Volume 4 — Connecticut Reports

IN ERROR. On the 14th of September, 1820, French brought a petition to the superior court, stating, that he had become insolvent; that he had a fair character for probity and industry; that he was not justly chargeable with idleness or mismanagement in his affairs; and that he had not conveyed away any of his estate, with intent to defraud his creditors; praying that he might be adjudged to be an insolvent debtor within the statute granting relief in certain cases of…

This was an action of debt on covenant, demanding the sum of 8000 dollars.

<p>The plaintiff in an action for a libel, to which the general issue is pleaded, with notice of a justification, may, at the trial, abandon, ore tenus, any part of the libellous matter alleged in the declaration, and proceed upon the residue; after which the defendant will not be permitted to justify the libellous matter so abandoned.</p> <p>A party, who would justify a charge, must justify it specifically, and cannot prove a charge of the same general nature, but distinct as to the particular subject.</p> <p>Therefore, where the libellous matter alleged in the declaration charged the plaintiff with having set up and supported an infidel club, and with having seduced his early companions to join it; evidence that the plaintiff was an infidel, was held to be inadmissible to justify such charge.</p> <p>So, where the libellous matter charged the plaintiff with having attempted, and but too successfully, to destroy all religious institutions, the defendant was precluded from shewing, in justification of such charge, that the plaintiff had denied the authenticity of the Scriptures, and had spoken of them in terms of ridicule and sarcasm; that he had made a profane prayer; and that he had proposed certain votes, and procured them passed, in an ecclesiastical society meeting, reflecting upon an act of the general assembly, “for the support of literature and religion,” and upon the conduct of certain preachers, and the doctrines taught by them.</p> <p>An innuendo cannot extend the meaning of words; its office being to direct the application of the true meaning to the subject, or if they will bear different meanings, to select and apply the proper one.</p> <p>In justification of a charge against the plaintiff of having set up and supported an infidel club, the defendant, after introducing evidence to prove, that the Ethosian society, of which the plaintiff had been a member, was an infidel club, offered evidence to shew, that this was its general character: Held, that the last-mentioned evidence was inadmissible, first, because itwas irrelevant to the point in issue, and secondly, because it was not of as high a nature as might be had.</p> <p>Such evidence would be equally inadmissible for the purpose of mitigating damages.</p> <p>To repel evidence, adduced by the defendant, to justify his charge against the plaintiff of having attempted to destroy all religious institutions, the plaintiff offered in evidence certain subscription-papers for the support of preaching, drawn up, circulated and subscribed by himself, accompanied with proof of his having paid the money subscribed: Held, that such evidence was admissible for the purpose for which it was offered.</p>

<p>This was an action of ejectment, for an undivided fourth part of a piece of land in New-Haven.</p> <p>The cause was tried at New-Haven, January term, 1821, before Bristol, J.</p> <p>On the 8th of February, 1794, Hannah Langmuir, the wife of Alexander Langmuir, died; and on the day of her death, she, with her husband, executed a deed of the premises to William J. Cooledge. On the 10th of the same month, Cooledge, by deed, purporting to be “for divers good causes and considerations,” conveyed the premises to the said Alexander Langmuir. It was admitted, that Hannah Langmuir was seised of the premises, at the delivery of the deed to Cooledge; and that her title descended to the plaintiff, as her heir at law, if it did not pass by that deed. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that Alexander Langmuir, at the date of the deed in question, was an alien. He also claimed, that such deed was intended as a testamentary disposition of the property embraced within it, for the use and benefit of Alexander Langmuir; or that it was given in trust, that Cooledge should convey the property to him; and that it was without any other cause or consideration. The plaintiff, therefore, requested the judge to instruct the jury, that if they should find either of these facts proved, the deed was invalid. The judge did not so instruct the jury; and they returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial.</p> <p>contended, 1. That the conveyance to Coolidge and from him to Alexander Langmuir, was to be taken as one transaction, and was in the nature of a testamentary disposition from Hannah Langmuir to her alien husband; which, of course, was void, for want of capacity in him to take.</p> <p>2. That if this transaction could not be considered as a testamentary disposition, yet the deed to Coolidge was in trust for Alexander Langmuir, and was virtually a deed to him, and therefore void. These two points, however, were not much insisted on</p> <p>3. That the deed to Coolidge, taken by itself, was void, for want of capacity in the grantors. Hannah Langmuir, alone, could not convey; and no act of her husband could strengthen hers, for he had no right in the estate. Although by the common law, an alien may purchase lands, yet by the express provision of our statute, he is rendered incapable “of purchasing or holding.” (a) An alien husband cannot be tenant by the curtesey; nor is an alien wife entitled to dower. There was in this case no subject matter, for the act of the husband to opperate upon. The conveyance stands on the same footing as though he had not attempted to join.</p> <p>4. That the conveyance was void, under our statute to prevent alienations of real estate, by persons ousted of possessions. (b)</p> <p>remarked, in the first place, That the plaintiff had proved no fact, nor had he introduced any testimony, tending to prove, that the deed to Coolidge was a trust in him for the use and benefit of Alexander Langmuir; or that it was intended as a testamentary disposition. They then contended,</p> <p>2. That if such testimony had been introduced, it could not have availed the plaintiff, as it would not have defeated the deed. Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 114. Com. Dig. tit. Baron and Feme. G. 1. Beckwith's case, 2 Co. Rep. 57.</p> <p>3. That Hannah Langmuir, being seised in fee of the land, and a native citizen, could, with her husband, make a valid conveyance. If he had any interest in the land, he could convey it. If he had none, she had the whole; and she wanted nothing from him, to enable her to convey the whole, but his consent, manifested in the mode prescribed by the statute. (c) The statute requisites having been complied with, the conveyance is, vigore statuti, valid.</p> <p>4. That an alien may purchase and hold land against any one but the state. Sheaffe v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. Rep. 256. Fairfax’s devisee v. Hunter’s lessee, 7 Cranch 603. 2 Black. Comm. 293.</p>

