394 So. 2d 100 - Waldon v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the offense; we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is required.' 96 S.Ct. at 2258 , no. 18. (Emphasis added) "The Court also noted that `(t)he charge of second-degree murder was never formally made. Had it been made, it necessarily would have included a charge that respondent's assault was "committed with a design to effect the death of the person killed."' 96 S.Ct. at 2258 . "As was recognized in McGuirk v. Fair , 622 F.2d 597 , 598 (1st Cir. 1980), `(t)he holding of Henderson was very narrow, however, and its facts are distinguishable from those of the instant case.' The majority in Henderson even recognized the uniqueness of their decision: "`Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. This case is unique because the trial judge found as a fact that the element of intent was not explained to respondent.' 96 S.Ct. at 2258 -9 ."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 426 So. 2d 481 - Morrow v. State

2. “"The specific question . . . [in Henderson] was `whether a defendant may enter a voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder without being informed that intent to cause the death of the victim was an element of the offense.' 96 S.Ct. at 2254 . Based on the general proposition that a guilty plea is involuntary if the accused `has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt', 96 S.Ct. at 2257 , n. *Page 483 13, the majority concluded that, in the particular situation before it, the circumstances surrounding the accused's plea failed to satisfy its test for voluntariness for the following reasons: (1) Neither defense counsel nor the trial court informed the accused that intent to kill was an element of the crime of second degree murder; (2) defense counsel did not stipulate to the existence of such intent; and (3) the accused made no factual statements to the court implying that he had such intent. 5 Amer.J.Crim.Law 105 (1977).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 426 So. 2d 481 - Morrow v. State

3. “"There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element 4 of the offense; *Page 509 we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is required."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 484 So. 2d 506 - Pierce v. State