Passaic Cty.

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · State v. Stevens · 337 So. 2d 1031 - Lewis v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-12-24

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Michael Barnette, Asst. State Atty., Daytona Beach, for appellant.

¶2James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Ronald K. Zimmett, Chief, Appellate Division, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

¶3COBB, Judge.

¶4Hunt was charged by an information with grand theft in the second degree of a motor vehicle in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1979). He moved to suppress his statements and any physical evidence on the ground that the initial stop that led to his arrest was illegal. The trial court granted that motion to suppress, and it is that order that the state is seeking to have reviewed on this appeal. The issue raised is whether the arresting police officer was justified in initiating a stop and identification check of Hunt.

¶5At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the only witness was Officer Northcutt, who was the arresting officer. Officer *761 Northcutt testified that as he was cruising through the parking lot of an apartment complex at approximately 5:11 A.M., he saw Hunt inside a white-over-red Mercury automobile with the door open. About a month before, the officer had taken a breaking and entering report of a white-over-red automobile at the same complex in about the same parking space. The officer thought that this white-over-red automobile might be the same as the automobile involved in the prior breaking and entering, and the officer did not recognize Hunt as the owner of that vehicle. When Hunt saw the officer in his cruiser, Hunt got out of the car and started walking away. It was at this time that the officer stopped Hunt for questioning which led to the arrest.

¶6Pursuant to section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1979), and Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer may initiate a stop of a person based upon a founded suspicion. A founded suspicion is something less than probable cause, but something more than a mere suspicion. It is a reasonable suspicion that requires further investigation. Lewis v. State,337 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); State v. Othen,300 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). It is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the surrounding circumstances observed by the officer, when those situations are interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge. State v. Spurling,385 So.2d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Stevens,354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

¶7In this case, due to the color, size, and location of the automobile, Officer Northcutt reasonably believed that the car was the same one that had been burglarized about one month previously, and he reasonably suspected that somebody other than the owner of the car was in it at 5:11 A.M. The police officer was justified in stopping Hunt and making an investigation check.

¶8The trial court's order granting the motion to suppress is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶9REVERSED and REMANDED.

¶10FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur.

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