Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

4 Cal. 4th 1134

847 P.2d 55

People v. Ceja

California Supreme Court

Decided March 18, 1993

California Supreme Court · decided 1993-03-18

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[ (1) ] `[M]urder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death' [and][i]n contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires `an intentional murder'[; and (2) ] the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires 'that the killing take place during the period of concealment and watchful waiting, an aspect of the special circumstance distinguishable from a murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait. . ..'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 105 Cal. App. 4th 297 - People v. SUPERIOR COURT (BRADWAY)

Applies CA PEN § 189

Relies on People v. Green · 25 Cal. 3d 668 - People v. Flannel · 27 Cal. 3d 1 - People v. Green

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1993-03-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 116 later decisions — most recently August 2020 · most notably 33 Cal. 4th 1158 - People v. Cole (2004), 27 Cal. 4th 469 - People v. Hillhouse (2002)

113 state decisions

5701993200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

MOSK, J.

¶1I dissent.

¶2In my view, the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury as it did on the theories of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 189) presented by the prosecution.

¶3Let us briefly review the general principles that are applicable on the facts of this case.

¶4A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory that is supported by substantial evidence. (E.g., People v. Glenn (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1461, 1465 [280 Cal.Rptr. 609]; see, e.g., People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Conversely, it may not instruct on any that is not. (See, e.g., People v. Flannel, supra, at pp. 684-685 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Evidence is “substantial” if it allows a reasonable jury to make a determination in accordance with the theory presented under the proper standard of proof. (See, e.g., People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) As pertinent here, it *1148must permit the panel to find the elements of first degree murder under the theory in question beyond a reasonable doubt1

¶5At the prosecution’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder “perpetrated by means of . . . willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” (Pen. Code, § 189.) I shall assume for argument’s sake that the evidence on this theory was substantial.

¶6Also at the prosecution’s request, but over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder “perpetrated by means of . . . lying in wait.” (Pen. Code, § 189.) On this theory, however, the evidence was not substantial. Individually, the elements require waiting, watching, and concealment. (E.g., People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554-557 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].)2 Together, they call for the perpetrator to design and execute a “plan” to “put[] [himself] in a position of advantage” in order “to take the victim by surprise.” (People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448, internal quotation marks omitted.) At trial, there were indeed isolated pieces of evidence that bore on “waiting,” “watching,” and “concealment” as discrete facts. But, viewed in its entirety, the evidence did not establish an underlying, and unifying, fatal plan. Quite the contrary, it revealed a tragic fortuity. The last encounter between defendant and the victim was similar to many that preceded it during the course of their stormy relationship. It was different in this: Maria Ortega spit a “nasty” remark at defendant. As a consequence, he immediately drew a gun and pointed it at her; she ran behind a tree; and he then turned the weapon against the victim.

¶7*1149On such facts, a reasonable jury could not have found lying-in-waiting beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶8Under the rule of People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]—to which I adhere (People v. Guiton, ante, p. 1116 at pp. 1131-1133 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.))—the trial court’s instructional error requires reversal of the judgment insofar as it convicts defendant on the jury’s general verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder. “[W]hen,” as here, “the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand.” (People v. Green, supra, at p. 69.)

¶9For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

¶10Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 13, 1993. Mosk, J„ was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

¶11The question in this case involves instructional error, i.e., whether the theories set out by the trial court were supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the focus of review is on the court. Further, the standard is de novo. (Cf. 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review (2d ed. 1992) § 11.29, p. 11-120 [discussing federal appellate procedure as to whether a defense theory is supported].)

¶12The question here does not concern the validity of the conviction, i.e., whether the verdict rendered by the jury was supported by substantial evidence. If it did, the focus of review would be on the jury. Also, the standard would be “highly deferential.” (Cf. 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review, supra, § 9.1, p. 9-3 [discussing federal appellate procedure].)

¶13Inexplicably, the majority misapprehend the focus and standard of review. On the very first page of their opinion, they reveal their recognition that the question in this case involves instructional error. But they then proceed as though it concerned the validity of the conviction. As a consequence, they state inapplicable principles and cite inapposite decisions.

¶14I have expressed my view that the element of concealment demands “actual physical concealment”: “concealment of purpose as distinguished from concealment of the person is not enough." (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 222-223, fn. 1 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) My colleagues, however, have not been persuaded. (See, e.g., People v. Morales, supra,48 Cal.3d at pp. 554-555; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273] [following Morales].) On this point I now concur—under compulsion. (See People v. Hardy, supra, at p. 223, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)

/4/cal4th/1134 · .json · Public domain