Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.’s Empirical Analysis
1968
Citation profile
214 federal appellate · 43 district · 525 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 885 later decisions (43 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2026 · most notably Chimel v. California (1969), Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971)
214 federal appellate · 43 district · 525 state decisions — followed in 41 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Carroll v. United States · Brinegar v. United States · Duncan v. State of Louisiana · Preston v. United States · Cooper v. State of California
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 885 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a war-rantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 [ 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 ] (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 [ 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 ] (1925). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have ‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search.””
16 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“precisely where the line falls between punishments that can be considered `petty' and those that cannot be.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“* * * The State * * * asserts that it [the search] was not in violation of the Constitution because “reasonable.” While the record is not entirely clear, petitioners appear to have been arrested for reckless driving. Whether * * * a car may constitutionally be searched “incident” to arrest for a traffic offense, the search here did not take place until petitioners were in custody inside the courthouse and the car was parked on the street outside. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1964), holds that under such circumstances a search is “too remote in time or place to [be] incidental to the arrest * U.S. at 368, 84 S.Ct., at 884 [11 L.Ed.2d at 781]. * * * In the instant case there is no indication that the police had purported to impound or to hold the car, that they were authorized by any state law to do so, or that their search of the car was intended to implement the purposes of such custody. Here the police seem to have parked the car near the courthouse merely as a convenience to the owner, and to have been willing for some friend or rel ative of McKinney (or McKinney himself if he were soon released from custody) to drive it away. The reasons that made the warrantless search in Cooper [v. California, supra] reasonable thus do not apply to the search here. The Court discussed in Cooper, 386 U.S., at 61 , 87 S.Ct., at 790 , [ 17 L.Ed.2d at 733 ], the reasons why that case was distinguishable from Preston. The case before us is like Pres”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Jenkins v. Hartman
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.