<p>The principle that the remedy for the breach of a contract is to be governed by the lex fori, without regard to the lex loci contractus, is applicable to statutes of limitation and of protection from arrest. It was, therefore, held, that neither the statute of limitations, nor a discharge under the insolvent law of another state, would avail, as a defence, or as a protection from arrest, in this state, although the debt was contracted, and the debtor lived, in the former state.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, tried before the superior court, in New-Haven county, January term, 1821. On the 20th of November, 1816, the defendant was discharged from the demand in the plaintiff’s declaration, pursuant to the act giving relief in certain cases of insolvency, of the state of New-York, passed April 12th, 1813.

This was an action on a promissory note. Held: that under this power an appointment might be made by the vicar and a majority, without the concurrence of all, of the church-wardens. The powers of the directors of a bank, or of an insurance company, are strictly of a private nature, being derived from the stockholders; yet a majority may do any act, which all could do.

IN ERROR. This was an action on the case, brought by Bunnel and Seely, against The New-Haven and East-Haven Toll Bridge Company, for the neglect of the latter to open the draw of their bridge, and to permit the plaintiffs’ vessel to pass through; demanding three-fold damages. The action was founded on two acts or resolves of the General Assembly, one passed in October, 1796, incorporating the company, the other passed in May, 1820, which were set forth in the declaration.

IN ERROR. This was an information brought before the county court for New-Haven county, against Henry Daggett, Esq. for a violation of the statute to secure the city of New-Haven from damage by fires.

IN ERROR. This was an information, brought to the county court, against Booth, charging him with having built and erected a dwelling-house in the city of New-Haven, in violation of the statute to secure that city from damage by fire. More than fifty years ago, a building was erected and finished, and was subsequently used, for a meeting-house, on the ground stated in the information.

IN ERROR. This was an information, brought to the county court, against Tuttle, for a violation of the statute to secure the city of New-Haven from damage by fire. There were two counts.

IN ERROR. This was an action of debt, brought in the name of Isaac Spencer, Esq. treasurer of the state of Connecticut, on a recognizance alleged to have been entered into, by Joseph T. Waldo and his surety or bail. The declaration set forth the proceedings in the case, in which the recognizance was taken.

IN ERROR. This was a proceeding under the statute relating to forcible entry and detainer.

This was an action of ejectment, for two pieces of land. The plaintiff claimed title to the demanded premises, by the levy of an execution against James Day. The defendant also claimed title, by virtue of the levy of an execution against the same James Day, of a prior date. The plaintiff claimed, that the judgment on which the defendant’s execution issued, was fraudulent and void.

This was an action of assumpsit, to recover a sum of money, alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff, on the credit of the defendants, and on their express promise to repay it to him.

This was an action of trespass for false imprisonment, tried in New-London county, January term, 1821, before Brainard, J. The imprisonment alleged in the declaration, was admitted. As a justification the defendant gave in evidence the record of certain proceedings before him, in the capacity of a justice of the peace.

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the town of Plainfield, for the support of the wife and two children of Sylvester Stacy, who were alleged to be paupers, and settled inhabitants of the town of Sterling. In 1763, Sybil Boon, an inhabitant of Upton, in the state of Massachusetts, had there a bastard son, named Stephen Stacey. In 1789. he came to reside in that part of the town of Voluntown in this state, which is now included in the town of Sterling.

