Rosa v. McCray’s Empirical Analysis
396 F.3d 210 · 2005
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently March 2022 · most notably Nicholas v. Goord (2005), United States v. Rommy (2007)
12 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Williams v. Taylor · Kotteakos v. United States · Brecht v. Abrahamson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... [T]he booking questions were presented to Rosa in the exact order that the questions appeared on the booking form .... Moreover, if the officer perceives — either through direct observation or otherwise — that a specific piece of information provided by the arrestee is patently incorrect, then it is not only reasonable, but arguably the officer’s duty, to inquire further. We hold that [Detective] Arroyo was engaged in a booking process that was reasonably related to police administrative concerns. But of course “recognizing a booking exception to Miranda does not mean ... that any question asked during the booking process falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.” Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602, n. 14 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , ....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Second Circuit has explained that: an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. Thus, a federal habeas court is not empowered to grant the writ when, in its independent judgment, it determines that the state court incorrectly applied the relevant federal law. The state court’s application must reflect some additional increment of incorrectness such that it may be said to be unreasonable. However, the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In sum, the statute directs federal courts to attend to every state-court judgment with utmost care, but it does not require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on the content of federal law. If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state-court’s judgment a federal court is convinced that a prisoner’s custody ... violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail. Otherwise the federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States might be applied by the federal courts one way in Virginia and another way in California.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.