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← 393 F.3d 356 - J.C. Penney Life Insurance v. Pilosi

J.C. Penney Life Insurance v. Pilosi’s Empirical Analysis

393 F.3d 356 · 2004

Citation profile

79
cited by 79 later decisions
1
states following
January 2024
most recently cited

14 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 79 later decisions — most recently January 2024 · most notably Hammersmith v. TIG Insurance (2007), Viera v. Life Insurance Co. of North America (2011)

14 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

430200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. · Barnhart Commissioner of Social Security v. Thomas · Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance · Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp. · 437 Pa. Super. 108 - Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “As a threshold matter, the task of interpreting a contract is generally performed by a court, rather than by a jury. The goal of that task is, of course, to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument. Where an insurance policy provision is ambiguous, it is to be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.... Where, however, the language of an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to enforce that language. That is, a court must refrain from torturing the language of a policy to create ambiguities where none exist.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Bad faith” on [the] part of [an] insurer is any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that such refusal be fraudulent. For purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to pay a claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means a breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The ... contested issue in the instant case involves the interpretation of the scope of coverage of the insurance contract [under Pennsylvania law]. The interpretation of the scope of coverage of an insurance contract is a question of law properly decided by the court, a question over which [we] exercisef ] plenary review.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.