Kane v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

48 federal appellate · 4 district · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The included crimes of murder in the second degree ( 18 U.S.C. § 1111 ) and voluntary manslaughter ( 18 U.S.C. § 1112 ), do not require a specific intent (willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated), as distinguished from a general intent to kill, and therefore, as to them, the exculpatory rule is inapplicable. See Bishop v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 132 , 107 F.2d 297 , 302-303.” 399 F.2d 730 , 736.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Jewett · 470 F. Supp. 194 - United States v. Marshall

2. “Kane proceeded at the trial, and proceeds in this court, as if the testimony of Doctors Cutts, Estes and Jones, concerning so-called pathological intoxication, presents but another facet of an insanity defense. There is, perhaps, some superficial basis for such a view, inasmuch as all three of these doctors expressed the opinion, characteristic of the M’Naghten test, that at the time he shot his wife Kane did not know the nature and quality of his action and was in an uncontrollable state. But this element of the M’Naghten test is not to be read independently of the M’Naghten concept that the mental condition which produced such disability must have been brought about by circumstances beyond the control of the actor. According to these three doctors, Kane did not have this disability when he was sober. He had it only when he voluntarily began to drink. It is true that, because of pathological intoxication, it took less liquor to produce unsocial results than with one not so afflicted, and the unsocial results were more serious than in the case of normal intoxication. But still, the disability which he does acquire from drinking liquor was within his own control and cannot be classified as a mental illness excusing criminal responsibility, (footnote omitted) 399 F.2d at 735-36 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Burnim

3. “* * * by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. City of Minneapolis v. Altimus