397 Pa. Super. 364 - Commonwealth v. Ariondo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

64 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “determine whether the factual findings of the [suppression] court are supported by the record. In making this determination, we consider only the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense, as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. If, when so viewed, the evidence supports the factual findings, we are bound by such findings and may only reverse if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Commonwealth v. Trenge, 305 Pa.Super. 386 , 451 A.2d 701 (1982).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 446 Pa. Super. 609 - Commonwealth v. McEnany · 411 Pa. Super. 187 - Commonwealth v. McDonel

2. “... we are satisfied that no basis exists for suppressing the evidence seized from appellant’s home. Any evidence that was found for the first time during the execution of the search warrant was admissible pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Segura v. United States, supra. As for the evidence which had first been observed in plain view following the illegal entry, it was subsequently seized pursuant to a valid search warrant issued independently of observations made during the illegal entry. This evidence would inevitably have been discovered during the subsequent search pursuant to the valid warrant. Therefore, even though appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the initial illegal entry by police, suppression of the evidence subsequently seized pursuant to the valid search warrant was not constitutionally required. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would put the police in a worse position than they would have occupied if no violation had occurred. Murray v. United States, supra [487 U.S.] at 541, 108 S.Ct. at 2535 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 483 . ****** Instantly, when the search warrant is viewed without reference to the plain view observations which occurred after the illegal entry into appellant’s house, it is abundantly clear that the untainted information in the warrant was more than adequate to establish probable cause for the warrant’s issuance. ****** We conclude, therefore, that the information gained thro”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 415 Pa. Super. 22 - Commonwealth v. Mason

3. “In addition to these considerations, we further recognize that all the facts and circumstances surrounding possession are relevant in making a determination of whether contraband was possessed with the intent to deliver. Expert opinion testimony is admissible concerning whether the facts surrounding the possession of controlled substances are consistent with an intent to deliver rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use. Under Pennsylvania law, intent to deliver may be inferred from possession of a large quantity of controlled substances. Similarly, the absence of intent to deliver may be inferred where only a small amount of the controlled substance was discovered. However, ‘the amount [of [the] controlled substance] involved is not necessarily crucial to establishing an inference of possession with the intent to deliver, if ... other facts are present.’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 414 Pa. Super. 477 - Commonwealth v. Sherrell