McLaughlin v. Tilendis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

86 federal appellate · 15 district · 24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 189 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The second ground of defendants' motion to dismiss was that they are protected against suit by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stats. 1967, Ch. 85, Sec. 2-201). Under the Supremacy Clause, that statute cannot protect defendants against a cause of action grounded, as here, on a federal statute. Legislators and judges have broad immunity under Section 1983 because in enacting that statute Congress did not intend to overturn their pre-existing defense. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019 ; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 . However, other officials, such as present defendants, retain only a qualified immunity, dependent on good faith action. Pierson v. Ray, supra, at p. 555 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 ; Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1229, 1235-1236 (1955); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1285, 1299 (1953). Even under the Illinois Act, immunity is conditioned upon a showing of good faith (Baum, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their Employees: An Introtion to the Illinois Immunity Act, Ill.Law Forum (1966) 981, 1003-1004), and there has been no hearing on that question. In this Court and in their brief below the defendants also rely on common law immunity, but we rejected a similar contention in Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222, 231 (7th Cir.1961), where it was held that common law immunity did not ext”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Professional Ass'n of College Educators v. El Paso County Community College District · Gomez v. BOARD OF ED. OF DULCE IND. SCH. DIST. NO 21

2. ““Even though the individual plaintiffs did not yet have tenure, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) gives them a remedy if their contracts were not renewed because of their exercise of constitutional rights. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 1003 , 87 S.Ct. 706 , 17 L.Ed.2d 542 ; Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947), certiorari denied, 332 U.S. 825 , 68 S.Ct. 166 , 92 L.Ed. 400 ; Smith v. Board of Education of Morrillton [Morrilton] School District No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Rack ley v. School District No. 5, Orangeburg County, S. C., 258 F.Supp. 676 (D.S.C.1966); Williams v. Sumter School District No. 2, 255 F.Supp. 397 (D.S.C.1966).” McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1968).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pavlak v. Duffy · Roberts v. Lake Central School Corporation

3. “It is settled that teachers have the right of free association, and unjustified interference with teachers' associational freedom violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * Public employment may not be subjected to unreasonable conditions, and the assertion of First Amendment rights by teachers will usually not warrant their dismissal. * * * Unless there is some illegal intent, an individual's right to form and join a union is protected by the First Amendment. * * *”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 308 F. Supp. 1369 - Orr v. Thorp · American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Afl-Cio v. Woodward