Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our goal, when interpreting statutes, is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.” Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 662 , 887 A.2d 549, 553 (2005); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327 , 872 A.2d 681, 685 (2005); Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335 , 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47 , 57 -58, 862 A.2d 419, 425 (2004); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 345 , 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). See also Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 148-49 , 626 A.2d 946, 951 (1993) (“ ‘[T]he search for [legislative] intent is most accurately described as an effort to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy of the statute.’ ”); In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542 , 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991) (“Our focus is, therefore, centered upon the statute’s policy or purpose.”). The best source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Gilmer, 389 Md. at 663 , 887 A.2d at 553 ; Cain, 386 Md. at 327 , 872 A.2d at 685 ; Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58 , 862 A.2d at 425 ; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 6-7 , 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993). “In the interest of completeness, however, we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stubbs v. State · Kramer v. Liberty Property Trust

2. ““In the interest of completeness, however, we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.” Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). See also Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454 , 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007); Stanley v. Slate, 390 Md. 175, 185 , 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005). In other words, the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to seek contradiction of the plain meaning of the statute. Robey, 397 Md. at 454 , 918 A.2d at 502 ; Stanley, 390 Md. at 185 , 887 A.2d at 1084 . In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments. Robey, 397 Md. at 454 , 918 A.2d at 502 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 198 Md. App. 87 - Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.

3. “(b) When transfer allowed.—Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case involving a child may transfer the case to the juvenile court before trial or before a plea is entered under Maryland Rule 4-242 if: (1) the accused child was at least 14 but not 18 years of age when the alleged crime was committed; (2) the alleged crime is excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 3-8A-03(d)(l), (4), or (5) of the Courts Article; and (3) the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer of its jurisdiction is in the interest of the child or society.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 197 Md. App. 419 - In Re Nancy H.