394 So. 2d 570 - Bell v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The state charged the appellant with sexual battery with the use of "force likely to cause serious personal injury" under section 794.011(3) and included in the charge that he "did in the process thereof use, threaten to use, or carried a firearm." The first quoted portion of the charge accuses him of the crime while the second quoted portion makes operative the "reclassification" statute. § 775.087. Appellant would have us hold that because the statute under which he was charged provides an alternative means by which to commit a crime, "uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon," that section 775.087 is unavailable to the sentencing judge. He argues that section 775.087 specifically excludes felonies in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element. While he is correct that the statute excludes those felonies, he is incorrect that the exclusion applies here. The appellant in this case was not charged with sexual battery "and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon." He was charged with using "actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury," an alternative way of committing the crime. He was also charged, incidentally, with using, threatening to use or carrying a firearm. As we said, this was to make the enhancement operative.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 554 So. 2d 638 - Lareau v. State · 534 So. 2d 425 - Pinkerton v. State

2. “A problem arises in this case from the fact that there are two separate and distinct types of aggravated battery, i.e., a battery under section 784.045(1)(a) which intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, and a battery under section 784.045(1)(b) which is committed by one who uses a deadly weapon. Obviously in a given case, as here, the facts could be that great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement resulted from the use of a deadly weapon. However, distinctions between these two species of aggravated battery must be carefully made and preserved because of the necessity of procedural and substantive consistency between allegations, proof, verdict, judgment and punishment in criminal cases. Neither battery nor either type of aggravated battery is a necessarily lesser included offense of attempted murder but either type of aggravated battery could have been alleged as a permissible lesser included offense of the attempted murder charge. See Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1968).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 554 So. 2d 638 - Lareau v. State

3. “Of course, every deadly weapon as used in section 784.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), (the second type of aggravated battery) is a weapon within the exception in section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Therefore, no conviction of aggravated battery under the "deadly weapon" subsection can be enhanced under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979). See Williams v. State, 358 So.2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), reaching the same conclusion as to an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (§ 784.021(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979)). Here, as there, we do not reach the question as to whether a battery causing great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement can be reclassified under section 775.087(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), where a weapon is used because here the allegations, instructions, verdicts and judgments relate only to aggravated battery by a firearm.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 554 So. 2d 638 - Lareau v. State