IN ERROR. This was a qui tam complaint in the following words: “To John Francis, Esq. a justice of the peace for the county of Windham, comes David Hyde of Canterbury in said county, and complains, in the name and behalf of the state of Connecticut, as well as in his own name, and informs, that at said Canterbury, on the 8th day of July, 1820, Comfort S. Hyde and Alfred Hyde, of said Canterbury, did, with force and arms, an assault make on the body of the complainant, and…

This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration consisted of three counts.

This was an action of assumpsit against the defendant, as indorser of a promissory note, made by Augustus Bushnell, for 258 dollars, 21 cents, dated December 11th, 1818, payable to the plaintiff, on the 1st day of April, 1819. The declaration consisted of four counts.

This was an action of assumpsit, for the use and occupation of land. The plaintiff, in his declaration, stated, That on the 5th of April, 1817, the defendant hired of the plaintiff his farm in Canterbury, for the term of three years then to come; and in consideration thereof, the defendant, then and there, gave, executed and delivered to the plaintiff his certain writing, in the words and figures following, viz. “April 5th, 1817.

This was an action of trespass, for criminal conversation with the plaintiff’s wife. The cause was tried at Tolland, December term, 1820, before Bristol, J. On the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, that the plaintiff and his wife were joined in marriage, at Ellington, on the 3d of September, 1812, by Amasa Dimick, an ordained minister and deacon of the Methodist Episcopal church.

This was an action of covenant. The declaration stated, That on the 4th of August, 1818, by a certain writing or agreement of that date, signed and sealed, by the president and directors of the Hartford Bridge company, on the one part, and the defendants, on the other part, the defendants jointly and severally covenanted, for the consideration therein expressed, among other things, to build for said company a bridge across Connecticut river, and furnish all the materials for…

This was an action against the defendant, as sheriff of the county of Hartford, for the escape of Henry Osborn from prison, on the 21st of June, 1820; he having been committed on an execution in favour of the plaintiff. The process was a summons, dated the 21st of June, 1820.

This was an action on a promissory note, made by the defendant, for 150 dollars, dated the 10th of August, 1819, payable to the order of Chester Whittlesey, at the Eagle bank, 90 days after date. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, with notice of usury.

This was a bill in chancery to foreclose the equity of redemption of the defendants in certain mortgaged premises.

This was an action of assumpsit for a legacy. The declaration stated, that Rebecca Griswold, of Windsor, on the 6th day of March, 1819, made her last will and testament, and therein gave to the plaintiff the sum of 1000 dollars, to be paid to her in two years from the death of the testatrix ; that on the 12th day of April, 1819, the testatrix died; that that on the 23d day of April, 1819, the defendant was duly appointed administrator of her estate; and, the will being…

This was an action of trespass, for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s house, striking him, imprisoning him, &c. The cause was tried at Hartford, February term, 1822, before Peters, J. On the trial, the plaintiff adduced evidence to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that on the day of the trespass complained of, he was in his own house, with his wife and children around him, his outer doors being closed; that the defendant came, and after assuring the plaintiff, upon…

<p>A corporation having for its sole object the education and instruction of the Deaf and Dumb; supporting and instructing indigent persons of that class gratuitously, and receiving a pecuniary compensation from pupils of ability to make it; deriving its means of dispensing charity from the donations of individuals and of the public; and applying its funds exclusively to the general object of its institution; is an incorporated school for charitable purposes.</p> <p>A writ of mandamus does not lie to enforce a private right; nor where there is another specific remedy; nor where satisfaction, equivalent to specific relief, may be had, in an action on the case.</p> <p>A writ of mandamus is merely prospective: Therefore, where the exigencies of the case require redress for the past privation of a right, as well as restoration to the enjoyment of it in future, the appropriate remedy is not by writ of mandamus, but by bill in chancery.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, for seven acres of land in Hartford; tried at Hartford, February term, 1822, before Peters, J. The land in question had been, by the court of probate, set out to the plaintiff, as dower in the estate of Allen Whiting, her late husband; and, it was admitted, that she was entitled to recover, if upon the following facts, she had a right of dower.

This was an action of assumpsit, to recover of the defendant certain sums of money, which he had received as executor of Sarah and Julia Norton, deceased. The cause was tried at Hartford, September term, 1821, before Hosmer, Ch. J. Sarah Norton died, on the 16th of January, 1815, seised of an estate of inheritance in a shop in Farmington.

