Hadix’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he statute contains no reference to congressional appropriations or to rates of compensation that are actually paid to court-appointed counsel. While congressional appropriations may place a practical limitation on the amount actually paid to court-appointed counsel, there is no language in § 3006A that expressly limits the Judicial Conference’s discretion to set rates based on budgetary constraints. If Congress had wanted attorney fees under the PLRA to be based on the amount of money budgeted for payment of court-appointed counsel, it could easily have used such language rather than cross-referencing § 3006A. Moreover, in the absence of express statutory language, there is no inherent reason why attorney fees under the PLRA should be limited by the amount budgeted to pay court-appointed counsel under the CJA. Attorney fee awards in prisoner civil rights litigation are paid from the pockets of unsuccessful defendants whether they be private individuals or government entities; such fees are not paid from funds set aside by Congress to compensate court-appointed counsel under the CJA. There is no logical reason to limit fee awards in such cases to the amount of money set aside to fund the CJA.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Carruthers v. Israel · Laube v. Allen

2. “(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which at torney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that— (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiffs rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. (1) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid' by the defendant. (3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Siggers-El v. Barlow