Chow v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

151 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 151 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then “courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].””

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Higginbotham v. Public Service Commission · 180 Md. App. 440 - Stevenson v. State

2. ““ ‘In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and then the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. However, before judges may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Where the statutory language is free from such ambiguity, courts will neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute. Only when faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the literal or usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in light of the objectives and purposes of the enactment. As our predecessors noted, “We cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.” Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text.’ ””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Beaver Dam Area Development Corp. · City of Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel Realty Associates

3. “(0 Knowing participants in sale, rental, etc.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, any dealer or person who knowingly participates in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm in violation of this subheading shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each violation shall be considered a separate offense.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Jones v. State · Alston v. State