This was an action of debt on book. The writ and declaration were as follows: “Summon Stephen Payne and Rachel, the wife of the said Stephen, Joseph Gaylord and Charles F. Dickinson, all of Norfolk, to appear, &c. to answer unto Asahel Gaylord of said Norfolk, in a plea, that to the plaintiff the defendants render the sum of 450 dollars, which to the plaintiff the defendants justly owe, by book, as by the book of the plaintiff, ready in court to be produced, fully appears;…

This was an action of assumpsit, in three counts. Held: that there was a variance. Secondly, the words value received were a material part of the contract, which was the foundation of the action. It is an universal rule, that in all actions on contracts, which are entire and indivisible, the pleader must set forth all the material parts of the contract, and must prove them as laid.

This was an action on a promissory note; tried in the county court of Litchfield county. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, with notice, that at the time of the alleged execution of the note, he was a lunatic and non compos mentis.

This was an action of assumpsit, to recover the sum of 380 dollars, expended, by the plaintiffs, at the special instance and request of the defendants, for the support of Betsey Cooke, the wife of Joseph Cooke, and their five children, from the 8th of October, 1818, to the 9th of September, 1820, alleged to be paupers, having their legal settlement in the town of Stonington, and residing in the town of Goshen, at the time the support was furnished.

This was a bill in chancery, to obtain from the defendant the conveyance of a piece of land, or the restitution of a sum of money, under the circumstances of the following case.

This was a scire-facias, stating, That by the consideration of the county court for Litchfield county, held at Litchfield on the fourth Tuesday of March, 1817, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant and one Miles Tobey, for the sum of 216 dollars, 43 cents, and had execution for the same; which execution the plaintiff put into the hands of William P. Russell, a deputy sheriff, to execute; who, on the 18th of May, 1817, levied the same upon a piece of land…

This was an action of assumpsit for the rent of the county-house in Litchfield, from the 1st of December, 1817, to the 10th of April, 1818. The declaration contained two counts; the first was on a special agreement; the second was general, for use and occupation.

IN ERROR. This was an action on a promissory note. The plaintiffs declared, that the defendant, in and by a certain writing or note, under his hand, by him well executed, dated the 29th day of October, 1818, promised the plaintiffs to pay to their order, nine months from date, for value received, the sum of 769 dollars and 12 cents; but that the defendant, his promise aforesaid not regarding, had never performed the same, There was a demurrer to the declaration; on which…

This was a bill in chancery to foreclose the equity of redemption in mortgaged premises. The principal facts stated in the bill, and found by the court, were the following. On the 3rd of February, 1812, Isaac Hawley mortgaged the premises to Truman Minor, to secure the payment of six promissory notes, amounting to 3.143 dollars. Afterwards, on the same day, he mortgaged the same lands to William Wright, to secure the payment of two notes, amounting to 5,500 dollars.

IN ERROR. In an action on a promissory note, the original plaintiffs declared as follows: “That the defendant, in and by a certain writing or note, under his hand, by him well executed, dated the 11th of March, 1819, promised the plaintiffs to pay to them, for value received, the sum of 500 dollars, three years after date, with the interest annually; as by the said writing or note, ready in court, fully appears: Yet the defendant, his promise aforesaid not regarding, hath…

This was an action of assumpsit. The first count stated a submission made by the plaintiff and defendant of certain differences, which had arisen between them concerning the use and occupation of a clothier’s shop and mill, owned by the defendant, and concerning certain books containing accounts for work done therein, to the award and final arbitrament of Henry Waring and John Augur, and an award by them, made in the premises, which the defendant, although requested, had…

This was an action of trespass and assault and battery, tried at Danbury, September term, 1822, before Brainard, J. There was no proof, on the trial, that the defendant Glover personally committed the trespass complained of. But the plaintiff insisted, and adduced evidence to prove, that Frederick, a negro, the other defendant, made an assault on her, at the time alleged, at the dwelling-house of Bennett Prindle in Newtown; and that Glover aided and abetted him, therein.

This was action on a promissory note, in these words: Value received, I promise to pay Squire Brown two thousand dollars. July 9th, 1818.

This was an action of ejectment for a piece of land in Weston, alleging a disseisin, on the 31st of January, 1820. The defendant pleaded two pleas. The first alleged the title of the land in fee-simple to have been in the defendant. The second set up an estoppel. It was, substantially, as follows.

This was an action of book debt; tried at New-Haven, August term, 1821, before Chapman, J. The plaintiff’s account consisted of articles delivered to, and work done for, Oliver P. Jackson, a minor son of the defendant, and a student in Yale College; which account accrued between the 22nd of June, and the 11th of September, 1818; and the question was, whether the defendant was liable for it.

