James Wm. Smith v. Robert S. McNamara U. S. Secretary of Defense, Gilbert Esco Angle v. Robert S. McNamara U. S. Secretary of Defense’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 8 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““To deny collateral attack to one not in confinement — the consequence of saying that habeas corpus is the only remedy — would be to deny the possibility of review by a constitutional court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court, of the constitutional claims of servicemen * * * who have not been sentenced to jail or who have been released.” For like reasons we conclude that the trial court was vested with jurisdiction to review by mandamus, as in habeas corpus, the “final” court martial decision even though Smith had completed the term of imprisonment imposed as a result of that conviction. Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d p. 899.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Green v. Skulute · 343 F. Supp. 1087 - Parrish v. Seamans

2. “Our analysis of this problem in the context of this case begins with section 207 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 837 , 10 U.S.C. § 1552 , which in terms provided that the “Secretary of a military department, under procedures established by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department, may correct any military record of that department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” This statute enabled the Secretary, acting through a civilian Correction Board, to change the kind of discharge a former service man had received and relieved Congress of the burden of the great number of private bills theretofore introduced at each session to accomplish such changes. Moreover, this power of review was conferred in sufficient generality to cover discharges pursuant to court-martial sentences as well as administrative discharges. To this extent Congress created an exception to or authorized relief from the mandate of the 76th Article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that “all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial following approval, review, or affirmation as required by this chapter, are final and conclusive.” As originally enacted, the 1946 statute said nothing about the finality of the authorized administrative action. Shortly thereafter, the Comptroller General refused to’recognize a chang”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 343 F. Supp. 1087 - Parrish v. Seamans

3. “whether the representation afforded him [at his court-martial] complied with the fundamental right of due process, i. e. a full and fair hearing where liberty is at stake.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Angle v. Laird