394 So. 2d 259 - State v. Temple’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"All of the elements of the two crimes, murder and manslaughter, are identical; there exists only one difference. That is, the statutory definition of manslaughter provides that the killing, which would be murder under 14:30(1), be `committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.' If passion reduces a homicide requiring the same scienter, specific intent, from murder to a less serious crime, manslaughter, then lack of passion may realistically be seen as the additional element which elevates a manslaughter to murder. The presence of passion, however, is in the nature of a defense and, for this reason, the additional `element' of lack of passion need not be proven by the state in a murder prosecution. Therefore, the presence of passion is not an additional element of the crime of manslaughter; rather, it is a factor which exhibits a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without passion caused by provocation. * * * * * * "Additionally, a review of our manslaughter statutes (that statute in effect at the time of this defendant's trial and the new manslaughter statute) reveals that the `sudden passion' or `heat of blood' provisions operate in a mitigatory fashion in a murder prosecution, not a great deal unlike provisions in the criminal law of other jurisdictions where such factors are considered to be `affirmative defenses' to a c”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Dill · State v. Willis

2. “A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an 112average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed [.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 529 So. 2d 1347 - State v. Gibson · 161 So. 3d 918 - State v. Murray

3. “A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. B. Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended. C. An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. . . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 528 So. 2d 752 - State v. Holley