This was an action of debt on a bond, executed by the defendants, to the plaintiff, as sheriff of the county of New-Haven, the condition of which was, that Lyman Downs, one of the defendants, being confined in New-Haven county gaol, by virtue of an execution in favour of George Monson, issued by the county court, signed by John H. Lynde, clerk, and dated the 29th of March, 1817, for the sum of 68 dollars, 46 cents, besides officer’s fees, should remain a faithful prisoner…

This was a bill in chancery. In November, 1816, the plaintiff, with Smith & Hubbell of New-York, built a schooner, called the Ellen Tooker, by an agreement with one Abraham Riviere, a carpenter, at an expense of 4,800 dollars for the hull; to be owned, when completed, one half, by Smith & Hubbell, and the other half, by the plaintiff. They finished her, at an expense, with the cost of building, of 10,025 dollars. She was designed for a voyage of enterprize.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by Bradley against Davenport, demanding 300 dollars damages. The defendant was defaulted; and was afterwards heard in damages. The court assessed the damages at 600 dollars; and rendered judgment for that sum against the defendant. To reverse that judgment the present writ of error was brought.

<p>The holder of a negotiable note, payable to a third person, deriving his title, not by indorsement, but by an assignment under the insolvent laws of another state, cannot maintain an action here, in his own name, on such note.</p> <p>The assignment of an insolvent debtor’s effects, under the laws of another state, is equivalent to a voluntary assignment made by him personally.</p>

<p>This was an action of assault and battery, and false imprisonment.</p> <p>The defendant, by a special plea of justification, alleged, that all the acts averred in the declaration, were done under a process of attachment, issued from, and returnable in, the circuit court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, in favour of the bank of the United States, against the plaintiff, in an action of assumpsit; and that three of the defendants were the agents of the bank, and, as such, procured the process; and that the other defendant acted as deputy-marshall, in pursuance of their authority, and in execution of the duties of his office. The plea concluded with the usual averments, that no unnecessary force was used; and that this was the same trespass as that alleged in the declaration. To this plea the plaintiff demurred; and the case was reserved for the advice of all the Judges.</p> <p>Sherman and Stanley, in support of the demurrer, contended, That the process set forth in the plea, was not a justification of the defendants, because the circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction of the cause. In support of this general proposition, they contended,</p> <p>1. That it did not appear that the circuit court had jurisdiction, from the character of the parties; they not being citizens of different states. The plaintiffs in that suit, being a corporation aggregate, the corporation, as such, cannot be a citizen. If the individuals composing the corporation, are citizens of a different state from that of which the defendant is a citizen, and are so averred to be, such corporation may sue in the circuit court; but not otherwise. The Hope Insurance Company of Providence v. Boardman & al. 5 Cranch 57. The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux & al. 5 Cranch 61.</p> <p>2. That there is nothing in the nature of the case, to give the circuit court jurisdiction; it being merely an action of assumpsit at common law.</p> <p>3. That the authority given to the bank, by the 7th section of their charter, to sue and be sued, in all cases, in any circuit court of the United States, must be limited by the constitution; otherwise, the provisions of the constitution are nugatory; and Congress may, by a declaratory law, bring every person, and every cause of action, within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Hodgson & al. v. Bowerbank & al. 5 Cranch 303. Owings v. Norwood's lessee, 5 Cranch 344. Congress has no power to confer jurisdiction, except by virtue of the affirmative provisions of the constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 400.</p> <p>4. That the suit in question was not a case arising under the laws of the United States within the constitution. To constitute such a case, the party must ground his action or defence—or the right in controversy must appear from the pleadings to depend—on a law of the United States. But here the cause of action—the right sought to be enforced, by one party, and the liability of the other,—depend wholly on principles of the common law. An action brought by a bank, incorporated by the laws of this state, for money had and received, is an action at common law; and not an action or case arising under the statute, which created the corporation. A case arises under a law, when a right given by that law, is violated. The fact that a corporation derives its existence, and its power to contract, from a law of Congress, does not make every wrong of which that corporation may complain, a case arising under the law of Congress.</p> <p>insisted, 1. That the circuit court had jurisdiction, by the express provision of the act of Congress incorporating the bank of the United States, approved April 10th, 1816. In the 7th section of that act, the bank is declared to possess the power “to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in all state courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States.” If the circuit court had not jurisdiction, it must be, either because the law establishing the bank is unconstitutional; or because the provision giving the bank power to sue in the circuit court, is so. He then contended,</p> <p>1. That the act of Congress incorporating the bank of the United States, was constitutional. First, the three branches of the government so decided, after the most powerful opposition from the ablest men in the nation, in 1791. Secondly, it was so decided, in 1816, by the same constitutional authority, after all the interesting and enlightened discussions of the question, for twenty-five years. Thirdly, it has been so decided, sub silentio, by the courts of the United States, and of the several states, in sustaining civil suits, and awarding damages; in sustaining criminal prosecutions, and punishing forgeries of its paper. Fourthly, it was solemnly decided, by the supreme court of the United States, in 1819, in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. The question, therefore, is no longer open.</p> <p>2. That the provision giving the bank power to sue in the circuit court, was constitutional. First, it is a political axiom, as unquestioned as any one in the science of government, that the judicial power of any government should be co-extensive with its legislative power; because it is an attribute of sovereignty; because it is essential to accomplish the ends of government; and because it is essential to its preservation. 2 Fed. 224. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. 384. Hence, we might expect in the constitution of the United States, that the judicial power would be declared co-extensive with the legislative; and in determining the limits of the judicial power, we take this principle into consideration. 6 Wheat. 384. Secondly, the judicial power given to Congress, did in fact, as we might expect that it would, authorize this provision. The words of the constitution are “The judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States," &c. Now, is not a suit in favour of, or against, a bank of the United States, created by a law of the United States, a case arising under a law of the United States? It is a case, certainly; and a case, which, without this law, could never have arisen: it was created by it, and could exist by no other authority. It is, therefore, within the words and spirit of the constitution.</p> <p>Lastly, that this question had been decided, in cases much stronger against the jurisdiction than this, in favour of the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The Bank of the United States v. Roberts, cor. circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. (a) The Bank of the United States v. The Northumberland Union and Columbia Bank, cor. circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. (b)</p> <p>It is objected, that under the first act incorporating a bank, it was decided, by the supreme court of the United States, that the bank could not sue in the circuit court of the United States. This is true. The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux & al. 5 Cranch 61. The reason was, that no power was given, by the act, to sue in any particular court; and the circuit court, not having any power except what is given to it, by Congress, could not hold jurisdiction. See Ch. J. Marshall's opinion, p. 85, 6. of the same case. It has been repeatedly, and uniformly, decided, that the courts of the United States have no common law jurisdiction; that they cannot hold jurisdiction of any cases, to which the judicial power of the United States extends, except given to them, by the constitution or laws of the United States. The United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32. On that ground rested the decision in The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux & al.</p> <p>It is again said, that the judiciary act of 1789, confined the jurisdiction of the circuit court to suits between citizens of different states; but in this case, all the parties are citizens of the same state. This is true; and if, by the charter of the bank, the jurisdiction of the circuit court had been limited to suits between citizens of different states, it could not hold jurisdiction in this case: but it is not so; there is no limitation. The true idea is, that where the controversy is between citizens of different states, the parties are every thing; where it is a case arising under a law of the United States, the character of the case is every thing. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 378. 392.</p>

