Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

392 P.3d 290

SPENCER v. WYRICK

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided March 7, 2017

Supreme Court of Oklahoma · decided 2017-03-07

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently November 2018

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2017-03-07

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

REIF, J.,

¶1concurring

¶2¶ 1 A court, including this Court, has a duty to inquire into whether it possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action that has been brought before the court. Dutton v. City of Midwest City, 2015 OK 51, ¶ 15, 353 P.3d 532, 553. “[This Court’s] inquiry requires us to examine the nature of [the] pled cause of action and the *292remedy [sought] in this Court and determine whether that cause of action and remedies for that action are within the jurisdiction of this Court.” Id., ¶ 16, 353 P.3d at 539.

¶3¶ 2 In the case before us, the subject matter of the parties’ controversy is the appointment of Justice Patrick Wyrick to this Court. More particularly, two citizens ask this Court to redetermine the issue of whether Justice Wyrick has met the qualifications for his office.

¶4¶ 3 The people of Oklahoma addressed the subject matter of “the selection and tenure of all Justices of the Supreme Court” in Article 7B, § 1, of the Oklahoma, Constitution. In doing so, the people plainly said the provisions of Article 7B “govern” this subject matter. The people further expressed their intent that Article 7B “govern” this subject matter, “other provisions of the Constitution or statutes of the State of Oklahoma to the contrary notwithstanding, and the provisions of Article [7] ... to the contrary notwithstanding.” The people have made it clear that Article 7B will exclusively “govern” the subject matter of selection of a Supreme Court Justice.

¶5¶ 4 As concerns the actual selection of a Justice to this Court, the people of Oklahoma established a process and vested two agents with power to judge the qualifications of persons seeking the office of Supreme Court Justice. The agents vested with the power to judge the qualifications of an applicant are the Judicial Nominating Commission and the Governor. The process in which these agents exercise their power has two stages.

¶6¶ 5 The first stage of the constitutional selection process is conducted by the Judicial Nominating Commission. The people have expressly provided that: “The Commission shall have jurisdiction to determine whether the qualifications of nominees to hold Judicial Office have been met.” Okla. Const. Art. 7B, § 3 (e). At the conclusion of this stage, the Commission nominates the three applicants it has determined to be best qualified.

¶7¶ 6 The second stage of the constitutional selection process is conducted by the Governor, The people of Oklahoma have vested the ultimate power to judge the qualifications of the nominees in the Governor. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Commission and by the Governor in the selection of a Supreme Court Justice involves a considerable degree of judgment.

¶8¶7 In performing their respective functions, and in their exercise of judgment, the Commission and Governor have a duty to hear and consider any comments by individual citizens concerning the qualifications dr fitness of the applicants they review. Individual citizens of Oklahoma, where ever they may reside, have the right to question the qualifications or fitness of any or all of the applicants, or to object to their selection as a nominee or appointee. The time to do so, however, is during the respective stages of the selection process. That is the point in time that citizen questions and objections must be weighed and addressed by the only officials that have jurisdiction “to determine whether the qualifications of nominees to hold Judicial Office have been met.” This likewise provides a measure of due process to allow applicants to be heard concerning such questions or objections.

¶9¶ 8 The fact that Article 7B provides the complete and exclusive process for the selection of a Supreme Court Justice does not mean that certain acts by the agents of that process (the Commission and Governor) are completely beyond judicial relief. For example, if the Commission refused to meet, mandamus would be available to compel the Commission to perform this constitutional duty, but could not direct the Commission in regard the exercise of its judgment upon meeting. Similarly, if the Governor selected and appointed a Supreme Court Justice without following the process specified by Article 7B, judicial relief would be available to void such an illegal act.

¶10¶ 9 Unlike these examples, both the Commission and Governor duly exercised their constitutionally vested subject matter jurisdiction for the selection of Justice Wyrick to serve on this Court. The constitutional process has been completed, and his qualifications to hold the office of Supreme Court Justice are, in my opinion, finally and conclusively determined.

¶11*293¶ 10 In the future, it would behoove the Commission and the Governor to be very proactive in letting the citizens of this State know (1) when the Article 7B process to fill a particular office has begun and will be pending, (2) the persons who have applied, or who have been nominated, and (3) what time frame will be allowed for citizens to provide comment to the Commission and Governor.

¶12¶ 11 The foregoing considerations lead me to conclude that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over both the controversy and the relief sought. I therefore join in the assumption of original jurisdiction for the limited purpose of deciding this jurisdictional issue and join the dismissal of relief.

WATT, J.,

¶13concurring in part, dissenting in part:

¶14While I concur in part with the reasoning expressed in the majority opinion, I write separately to express my views concerning the unprecedented issue which currently stands submitted to this Court.

¶15I concur that our Article 7 authority vests in us power to review the actions of inferior courts, agencies, boards and commissions, including the Judicial Nominating Commission. We cannot exercise that power under the theories pressed by these two petitioners.

¶16The critical issue confronting us cannot be resolved without more facts than those contained in the record before us.

¶17I dissent to the majority’s dismissal with prejudice, albeit only as to these two petitioners.

¶18Adoption of the majority opinion does not nor can it resolve the ultimate issue.

¶19Accordingly, I would have simply issued a special order denying the petitioners quest for original jurisdiction and a writ, without prejudice to seeking its resolution of the issue in the appropriate forum below.

¶20By so doing, all parties would have the due process rights they deserve and any subsequent review could be done upon a more fact-filled record to resolve what I believe to be the most critical issue this court has ever faced.

/392/p3d/290 · .json · Public domain