Flattery v. Gregory’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 18 district · 66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties to the contract and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances in dicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 203 F. Supp. 2d 52 - Orell v. UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Travelers Indemnity Company

2. ““There is some similarity between [LaClair, Rae, and Craig] and the present case. However, there is at least one critical distinction between them, and that distinction is fatal to the plaintiff’s tort claim. In each of the cited cases involving workmen’s compensation insurance, the plaintiff rightfully and foreseeably expected the insurance to be in effect and relied on it. The expectation was rightful and foreseeable because the insurance was mandated by statute. Also, foreseeable expectation and reliance were present in Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., supra. In the present case, however, the plaintiff clearly did not foreseeably rely on [the defendant’s] motor vehicle being insured in an amount greater than that required by G. L. c. 90, § 34A (1984 ed.). We have never held that in the absence of foreseeable reliance on the promised services being performed by someone, a promisor of services may be hable in tort not only to the promisee but also to potential beneficiaries of the promise. To the contrary, we have recently declared that ‘[w]hile [our decision in Craig, supra,] is an example of our recognition that tort liability may exist in the absence of privity of contract, . . . recovery under the principles of Craig is limited to instances “where the defendant knew that the plaintiff would rely on his services.” Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 193 (1982).’ Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55, 64 (1983).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wilson v. James L. Cooney Insurance Agency

3. “Although the owner of a motor vehicle may be motivated to obtain optional liability insurance coverage solely by a selfish interest to protect his assets, rather than by concern for the needs of parties negligently injured by him, the fact is that a motor vehicle owner achieves that protection by entering into a contract the very object of which is the payment ... of judgments against him. The parties to the insurance policy, or, as in this case, to a contract to procure such a policy, intend the injured third-party judgment holder to benefit from their contract. It makes no difference, therefore, whether the insurance is compulsory or optional [ Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 266 N.J. Super. 471 - Werrmann v. Aratusa, Ltd.