<p>The acknowledgment of one of several joint makers of a promissory note, takes it out of the statute of limitations as against the others.</p> <p>The admissions of one of several joint contractors, in respect of the contract entered into, are evidence against all.</p>

This was an action on the statute of this state against fraudulent conveyances.

This was a bill in chancery for a foreclosure. The bill set forth a mortgage deed, executed by Timothy Chapman, deceased, on the 10th of March 1798, to secure to the plaintiff a debt of 260 dollars. The subscribing witnesses to this deed were Hezekiah Brainard, who died long before the commencement of the present suit, and Dolly Chapman, at that time the wife of the mortgagor, and now one of the defendants.

This was an action of book debt against Samuel P. Lord and Hall and Robbins. Judgment was rendered against Hall and Robbins, by default.

This was an action of indebitatus assumpsit, for money had and received, by the defendant, to the plaintiff’s use. The cause was tried at Haddam, October term, 1821, before Chapman, J. The money sought to be recovered, was paid, by the plaintiff, to the defendant, in part of the purchase money for a certain piece of land, to which the defendant had agreed to give the plaintiff a good and valid title by deed.

This was an action of trespass, for taking and carrying away from the plaintiff’s possession certain goods. The cause was tried at New-London, January term, 1821, before Brainard. J. The plaintiff claimed property in the goods, by virtue of a bill of sale from Ebenezer Prentis, dated July 29th, 1820. The defendant claimed a special property in them, by virtue of an attachment, in favour of one Mudge against Prentis and others, which he levied on them the same day.

IN ERROR. This was an action of book debt, brought by Fitch against Avery, before the county court, by writ dated the 18th of April, 1818.

This was action of trespass, against Elisha Tracy and Charles Thomas, for taking three horses, the property of the plaintiff.

This was an action of assumpsit, for supplies furnished to, and money laid out and expended for the support of Mulford Babcock, and his wife and minor children, from the 20th of June, 1817, to the 20th of May, 1820, alleged to have been legally settled inhabitants of the town of Stonington, residing in Bozrah, sick and needing relief. The cause was tried at New-London, October term, 1821, before Peters, J. was the legitimate son of Abel Babcock and Elizabeth, his wife.

