Heine v. Raus’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 6 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Disclosures in camera are inconsistent with the normal rights of a plaintiff of inquiry and cross-examination, of course, but if the two interests cannot be reconciled, the interests of the individual litigant must give way to the government’s privilege against disclosure of its secrets of state.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Eisenberg · Jabara v. Kelley

2. ““ * * * The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. “The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. The latter requirement is the only one which presents real difficulty. As to it, we find it helpful to draw upon judicial experience in dealing with an analogous privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination. “The privilege against self-incrimination presented the courts with a similar sort of problem. Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect, while a complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses. Indeed, in the earlier stages of judicial experience with the problem, both extremes were advocated, some saying that the bare assertion by the witness must be taken as conclusive, and others saying that the witness should be required to reveal the matter behind his .claim of privilege to the judge for verification. Neither extreme prevailed, and a sound formula of compromise was developed. This formula received authoritative expression in t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Andrews

3. “If, in defamation cases, recognition of an absolute privilege for judges, legislators and highly placed executive officers of the government, when acting in line of duty, is to serve its intended purpose, it must extend to subordinate officials and employees who execute the official’s orders. * * * If the circumstances impose a compelling moral obligation upon the superi- or to defend and indemnify the subordinates, immunization of the superior alone from direct defamation actions would be a useless formalism. Recognition of an absolute privilege of the subordinate by attribution of the superior thus appears to be a necessary corollary of the superior’s privilege. It is generally recognized that an agent, acting within the scope of his authority, does have whatever privilege the principal would have enjoyed if he had acted for himself. The principle is applicable in defamation actions and, if an authorized agent would have been privileged, subsequent ratification confers the privilege upon an unauthorized agent. -* * * We conclude that the absolute privilege is available to Raus if his in structions were issued with the approval of the Director or of a subordinate authorized by the Director, in the subordinate’s discretion, to issue such instructions, or if the giving of the instructions was subsequently ratified and approved by such official. Id. at 790-791.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 384 F. Supp. 99 - Grossman v. McKay