¶2The defendant was indicted and convicted of burglary in the second degree. Sentence was seven years' imprisonment.
¶5The defendant was arrested and then given his "Miranda" rights in the back seat of a sheriff's car parked at his house. He stated that he understood his rights. The deputy stated that the defendant appeared to understand his rights. Present were a deputy and a Mrs. Motes — a close friend of the defendant and his family.
¶6The defendant testified that Mrs. Motes told him "to tell the truth, it would go more easy" for him.
¶7The deputy stated that Mrs. Motes told the defendant to "go ahead and tell Mr. May (the deputy) the truth about it"; and to "go ahead and tell Mr. May what you done with the, with that gun." After Mrs. Motes said whatever she said to the defendant, the deputy then advised him of his constitutional rights underMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
¶8The mental subnormality of an accused does not in and of itself render a confession involuntary. Hines v. State, 384 So.2d 1171 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 384 So.2d 1184 (Ala. 1980); Parkerv. State, 351 So.2d 927 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. quashed,351 So.2d 938 (Ala. 1977); Arnold v. State, 348 So.2d 1092 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1097 (Ala. 1977). In Twymon v. State,358 So.2d 1072 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), the confession of a defendant with an I.Q. of 57 was held to be voluntary.
¶9It is constitutionally permissible to tell the accused that it is best to tell the truth. Eakes v. States, 387 So.2d 855 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978).
¶10The trial judge had an opportunity to observe the demeanor and character of the defendant when defendant testified at the suppression hearing. Considering the totality of the circumstances we find no abuse of discretion in the ruling of the trial judge admitting the confession.
¶11We have searched the record and found no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
¶12AFFIRMED.