Volume 4 — Court of Claims Reports

The ownership of this cotton and the manner in which it was. acquired are shown by the following facts: Elias Einstein, of Macon, Georgia, was indebted to claimant for money borrowed from him in 1859; whilst so indebted he was authorized by the claimant to invent the amount of his indebtedness to him in. cotton, and hold it for him.

<p> On Motion. </p> <p>The claimant gives his testimony before a commissioner of the court after the act 2d March, 1867, (14, Stat. L.,p. 457,§2,) allowing claimants to testify in theCourt of Claims, and before the act25th June, 1868, (15 Stat. L , c. 71, § 4,) declaring that no testimony given by a claimant shall be used. The deposition is filed in the clerk's office and printed. Before trial the Assistant Attorney General moves to suppress the deposition as testimony for the claimant, but insists on the right to rise it if he sees fit as testimony for the defendants instead of examining the claimant under the act ?>d March, 1863, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 8;) or the right to read it in evidence as a written declaration by the claimant. The point is argued by a number of counsel, interested in other cases wherein it is involved.</p> <p>The Act 25th June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., o. 71, §4,) which provides that no claimant "shall be a competent witness in the Court of Claims in supporting" any claim, and that "no testimony given by such claimant shall be used,” extends to testimony given before the act as well as after; and the prohibition that the testimony shall not be used applies to the defendants as well as to the claimant. Therefore the claimant cannot give in evidence on the trial his own deposition taken before the act was passed; and the defendants cannot use such a deposition, either as testimony or as a written declaration of the party. They may, however, resort to the examination given by the act reorganizing the Court of Claims; Act 3d March, 1863, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 8.)</p>

The evidence in this case shows the following state of facts: That as early as the year 1858, the plaintiff, Bramhall, and Hill Gowdy made and entered into an arrangement or agreement, by which Gowdy should purchase for Bramhall cottons of the various grades, and ship to him in New York, he furnishing the money, Gowdy acting as the agent of Bramhall, and paid by him for his services in purchasing.

cites treaty witb Hanover, 8 Stat. L., 552, and as to tbe insufficiency of tbe plea, 2 Curtis U., p. 265. I. Tbe plea contains a substantive averment of facts constituting a bar to tbe action under tbe second section of tbe act of 27tb July, 1868, and is sufficient in substance and form. 1.

- The facts are that the claimants with other parties made a written proposal to Colonel James Belger, the senior officer of the quartermaster’s department at Baltimore, Maryland, to deliver corn, oats, and hay. Tbis proposal was referred by Colonel Belger to Brigadier General S. Yan Yliet, the senior quartermaster at Washington city.

This case is submitted ou the record of proofs and official reports furnished by the War Department and onffile therein, together with some additional official reports of officers on file in the Treasury Department, obtained since the action of the War Department declining to direct payment of the claim.

In the month of February, 18G5, and after the evacuation of ■'Charleston, South Carolina, by the confederates, the claimant (who had kept his said steamer out of the possession of the retiring confederates, and had saved her-from being burnt up by them, by the greatest efforts) offered to hire or charter this steamboat to the United States authorities.

<p> On Demurrer. </p> <p>Spirits distilled, in 3864 are inspected and marked at the distillery and carried to a handed warehouse. While in the bonded warehouse a portion is lost by evaporation and leakage. The owners remove for sale what remains, and are required to pay the internal revenue tax on the entire1quantity placed in the bonded warehouse. They seek to recover back the amount of duties paid on theportion there lost.</p> <p>I. Under tbe Act 30fh June, 1864, (13 Stat.., L., p. 244, §5 55, 57, 59,) the internal revenue duty attaches to distilled spirits at the time of inspection and marking in the distillery, absolutely to those not removed to a bonded warehouse, conditionally to those which are. The statute makes no provision for the reiuspection of spirits removed from a bonded warehouse for “ consumption or saleand as the spirits while in the warehouse are the property of the distiller, the leakages are at his risk.</p> <p>II. It is the general policy of the revenue laws of the United States to allow the loss by leakage on transportation, but not for any loss while the property on which the duty has attached is in a bonded warehouse. — Act 28th March, 1854, (10 Stat. L., p. 270;) 'Act 30th June, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 244, U 59, 61.1</p>

This is a suit to recover duties exacted on liquors lost by leakage in course of transportation. By the act of July, 1862, sec. 47, distillers were authorized to remove liquors intended for export, without paying duties, upon giving bond to pay the duties unless the liquor should be exported. The purpose of this enactment was to exempt from tax liquors exported.