This was an action on a promissory note, brought originally before the Norwich city court.

This was an action of debt on a judgment of the supreme judicial court of the state of Rhode-Island, holden at Providence, in March, 1817.

This was an action against the defendant, as sheriff of the county of Hartford, for the default of Titus L. Bissell, one of his deputies, in relation to an execution in favour of the plaintiff against Serrel Bissell.

This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration contained three counts.

IN ERROR. This was an action of debt, brought by Williams against Denison, on a judgment of the county court for New-London county, in December, 1811. The writ was dated and served in February, 1820.

This was an action on the following writing, under the hand and seal of the defendant: Plainfield, 11th March, 1812. Whereas I have, this day, received of my honoured father a valuable consideration, I do, by these presents, bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, to truly and faithfully support my mother, Abigail Johnson, during her natural life, It is understood, that this promise is to take effect after the death of my father.

This was an action of slander, tried at Brooklyn, September term, 1821, before Peters, J. The words laid in the declaration, as spoken, by the defendant, Catharine Browning, of the plaintiff, Eliza S. Treat, were the following: “She had a child in the city of New-York; and her father is supporting it.” “She has been guilty of fornication; and has had a bastard child.” “She was pregnant with a bastard child; and was, by her parents, carried away from home, for the purpose of…

This was an action on the case, for obstructing a watercourse; which was tried at Brooklyn, September term, 1821, before Peters, J. The plaintiff was the owner of a piece of meadow land below the defendant’s land. A small brook passed about half a mile through the defendant’s land, on to the land of a third person, and then on to the plaintiff’s meadow.

This was an action qui tam on the statute against selling pretended titles, (tit. 97. c. 17. p. 446. ed. 1808.) to recover one moiety of the value of 112 acres of land in Ashford, alleged to have been conveyed, by a mortgage deed, for the security of a note for 452 dollars, 40 cents, by David Edmunds, and Mary Edmunds, his wife, while they were held out of the possession of the premises, and ousted thereof, to the defendant, and by him accepted.

IN ERROR. This was an action against Johnson Butts and Loren Butts, on a promissory note, given by them jointly.

This was an action of assumpsit on a contract for making certain additions to the defendant’s house. General counts on a quantum valebat and a quantum meruit, were added. On the trial at Brooklyn, January term, 1822, before Hosmer, Ch. J., the defendant claimed, that he had paid the plaintiff in part for the work performed by him, on the contract in question, and, among other payments, had paid the sum of 70 dollars.

The plaintiff, in the first count, declared as follows: “That on the 18th of August, 1818, in consideration that the plaintiff would buy of him, the defendant, and at his special request, two certain bales of deer-skins, of the weight of 1503 pounds, at a large price, viz. at the rate of 30 cents per pound, amounting to the sum of 450 dollars, 90 cents, the defendant then and there undertook and faithfully promised the plaintiff, that said skins were in good and merchantable…

This was an action of ejectment, tried at Tolland, April term, 1822, before Peters, J. The plaintiff claimed title, by virtue of a mortgage deed, executed on the 19th of December, 1814, as security for the payment of four promissory notes, amounting to 4000 dollars. The execution of this deed was admitted; and it was also admitted, that the defendants were in possession of the demanded premises as purchasers under the mortgagor.

This was an action of ejectment, tried at Tolland, April term, 1822, before Peters, J. On the trial, the plaintiff claimed title, by virtue of an execution, in his favour, against William F. Storrs, legally issued, and levied, in due form, on the demanded premises, as the property of such debtor.

This was an action against the defendant, as the indorser of a promissory note, made by Hezekiah Kilbourn. The case was tried at Hartford, February term, 1822, before Peters, J. On the trial, the making and indorsement of the note, the demand of payment, non-payment and notice, as alleged in the declaration, were admitted.

This was an information against the prisoner, for breaking and entering, in the night season, a store, warehouse, or outhouse, the properly of Eleazar Hale, wherein goods, wares and merchandize were deposited, with an intention to commit theft within the same.

This was an action of trespass, for taking and carrying away a printing apparatus, claimed by the plaintiff, consisting of a press, cases, types, &c. The cause was tried at Hartford, February term, 1822, before Peters, J. On the 14th of May, 1818, and until after the 5th of December, 1820, William S. Marsh was a book-binder in the city of Hartford, and carried on that business in a shop belonging to the plaintiff.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit; tried at Hartford, September term, 1822, before Chapman, J. The plaintiff claimed title to the premises described in the declaration, solely by adverse possession of fifteen years. The defendant claimed, that during the fifteen years, the land was possessed by Elisha Williams, who held the record title, and that during said time, Williams permitted one Cotton to use and occupy the land on shares.

