United States v. Cooper’s Empirical Analysis
396 F.3d 308 · 2005
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently January 2025 · most notably United States v. Berrios (2012), Slagle v. County of Clarion (2006)
16 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2111 · 18 U.S.C. § 2112 · 18 U.S.C. § 2113 · 18 U.S.C. § 2114 · 18 U.S.C. § 2116 · 18 U.S.C. § 2118 (Controlled Substance Registrant Protection Act of 1984) · 18 U.S.C. § 2119 · 42 U.S.C. § 14135A
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Almendarez-Torres v. United States · Williams v. Taylor · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca · Duncan v. Walker
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“It is well settled that “[t]he first step in interpreting a statute is to determine ‘whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’” Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted)). “Where the language of the statute is clear ... the text of the statute is the end of the matter.” Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir.2001). However, if the language of the statute is unclear, we attempt to discern Congress’ intent using the canons of statutory construction. Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir.2004) (citing INS v. Cardoza — Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 , 107 S.Ct. 1207 , 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). If the tools of statutory construction reveal Congress’ intent, that ends the inquiry. Id. (citing Valansi, 278 F.3d at 208 (quoting Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir.2000))). If, on the other hand, we are unable to discern Congress’ intent using tools of statutory construction, we generally defer to the governmental agency’s reasonable interpretation. Id.; see generally, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Shovlin v. Klaas
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.