State v. White’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 2 district · 25 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently June 2009 · most notably 42 Cal. 3d 1222 - People v. Allen (1986), Tichnell v. State (1980)
3 federal appellate · 2 district · 25 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Woodson v. North Carolina · Jurek v. Texas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“a. beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance; and b. unanimously recommends, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, that a sentence of death be imposed.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Bailey v. Snyder · Flamer v. State“(1) He intentionally causes the death of another person; (2) In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, he recklessly causes the death of another person; (3) He intentionally causes another person to commit suicide by force or duress; (4) He recklessly causes the death of a law-enforcement officer, corrections employee or fireman while such officer is in the lawful performance of his duties; (5) He causes the death of another person by the use of or detonation of any bomb or similar destructive device; (6) He, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of rape, kidnapping, arson in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, or immediate flight therefrom; (7) He causes the death of another person in order to avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of any person, or in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of escape in the second degree or escape after conviction. (b) Murder in the first degree is a class A felony and shall be punished as provided in § 4209 of this title.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Whalen v. State · Flamer v. State““The defendants assert that the aggravating circumstances which are designated in our statute simply as ‘elderly’ and ‘defenseless’ victims, without further definition, are unconstitutionally broad and vague; that those aggravating circumstances do not provide adequate guidelines to channel the discretion of the sentencing authority sufficiently to constitute the clear and objective statutory standard mandated by Gregg and its companion cases. We agree. * * % * * * .... It cannot be said that the words have a common and ordinary meaning sufficiently definite to meet their usage in the context of the Statute. * * * * * * Manifestly, words such as ‘elderly’ and ‘defenseless’, without legislative definition of scope and meaning, are susceptible of widely differing interpretations. Thus, by the use of such vague terminology, there is substantial risk that sentencing authorities will inflict the death penalty in an arbitrary and diversified manner. Such vague terms have particular constitutional shortcomings and are particularly unacceptable, when they are applied to the imposition of the death penalty- At the risk of objectional repetition, the crux of the matter is this: The cornerstone of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is that the death penalty not be imposed in a ‘freakish and wanton’ or arbitrary and capricious manner. It is essential that the jury, or judge where applicable, must be provided by the Statute with clear and ob”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. State v. Chaplin
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.