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← 396 F.3d 975 - Terrell v. Larson

Terrell v. Larson’s Empirical Analysis

396 F.3d 975 · 2005

Citation profile

57
cited by 57 later decisions
1
states following
August 2023
most recently cited

30 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently August 2023 · most notably Graves v. Thomas (2006), Green v. Post (2009)

30 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

300200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2106 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Creighton · Graham v. Connor · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Farmer v. Brennan · Murray v. Carrier

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “the intent-to-harm standard most clearly applies in rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous situations which preclude the luxury of calm and reflective deliberation.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Because a wide variety of official conduct may cause injury, a court must first determine the level of culpability the § 1983 plaintiff must prove to establish that the defendant’s conduct may be conscience shocking. Mere negligence is never sufficient. Proof of intent to harm is usually required, but in some cases, proof of deliberate indifference, an intermediate level of culpability, will satisfy this substantive due process threshold. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49 [ 118 S.Ct. 1708 ]. The deliberate indifference standard “is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851 [ 118 S.Ct. 1708 ]. By contrast, the intent-to-harm standard most clearly applies in rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous situations which preclude the luxury of calm and reflective deliberation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.