Booth v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a.crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; * *”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Darr v. People · State v. MORETTI

2. “A thorough historical background of “attempt to commit crimes” is given by J. Irwin Shapiro, Justice of the Supreme Court, Queens County, Post 11, N.Y. It is to be found in the Rollino case [People v. Rollino (1962), 37 Misc.2d 14 , 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 ], supra. In that case, Judge Shapiro relates in substance that the development of attempts apparently stems from the decision of the Kings Bench in Rex v. Schofield, Cald. 397 (1784). There, the defendant was tried for arson. He had placed a lighted candle among combustibles in a certain house, with intent to burn it. There was, however, no proof of burning adduced. The court held that the COMPLETION of the criminal act was not required to constitute criminality if the attempt was committed with the necessary intent. It logically inquired: “ * * * Is it no offense to set fire to a train of gunpowder with intent to burn a house, because by accident, or the interposition of another, the mischief is prevented?””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lopez

3. ““In order to convict of receiving stolen goods, the goods in question must have retained their stolen character at the time they were received by accused; if they were stolen, they continue to be stolen goods until they are recovered by their owner or some one for him. Hence, where the actual physical possession of stolen goods has been recovered by the owner or his agent and afterwards carried to the receiver either by the original thief or the instrumentality through which the thief originally intended to convey it, at the express direction of the owner or his agent, for the purpose of entrapping the receiver, his receiving of the goods is not a receiving of stolen goods.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Felker v. State