¶1I respectfully dissent. I would accept the Petition in the Court’s original jurisdiction, and then dismiss the Petition. The Governor has the absolute authority under the South Carolina Constitution to convene the General Assembly in extra session “on extraordinary occasions,” and Petitioner so concurs. The Petition’s sole objection to the Governor’s exercise of convening an extra session is that the matters included in the Governor’s Executive Order are not included in the General Assembly’s sine die resolution. Moreover, the Petition even acknowledges the Governor’s authority to convene an extra session exists prior to expiration of the sine die resolution “to address matters that were truly unforeseen at the time the sine die resolution was adopted.” The Petition gives examples of an intervening natural disaster or an unanticipated drop in tax revenues. The inescapable conclusion is that the Petition seeks to assess the merits of the Governor’s decision to call an extra session. The exercise of discretion in this regard by a Governor is unassailable, and the law in this regard is uniform.
Under most constitutions, the governor’s power to call a special legislative session is absolute, and his opinion concerning the existence of an emergency or special circumstances demanding immediate legislative attention is unimpeachable by the courts.
¶21 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 5.5, at 235 (7th ed.2010).
Where the constitution authorizes the calling of such [special] sessions by the governor, he or she is the sole judge as *140to whether occasion for such session exists, and the exercise of such discretion is not subject to challenge or review by the courts.
¶381A C.J.S. States § 105, at 438 (2004).
¶4Rather than deal with the legal issue as presented in the Petition, the majority recasts the issue as one of “timing” and focuses on the word “extra.” The basis for the majority’s decision is not even argued by Petitioner.
¶5I would follow the prevailing law in this country and dismiss the Petition. I would adhere to the analysis of the Kansas Supreme Court in Farrelly v. Cole, 60 Kan. 356, 56 P. 492 (1899):
It would be an unseemly and unprecedented proceeding for this court, or any court, to entertain a controversy wherein, by proof obtained from witnesses sworn in the cause, it sought to ascertain judicially whether an extraordinary occasion existed, of sufficient gravity to authorize the governor to convene the legislature in extra session. If jurisdiction is retained of such a cause, what is the rule as to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that there was no emergency? ... It perverts and destroys the meaning of the word to hold that exercise of discretion may be reviewed or controlled by some other person or tribunal than the person on whom it is conferred.
¶7As for the General Assembly’s response to the Governor’s called extra session, it is free to act as it deems appropriate in the exercise of its constitutional authority. In other words, the convening of an extra session by the Governor in no manner compels the General Assembly to address the matters raised by the Governor in any particular manner or fashion. The Family Court addressed this matter as well:
Now, the legislature are to enact the laws upon their own view of necessity and expediency and they will refuse to pass the desired statute, if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so doing they indirectly review the governor’s decision, especially if, in refusing to pass the law, they do so on the ground that the specific event was not one calling for action on their part. In such case it is clear that while the decision of the governor is final, so far as to *141require the legislature to meet, it is not final in any sense that would bind the legislative department to accept and act upon it when they enter upon the performance of their duty in the making of laws.