A new trial of this cause having been granted, pursuant to the advice of a majority of the Court, (ante 142. 159.) it was tried again at Hartford, September term, 1822, before Chapman, J. For a statement of the declaration, it will be sufficient to refer to the report of the former case.

This was an action of assumpsit on a special agreement with general counts for work and labour done, materials furnished, &c. The cause was tried, on the general issue, at Hartford February term, 1823, before Bristol, J. The plaintiff gave in evidence the agreement stated in the declaration, which was as follows: “An agreement made this 24th day of May, 1820, by and between Thomas Belden of Hartford, and Nathaniel Alford of Windsor.

This was an action against the defendant as the maker of a promissory note.

This was an action on a promissory note for 100 dollars. On the day preceding the date of the note, Marcus De Forest of Woodbury, having in his hands an execution in his favour against the present defendant, Chauncey Whittlesey and three other persons, for the sum of 6,532 dollars, 25 cents; and having received information, that the defendant, whose place of abode was at New-Haven, and who was the only or chief responsible debtor in the execution, was, at that time, at…

This was an action of ejectment, for so much of a piece of land described in the declaration and the house thereon as 256 dollars in value bears to the sum of 1350 dollars in value, being an undivided interest of the plaintiff in said land and house, as tenant in common with Andrew Giddings, Jonathan Giddings and Joel Northrop, jun. An ouster on the 17th of November, 1820, was alleged, in the usual form.

This was an action on the covenants of seisin and of good right to convey in a deed, alleged to have been executed by the defendant, “by the name and description of Elijah Hazen, administrator of the… Held: that the party must be in possession, claiming the property as his own; claiming under his own title. The defendant had the benefit of this law, on the trial, in the charge of the judge; and the jury have found the fact against him.

In this action, the plaintiff, an attorney at law in the state of New-York, sought to recover for services rendered by him, in that capacity, to the defendant, in that state.

This was an action of assumpsit, in favour of the assignee, against the assignor of a promissory note not negotiable, made by one Orlando Porter. The cause was tried at Litchfield, February term, 1822, before Chapman, J. The making of the note, and the assignment of it, by an indorsement in blank, were admitted. The defence was, that due diligence had not been exercised in obtaining payment of it.

IN ERROR. This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, demanding thirty dollars damages, brought originally before Elijah Middlebrook, Esq. justice of the peace for the county of Fairfield. The defendant entered a general demurrer to the declaration, in which the plaintiff joined; and judgment was, thereupon, rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant then brought a writ of error in the superior court, assigning for error.

This was a bill in chancery for an injunction to restrain proceedings at law, and for a restoration of property attached, reserved, with the report of a committee finding the facts, for the advice of all the Judges, on the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought.

This was an action on a bond, given to the predecessor of the plaintiff in the office of judge of probate, by the defendant, as executor of the last will and testament of Abijah McEwen, deceased, conditioned for the faithful performance of his trust. The plea, after praying oyer of the bond and the condition, set them forth, and averred performance.

This was an action of ejectment for a tract of land in New-Fairfield, tried, on the general issue, at Fairfield, December term, 1822, before Chapman, J.; when the plaintiff obtained a verdict, and the defendants moved for a new trial, on the ground of a misdirection.

The mere fact that A. was instrumental is procuring B., who was abroad, to return to the town in which he had a legal settlement, for the purpose of compelling such town to support him, implies no… Held: that while this property continued vested in B., he could not be a pauper, with a claim upon the town for support, by virtue of his settlement, and it was the duty of the judge so to instruct the jury, and to direct them, upon these facts, to find a verdict for the town.

In Error. On a writ of error between the present parties, before this court, in Fairfield county, June term, 1821, it was adjudged, that in the judgment of the superior court, complained of, affirming a judgment of the county court, there was manifest error; and the judgments of both courts were reversed.

This was an action of account, founded on an express agreement, made between the plaintiff and Taintor, in March, 1810, by virtue of which, as the declaration alleged, they became jointly interested in all the profits, which might or should be made on the purchase and sale of sundry large tracts of land, which had been previously purchased of Dow Smith and others, through the plaintiff’s agency.

This was an action of ejectment, for a tract of land in the town of Oxford; tried at New-Haven, August term, 1822, before Peters J.; when the plaintiff obtained a verdict, and the defendant moved for a new trial, on the ground of a mis-direction.

This was an action on a conditional promissory note. The note and condition were in these words: “For value received, we jointly and severally promise Ezra Lines, to pat him, or his order, one thousand dollars, in three years from the 8th day of May next, with annual interest till paid.