¶1The offense is felony theft; the punishment, enhanced by two prior convictions for felonies less than capital, life.
¶2The indictment alleged the theft of “ten drill bits” of the value of more than $50 from K. L. Beck on or about November 15, 1964.
¶3A prior conviction for burglary, on October 8, 1959, in the District Court of Crane County, and a conviction for felony theft on September 30, 1950, in the District Court of Stephens County, for an offense committed prior to the commission and conviction for said burglary, were alleged for enhancement of punishment purposes.
¶4The statement of facts reveals that on the date alleged in the indictment Beck was General Superintendent for A. W. Thompson Drilling Contractor and had custody and control of their drill bits, fourteen of which were missing from the company yard in Ector County; that the value of ten of the bits was more than $50, and that he did not give appellant permission to take them from his possession.
¶5Grady Orbison, an accomplice witness, testified that he, Don Nave, Tommy Barney and appellant went to A. W. Thompson’s yard and got about 14 drill bits which they took to Tonkawa, Oklahoma and sold to Bill Strange; that Strange paid for the drill bits with two checks totaling $350 which they cashed and divided the proceeds.
¶6Bill Strange, also an accomplice witness, gave similar testimony and testified that he signed the checks in appellant’s car; that appellant was in the front seat at the time and Orbison was in the back seat; that the checks were cashed and appellant’s name appeared thereon as endorser.
¶7The checks were introduced in evidence and one of the drill bits was introduced,
¶8Howard Autry, Division Manager for Smith Tool Company, testified that the drill bit introduced in evidence was of the value of $200 or $300.
¶9Appellant’s testimony and the testimony of his witness Scott raised issue as to the value of the drill bits being less than $50 and the lack of unlawful intent on his part in taking them to Bill Strange’s yard in Tonkawa. He denied that the checks were given in payment for these drill bits or that he received any money from the sale of such bits, if they were sold to Strange,
¶10The prior convictions were proved and appellant admitted his identity as the defendant so convicted.
¶11Appellant’s able court appointed counsel presents fourteen claims of error.
¶12He complains of the overruling of four motions to quash the indictment. None of these is shown to have been presented to the trial judge for his ruling. In the absence of a bill of exception, formal or informal, appellant’s attack upon the indictment must be considered as though no motion to quash or exception to the indictment was filed. Crawford v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 305 S.W.2d 362; Brooks v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 555, 342 S.W.2d 439; Dominguiz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 373 S.W.2d 241.
¶13We overrule the contention that “ten drill bits” is an inadequate description of the property alleged to have been stolen. (Art. 403, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.) Beland v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 351, 271 S.W.2d 430, Guidry v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 360 S.W.2d 152. See also Hendley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 313 S.W.2d 296; Johnson v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 103, 58 S.W. 69; Baldwin v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 499, 175 S.W. 701.
¶14The prior convictions alleged for enhancement were proved by certified copies of the *293judgments of conviction and were admitted by appellant.
¶15The first conviction in point of time was in Stephens County on September 10, 1950. This conviction was final long before the commission of the offense for which appellant was on trial. The date of the commission of the offense for which appellant was convicted in 1950 is not material.
¶16The conviction in Crane County in 1959 was shown to be for an offense committed after the Stephens County conviction became final. The indictment returned on June 10, 1958, alleging the offense to have been committed on or about the 15th day of May, 1958, was introduced in evidence. An indictment for burglary may be presented within 5 years, and not afterward. Art. 179 C.C.P.
¶17Under the 1958 indictment a conviction could not be had for an offense committed prior to September 10,1950.
¶18It is contended that this conviction cannot stand because the record does not reflect waiver of the 10 days time to prepare for trial allowed by Art. 494, V.A.C. C.P.
¶19The trial judge appointed counsel on January 7, 1965. Under such appointment said counsel represented appellant at his trial on March 25, 1965, upon a re-indictment filed March 17, 1965, for the same offense, and the court allowed his fees under his appointment in January.
¶20We overrule appellant's contention that Ex parte Gudel, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 775, and Bennett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 382 S.W.2d 930, are applicable and require reversal.
¶21The remaining claims of error have been considered and are overruled. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction and no reversible error appears.
¶22The judgment is affirmed.