Twine v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““THE COURT: Well, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which is the standard the Court must use, at this point, the Court will deny your motion and does the defense rest? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I think for purposes of preserving the record, that in light of the statements that [the Assistant State’s Attorney] said [suggesting that Jeandell may have acquired a residence and simply not reported it], I think that I would put Mr. Jeandell— THE COURT: Well, you can do that if you want to, but I find the facts as they have been testified to, that Mr. Jeandell notified the authorities that he didn’t have a place to go. And that what happened subsequently, a year after that notification was given, he still doesn’t have a place to go, and he’s arrested and subsequently prosecuted and he’s here before the Court. That’s on the record. I don’t — and the State’s argument is that he didn’t notify them pursuant to the statute. So, this is really more of a legal question than it is a factual question. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, Your Honor. But is Your Honor accepting that he did not, in fact, have a place to live? I mean, that— THE COURT: That’s the evidence. That’s what’s before this Court. The man was homeless. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Then, Your Honor, I am not putting any additional evidence on. We would rest, as well. I would renew my motion.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jeandell v. State

2. “We conclude, on the basis of the plain meaning of “residence” and “address,” that the General Assembly did not intend the notification requirement in § 11-705(d) to apply to “homeless” persons .... Given the plain meanings of “residence” and “address,” we conclude that a registrant has a “residence” within the meaning of § 11-705(d) only if that person has a fixed location at which the registrant is living, or one to which the registrant intends to return upon leaving it. See ... Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 24-25, 1931 (1963) (defining “address” as “the designation of a place ... where a person or organization may be found or communicated with,” and defining “residence” as “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2119 (2d ed. 1950) (defining “residence” as the “act or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2009 Pa. Super. 116 - Commonwealth v. Wilgus

3. “We hold that appellant did not change residences within the meaning of § 11-705(d) when he became homeless, because he did not acquire a new “residence” within the meaning of the statute. “Residence,” as noted above, is used interchangeably with “address” in this statutory scheme. Because the ordinary meanings of “residence” and “ad dress” connote some degree of permanence or intent to return to a place, and appellant was homeless, he had not acquired a residence within the contemplation of the statute. The statute does not address how compliance can be achieved by a person in appellant’s circumstances.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2009 Pa. Super. 116 - Commonwealth v. Wilgus