I. Tbe claimant is an officer in tbe regular army, and late a brigadier general of volunteers. On tbe 22d of April, 1856, letters patent were issued by tbe United States to Major Henry H. Sibley, tbén an officer of tbe regular army, for tbe invention of a conical tent, since known as tbe Sibley tent. On tbe 16th of April, Sibley assigned to Major Burns one-balf of bis interest in said invention and letters patent.

I. The boat having gone into the government service, in pursuance of an order of seizure by the quertermaster in charge of river transportation at St. Louis, for a special purpose, required by the wants of the service, the quartermaster acting in the line of his duty, an implied contract was thereby created binding the government to make such reasonable compensation for the use and detention of said boat as the law would award were the action between individuals. II.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>Congress enact that the surviving officers of the navy of the Republic of Texas “shall be entitled, to the pay of officers of the like grades when waiting orders in the navy of the United States, for jive years” from the annexation of Texas, (11 Stat. L., 248, § 12.) Captain Moore was appointed “post-captain” in and commanded the navy of Texas. There was one captain junior to him. Texas had adopted the naval laxos of the United States, and under these laws allowed to him the pay of ‘ ‘ senior captain” in the United States navy. President Buchanan and Secretary Toiicey, under a mistake of fact, decided that “ Captain Moore, being the only captain in theTexan navy, could not be called the senior with greater propriety than the junior captain.”</p> <p>I. Under an act of Congress which provides that the surviving officers of the navy of the Republic of Texas ‘1 shall be entitled to the pay of officers of the like grades when waiting orders in the navy of the United States, for five years from the time of said annexation” of Texas, (Act 3d March, 1857, 11 Stat. L., p. 248, § 12,) an officer who was the senior of two captains in and who commanded the Texan navy, and who was allowed by Texas, under naval laws identical with those of the United States, the pay of “senior captain," is entitled to the pay of “senior captain” in the navy of the United States.</p> <p>II. The rule laid down in the United States v. Morse, (3 Story’s R., p. 87,) that where the words of a statute fixing the compensation of a public officer “are loose and obscure and admit of two meanings, they should be construed in favor of the officer,” cited and approved.</p> <p>III. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction of a case brought by one formerly an officer in the navy of the Republic of Texas, for pay allowed to him as such surviving officer by Act 3d March, 1857, (11 Stat. L., p. 248, § 12.) It is a claim founded upon a law of Congress within the meaning of the act to establish a court of claims. (Act 24i/t February, 1855, 10 Stat. L., p. 612.)</p>

I. Tbe petition does not allege whether or not there was in the proceeding for forfeiture, a certificate of probable cause of seizure. (Act of March 2,1799, sec. 89.) Thus it does not allege that the seizure was not unlawful, and for an unlawful act of its officers the government is not liable. II.

Botli the facts and the law of this case have been elaborately discussed, as well in judicial opinions as in the arguments of counsel; and nothing now remains but to apply the principles settled by the Supreme Court of the United States to the evidence, and to assess the damages accordingly. We claim that the Supreme Court have ruled in their opinion (6 Wallace, p. 545, 3 C. Cls. R., p. 451) as follows: 1.

In 1863 the plaintijf submitted to the War Department an improved breech-loading carbine, (together with a specimen of the cartridges to be used therewith,) for the purpose of procuring the introduction into the army of that particular style of carbine. It was inspected and tested by the officers of the Ordnance Bureau and favorably reported upon.

This is a claim brought for travel pay as first lieutenant of the 39th regiment Iowa volunteer infantry, from the city of New .York to the town of Adel, Dallas county, Iowa. The petitioner was in the United States military service as lieutenant of company 0, from the 24th day of November, 1862, to the 6th day of January, 1865.

