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4 App. D.C. 467

Lawrence v. Hammond

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Decided November 6, 1894

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · decided 1894-11-06

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment under tho Seventy-third Rule in an action on a promissory note and two bills of exchange.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion, stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is another case arising under the Seventy-third Rule of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Tho action was brought by the appellee, William A. Hammond, upon a promissory note and two bills of exchange, against the appellant, Joseph S. Lawrence, as maker of the note, and drawer and indorser of the bills of exchange. The declaration contains four counts; the first three being special — one upon the note, the other two upon the bills of exchange — and the fourth count is a common count, for money lent, and money paid by the plaintiff to and for the defendant, and for money received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff, and for money found to be due by the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated. The amount claimed is $10,000, with interest.</p> <p>To this declaration the defendant pleaded to the first three counts of the declaration : 1st. That he did not promise and assume as alleged; 2d. That the money claimed in the first three counts had been paid and settled by other obligations of the defendant, not now in suit; and, 3d. That he is not indebted as alleged in the fourth count.</p> <p>The plaintiff filed an affidavit * with his declaration, under the rule of court; and the defendant filed an affidavit† of defense with his pleas, under the same rule.</p> <p>The plaintiff moved for and obtained judgment under the rule, for the full amount claimed, for -want of sufficient affidavit of defense; and the defendant objected to such judgment, both upon the ground that the affidavit of the plaintiff was not sufficient to entitle him to judgment under the rule, and that the defendant’s affidavit was sufficient to entitle him, the defendant, to regular trial.</p> <p>1. Plaintiff’s affidavit and declaration, so far as the two bills of exchange sued upon in said declaration are concerned, are insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover. Eudlich on Affidavit of Defense, Sec. 283; James v. Davis, 3 Mackey, 158; Bond v. Shepherd, 3 Mackey, 367, 369; Foertsch v. Germuiller, 3 App. D. C. 340 ; Burke v. McKay, 2 Howard, 66; Young v. Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146; Bank U. S. v. Leathers, 10 B. Mon. 64; Ocean City Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass. 141; Phoenix Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483; Garter v. Union Bank, 7 Hump. 528; Daniels on Neg. Inst., 926 et seq.; Slacum v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch. 221; Byles on Bills, 398 ; Armani v. Gastrique, 13 M. & W. 443; Wilson v. Lenox, 1 Cranch, 194; Wilkins v. McGuire, 3 App. D. C. 448 ; Mathews v. Sharp, 99 Penn. Stat. 560.</p> <p>2. The court erred in holding defendant’s affidavit insuf•ficient. Feust v. Fell, 6 W. N. C. 43; Selden v. Neemes, 43 Penn. Stat. 421; Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat, 171, 172, 179, 180; Thornton v. Weser, 20 D. C. 233; Dailey v. Morgan, 21 D. C. 88; Picket v. Isgrigg, 10 Biss. C. C. 230; Indianapolis RR. v. McDin, 82 Ind. 435; Ruff v. Ruff, 85 Ind. 431; Vigo, etc., v. Brumfiel, 102 Ind. 146; Lake Shore, etc.,. v. Foster, 104 Ind. 202; Berry v. Griffin, 10 Md. 27; Witherly v. Man et al., 11 Johns. 516 ; Cox v. Boone, 8 W. Va. 500; Wolf v. Finks, 1 Penn. Stat. 435 ; Hilliard v. Smith, Comb. 19; Randolph on Com. Paper, 159; Du/nlop v. Silver, 1 Cranch. 27; McDonough v. Kane, 75 Ind. 181; Daniel on Neg. Inst., Secs. 68 and 81a; Johnson v. Hille, 2 Clark, 1274; Endlich on Aff. Defense, 629; Rand v. Lore, 5 W. N. C. 236; Slow v. Russell, 36 111. 18; Chrisman v. Hodges, 75 Mo. 413; Hargrave v. Conroy, 19 N. J. Eq. 281; Iowa Co. y. Foster, 49 Iowa, 676.</p> <p>1. Objection is made here for the first time of the want of" averment of protest of the drafts described in the second and third counts. But with regard to this it is only necessary to say that the averment that the drafts were “ duly presented for payment and were dishonered, whereof the defendant had due notice ” is in accord with the abbreviated forms of actions in use in the District of Columbia, which were held sufficient by this court. Wilkins v. McGuire, 2 App. D. C. 448.</p> <p>It cannot be said that the plaintiff has not set out a cause of action in precise and distinct terms, which, standing alone, would entitle him to judgment. But he goes still further and shows that defendant repeatedly declared his intention of repaying the $10,000, offering even to given as security a mortgage on a farm he owned in Maryland.</p> <p>Nowhere in defendant’s affidavit are any grounds of defense shown. Taking it “ as absolutely true and upon all the facts properly stated as conclusive,” no reason is shown why the plaintiff should not have judgment.</p> <p>The judgment of the court below can be sustained on the common counts alone, the pleas thereto and the affidavit annexed to the declaration. Wilkins v. McGuire, supra.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · Decided 1894-11-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently June 1935

