¶1(dissenting). While I conclude that proper practice dictated that the people introduce evidence of the admission in their case in chief rather than by cross-examination of defendant and rebuttal "impeachment” (People v Quick, 58 Mich 321; 25 NW 302 [1885], and People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 677 [1974]), I would find that the asserted "error” in this case does not warrant reversal. The majority, in finding reversible error on this record, extends without warrant the rule of Quickand McGillen #1.
¶2In Quick, supra,the Court predicated reversal on a catalogue of errors, only one group of which dealt with the people’s use of rebuttal testimony. Noting that it was improper for the people to introduce upon rebuttal that which belonged in the case in chief, the QuickCourt observed that *452this rule had been repeatedly violated. In Mc-Gillen #1, supra, the Court cited the rule of Quickfor instructional purposes, but did not predicate reversal upon violation of the Quickrule.
¶3Defense counsel objected to the rebuttal testimony in question, but only in general terms. He did not raise the Quickrationale in objection. In the absence of specifically framed objection, the trial court permitted defendant rebuttal in response to the rebuttal evidence of the people. The Quickrule was not repeatedly violated here. Demonstration of reversible prejudice is notably lacking in this record.
¶4Decisions of this Court have repeatedly stated that the order of proofs at trial is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 83; 185 NW 830 (1921) and People v McCrea, 303 Mich 213, 275; 6 NW2d 489 (1942). Where rules were repeatedly violated and prejudice indicating abuse of discretion is apparent, this Court has found reversible error. Quick, supra.Without demonstration of prejudice, I cannot predicate reversal upon the asserted error.