Griffin v. Rogers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) the petitioner’s lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Sherwood v. Prelesnik · Huey v. Smith

2. “(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of — • (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discov ered through the exercise of due diligence. (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sherwood v. Prelesnik

3. “a stay-and-abeyance procedure, which effects a mandatory form of equitable tolling for the narrow group of cases in which a mixed petition is dismissed near or after the expiration of the AEDPA limitations period. Our Court has determined that if such a petitioner files any unexhausted claims in state court within 30 days of dismissal and re-files in federal court within 30 days of exhaustion, the re-filed petition will automatically be considered timely. If this mandatory equitable tolling does not apply, this Court may still equitably toll the limitations period based on the traditional equitable factors as outlined by this court in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir.1988).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bolton v. Berghuis