2 state decisions

4018941900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Chief Justice Alvey

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court:

¶2We are not called upon to decide the question on this appeal as to whether the declaration sets forth in technical form a good cause of action. That is a question to be raised and decided on demurrer, or motion in arrest of judgment, or by instruction on the trial, and not in a collateral way by an objection to the affidavit.

¶3The first question is, whether the affidavit of the plaintiff is sufficient to gratify the rule. It is objected by the defendant, that the bills of exchange declared on are foreign bills of exchange, and that neither the declaration nor the affidavit avers or states that they were protested, and that protest is essential to hold either the drawer or indorser responsible on such bills. Neither the declaration nor the affidavit shows whether the bills of exchange were in fact foreign or inland ; and whether such an objection can be availed of in the manner here proposed, is a question that we need not decide. For assuming that the bills declared on are foreign bills, the want of protest may be excused; and among the several things that will operate to excuse such protest are, that the defendant, being the drawer, had no funds in the hands in the hands of the drawee, or had no right to draw the bill, or that he has admitted his liability on the bill, or has promised to pay the same. In such cases, a protest need not be proved. Chitty & Hume on Bills, 655; Bayley on Bills, 475 ; Gibbon v. Coggon, 2 Camp. 188. In the affidavit of the plaintiff, as we understand it, the case was brought within the principle by which the protest was excused. *474Indeed, the defendant does not claim to be exonerated because of the failure to have the bills protested, but because, as he alleges, he has paid and settled them, by substituting other obligations or promises for them. We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff’s affidavit was sufficient.

¶4Then, with respect to the affidavit of the defendant. The defendant admits an indebtedness to the plaintiff of $5,000, but he swears that such sum is not represented by, or owing from him, on the note and bills of exchange sued on. He says that the transactions between the plaintiff and himself have been frequently changed, and that his indebtedness to the plaintiff is now all merged in one single obligation of $5,000; and that the note and bills of exchange sued on in this case, are not valid and subsisting demands upon which the plaintiff is entitled to recover. If this defense be supported by evidence, it would, of course, defeat the action. It must be borne in mind, that while the affidavit required of the plaintiff to entitle him to summary judgment under the rule, may be determined to be insufficient, the party is left to pursue his action in the regular way to trial and judgment, if he be entitled to it. But with the defendant the rule operates very differently. If his affidavit of defense be adjudged insufficient for any cause, judgment goes against him in favor of the plaintiff, and he is concluded, without trial, and without an opportunity to produce his evidence to refute the claim of the plaintiff, or to make good his defense to the action. It would seem but reasonable, therefore, that the rule, and the affidavit of defense required by it, should be liberally construed in favor of the party’s right to make and maintain his defense. The object of the rule, as applied to the defendant, is supposed to be to prevent sham and fictitious defenses, to the hinderance and delay of justice. Therefore, when the affidavit is sufficient to satisfy the court of the good faith of the defendant in making his defense, great strictness ought not to be required. Otherwise, more litigation is produced, and delay and expense incurred, by *475appeals and otherwise, than can ever be prevented by the rule.

¶5We are of opinion that the affidavit of the defendant is sufficient to entitle him to a trial of the cause, and we must, therefore, reverse the judgment.

¶6 Judgment reversed, with cost to appellant and cause remanded for trial in regular course.

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