The following questions are presented, viz: 1st. Are distillers under the 55th section of the act June 30th, 1864, liable to pay an excise duty on spirits lost by leakage, while stored in a bonded warehouse, between June 30th and December 31st, 1864 ? 2d. Can an excise duty be levied and collected upon an article that does not exist at the date of assessment and collection? 3d. Under the 1st article, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States, must not all taxes be…

I. All tbe vouchers sued on in this case were for quartermasters’ goods sold to tbe United States by tbe claimants in a time of great public exigency, by open purchase or contract, at tbe city of St. Louis, in tbe mode in which such articles are usually bought and sold between individuals, and for prices agreed on between tbe claimants and tbe bonded sworn officers of tbe United .States. “ When immediate delivery or performance is required by the public exigency, tbe article…

I. Henry Jones was originally an enlisted man in tbe United States army. He was promoted to be 2d lieutenant 5tb United States cavalry, for gallantry, and subsequently became 1st lieutenant. This regiment was detailed for picket duty on the 28th of October, 1863, near Germantown, Virginia. Lieutenant Jones was in command of bis company, and went with it on that duty.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>This suit is brought under the st Abandoned or captured property act,” (\2 Scat. L.f 820,) to recover the net proceeds of two bales of cotton captured in the city of Charleston. There is no direct proof of loyalty.</p> <p>In the absence of proof of disloyalty merely, there cannot be a recovery under the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (Stat. L., 820 ) Direct and positive proof of loyalty is required to justify a recovery.</p>

