¶1*508Robert Orseck, Aaron Podhurst, Miami, Fla., for appellants.
¶2Jackson L. Peters, Cecyl L. Pickle, A. Lee Bradford, Miami, Fla. (Boeing Co.), for appellee.
¶3Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and JONES and CLAYTON, Circuit Judges.
¶5The District Judge dismissed Appellants suits (filed January 1967) against Air India for lack of jurisdiction over the person of that foreign corporation. The sole question presented is whether Florida’s long arm statute, F.S.A. §§ 47.16, 47.17, 47.171, and especially § 47.17(4),1 is long enough to subject Air India to suit in Florida on a claim which did not arise in any way out of Florida activities.2 We reverse.
¶6Air India’s only troublesome contention is that for service of process on its resident agent to be perfected under Florida’s long arm statute the cause of action must arise out of the foreign corporation’s business activities within the State of Florida notwithstanding the fact that it maintained an office in Miami in which it regularly carried on substantial business for its own profit.3
¶7Subsequent to the decision below and indeed during the pendency of this appeal this contention was decided adversely to Air India in the recent case of Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 390 F.2d 27 (Feb. 5, 1968). In a fact situation not nearly so strong as this one this Court held that “where a business agent of a foreign corporation actually resides in Florida and engages in sustained, continuous business for his employer, the corporation may be sued by service on the resident agent under section 47.17 *509(4), F.S.A., regardless of where the cause of action arose … 390 F.2d at 30.
¶8The Florida arm, short or long, is long enough to reach the one-third mile from the United States Courthouse, 300 N.E. First Avenue, Miami, to nearby 100 Biscayne Boulevard, North.
¶9Reversed.
¶15(concurring specially):
¶16I dissented in Woodham v. Northwestern Steel and Wire Co., cited in the Court’s opinion, because of my belief that the persons upon whom process was served were not of the kind necessary to come within the purview of the Florida Statute. I concur in the decision in this case because I believe that the doctrine of stare decisis requires it. I concur for the further reason that the agents upon whom service of process was made in this ease were of a kind which the Florida Statute did and properly could permit service to be made upon.