¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent. The Majority has erroneously disposed of Harris’ jurisdictional claim on the basis that he waived his right to present the question of jurisdiction on appeal. This disposition of his appeal contravenes our Supreme Court’s decision in Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320, as well as the Court of Appeals’ holding in Seay v. State (1975), 167 Ind.App. 22, 337 N.E.2d 489. Those authorities clearly establish that the failure of a trial court to *1349comply with statutory prerequisites for the assumption of jurisdiction is an error not susceptible to waiver on appeal.
¶3In Summers, the Court acted sua sponte in raising questions regarding the trial court’s failure to comply with the statutory procedures necessary to obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Court’s deviation from the normal rules of appellate review was triggered by the fact that a juvenile’s interests were at stake. Speaking per curiam, the Court explained:
“At the outset it should be pointed out that the questions we are deciding here are not specifically raised by the appellant on the appeal, however, in cases where the interests, rights and privileges of juveniles are involved, the rule is stated that this Court is permitted to search the record for a determination of issues inherently revealed by the record. McCord v. Bright (1909), 44 Ind.App. 275, 87 N.E. 654. . . .” (Emphasis added.).
¶4248 Ind. at 554, 230 N.E.2d at 322. See also Hicks v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 24, 230 N.E.2d 757. Based on the Court’s declaration in Summers, the Court of Appeals acted affirmatively in Seay v. State, supra, to raise questions not argued on appeal. For the unanimous Court, Judge Lowdermilk stated:
“In reviewing the arguments of appellant Seay, and in considering the various parts of the record before us, we find a disturbing absence of material information. Thus, in considering Seay’s arguments this court has inspected the entire transcript, and we will address all issues made apparent by such inspection. While several of the problems to be discussed below are not directly raised by Seay’s arguments, such does not preclude this court from a consideration thereof. . . .”
¶5167 Ind.App. at 28, 337 N.E.2d at 493. The Majority’s refusal to address the jurisdictional argument presented by Harris is wholly inconsistent with Summersand Seay, where the issues addressed were not even argued on appeal. Consistent with those authorities, I address Harris’ argument on its merits.
¶6The nature of the statutory requirements necessary to a proper assumption of jurisdiction over a juvenile was explained in Seay:
“ ‘We know that courts do not assume jurisdiction, sua sponte. In proceedings to determine whether or not delinquent, dependent or neglected children should be made wards of the Juvenile Court, the jurisdiction of the court must be invoked by the verified accusation as provided for by Sections 9-3207 and 9-3208, supra. Not until the proper charge is filed may the court cite the party charged and attain jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter of the particular case. We believe the Act itself clearly indicates jurisdiction is dependent upon strict compliance with its provisions. “Statutes which take away, change or diminish fundamental rights, statutory remedies for rights unknown to the common law, and statutes which provide new and extraordinary remedies must be construed strictly both to the cases embraced within their terms and as to the methods to be pursued. ” ’. . . . ” (Citations omitted.).
¶7167 Ind.App. at 28-29, 337 N.E.2d at 493, quoting Shupe v. Bell (1957), 127 Ind.App. 292, 141 N.E.2d 351. Strict compliance is thus required for a court to assume jurisdiction over a particular juvenile.
¶8*1350Among the requirements established by the legislature for a valid assumption of jurisdiction by a court is that it conduct a preliminary investigation of the juvenile’s home environment, his previous history, and circumstances surrounding the condition alleged. IC 1971, 31-5-7-8, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9-3208 (Burns Code Ed.)
¶9We are presented with identical circumstances here. Pursuant to Ingram, I would reverse both of Harris’
¶10. The Majority has erroneously characterized the jurisdictional matter at issue as one which affected the trial court’s jurisdiction over the particular case. As the Court in Seay expressly stated, noncompliance with the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites affects the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. In this respect, I note that the Majority, in its footnote two (2), has attempted to explain its use of criminal case authority in its rationale by reference to juvenile proceedings as “civil” in nature. While it is true that juvenile proceedings are civil in nature, that characterization does not justify the conclusion that waiver rules are consequently applicable to juveniles. As explained in the text of this dissenting opinion, our Supreme Court — motivated by its concern for the rights and best interests of juveniles — has extended its normal scope of appellate review to address jurisdictional questions not even raised by a juvenile appellant. See Summers v. State, supra.
¶11. As the Majority has noted, IC 1971, 31-5-7-8 was repealed effective October 1, 1979. The preliminary inquiry requirement has been retained by the legislature under the new statutory scheme, however. See IC 31-6-4-7 and 8 (Bums Code Ed.Supp.1979).