<p>Tbe plaintiff was an officer in tbe volunteer service of tbe United States, witli tbe rank of a major of infantry, during tbe late rebellion. In tbe month of April, 1863, be was arraigned before a court-martial on a series of charges and specifications, tried, found guilty of a part thereof, and sentenced, among other things, to be dismissed from the military service of tbe United States. During tbe period which elapsed between tbe termination of tbe trial and final action of tbe reviewing officer and promulgation of tbe orders in tbe case, be was captured by tbe enemy and carried within tbe rebel lines, a prisoner of war. He was detained as such prisoner of war for nearly two years, when be was exchanged. He now institutes this action to recover tbe pay and allowances due to him in pursuance of tbe provisions of tbe act of March 30, 1814, alleging that tbe action of tbe said court-martial was void and of no effect.</p> <p>Tbe Act of March 30,1814, (3 Stat.L., 114,) provides as follows:</p> <p>“Every non-commissioned officer and private of tbe army, or officer, non-commissioned officer, and private of any militia or volunteer corps, in tbe service of tbe United States, wbo bas been, or wbo may be, captured by tbe enemy, shall be entitled to receive during bis captivity, notwithstanding tbe expiration of bis term of service, tbe same pay, subsistence, and allowance to which be may be entitled whilst in tbe actual service of tbe United States.”</p> <p>Tbe first question arising for determination is this: was the plaintiff “in the service of the United States” at tbe time of bis capture by tbe enemy? If this question is answered in tbe affirmative, it follows that be is entitled to bis pay and allowance under tbe said act. Tbe action of tbe court-martial in bis case was null and void, and therefore did not sever bis connection with tbe service.</p> <p>First. Tbe court bad no jurisdiction to try or sentence him, because tbe officer under whose authority it was assembled bad no lawful power to perform that act. He was tbe commander of a geographical “ district.” Tbe sixty-fifth article of war provides, that “ any general officer commanding an army, or colonel commanding a separate department, may appoint general courts-martial whenever necessary.” (2 Stat. L., 364; Brightly’s Digest, 79.) And tbe Act of December 24,1861, (12 Stat. L., 330,) provides further, that “in time of war tbe commander of a division or separate brigade may a]ipoint general courts-martial, and confirm, execute, pardon, and mitigate their sentences, as allowed and restricted, in tbe 65th and 89th articles of war, to commanders of armies and dejiartinenfcs.” This officer was neither a general commanding an army, a colonel commanding a separate department, tbe commander of a division, nor of a separate brigade. Tbe record of tbe trial discloses tbe fact that be was tbe commander of a “ district.” Tbe statutes relating to courts-martial are penal statutes, and therefore fall within tbe well known rule of law, that such statutes must be construed strictly. (Black. Com., 881.) There is no law to be found which gives power to tbe commander of a “district” to appoint courts-martial. Tbe language of tbe statutes referred to as to what officers may exercise this authority is clear and explicit. And the Supreme Court of tbe United States, in Denn v. Beid, (10 Peters, 527,) declares that “it is not for tbe court to say, where the language of tbe statute is clear, that it shall be so construed as to embrace cases, because no good reason can be assigned why they were not included in its provisions.” * * * “ The court are bound by tbe clearly expressed language of tlie act.”</p> <p>The act of December 24,1861, contains a proviso that the “sentences of such courts, extending to loss of life or dismission of a commissioned officer, shall require the confirmation of the general commanding the army in the field to which the division or brigade belongs.” The words “ division” and “brigade,” as employed here, mean component parts of an “army in the field,” (see § 483 and § 474, Army Kegulations;) while the word “ district,” as used in the order appointing the court in this case, clearly refers to the geographical section of country subjected to the military control of the officer who issued the order. It has no reference to the number of men in his command, as the words “army,” “division,” and “separate brigade,” clearly do.</p> <p>Second. The sentence of the court is void and of no effect, because it was not confirmed according to the statute in such casemade and provided. (12 Stat. L.,330; Brightly’s Digest, 1101; § 896, Army Regulations.) The army regulations have the force of statutes. (12 Stat. L., 268; Brightly, 1107; Gratiot v. The United States, 4 How., 117.)</p> <p>Under the act of 1814, before cited, the plaintiff is entitled to the same pay and allowances that would have been due to him had he been actually on duty with his command, from January 1, 1863, to March 6,1865, (for amount of which see Army Regulations, 545, and Gilmore v. The United States, 2 C. Cls.R., 364;) together with his traveling allowance from Annapolis, Maryland-, to Burlington, in Ohio, at the rate of one day's pay and allowancesfor every 20 miles traveled. (12 Stat. L., 269; Brightly, 1108; 2 Stat. L., 1769, § 16; General Orders No. 43, War Department, 1861.)</p> <p>The first objection urged as to the legality of the action of the court-martial is that said court had no jurisdiction, because it was not appointed by “ the commander of a division or separate brigade,” as provided by law, but by the commander of a “ district.” The foundation for the assumption of this fact is, that the order convening the court is headed “Headquarters, district of Kanawha.” This is a circumstance going to show that General Scammon was the commander of a district; but it does not prove that he was not “ the commander of a division or separate brigade.” The testimony is, that he was, in fact, the commander of a division, “ designated as the third division, composed of a first and second brigade, eighth army corps, subordinate only to the department commander, middle department. This objection, therefore, falls to the ground.</p> <p>The second objection is, that “the sentence was never confirmed in accordance with the statute in such case made and provided.” This is a very fine point, so much so that I fail to observe it. The statute (Act of December 24,1861, § 1, Stat. at Large, vol. 12, p. 330) provides that sentences of courts-martial extending to loss of life or dismission of commissioned officers shall require the confirmation of the general commanding the army in the field to which the division or brigade belongs.” In this case the order of confirmation is in the words following, viz:</p> <p>“ Headquarters Department op West Yirginia,</p> <p>“ Clarksburg, West. Va., August 15,1863.</p> <p>“The proceedings and findings of the foregoing are approved and confirmed. Major Lorenzo A. Phelps, 5th regiment Virginia volunteer infantry, ceased to be an officer in the military service of the United States from April 24,1863.</p> <p>“B. F. KELLEY,</p> <p>"Brig. General.”</p> <p>It is not denied that General Kelley was the proper officer, but that his confirmation is of “ the proceedings and findings” and not of “ the sentence.” The sentence was that, the claimant should “ forfeit all q>ay and allowances now due or which may hereafter become due him, and that his shoulder-straps be publicly cut off his . shoulders before the United States troops at dress parade, and that he be cashiered and dismissed the service of the United States.” This sentence is a part of “the proceedings” which General Kelley approves and confirms.</p> <p>I. The claimant toas not an officer in the military service of the United States at the time of Ms capture.</p> <p>His sentence, as pronounced by the court, April 24,1863, was as follows: “ To forfeit all pay and allowances now due or which may hereafter become due; that his shoulder-straps be publicly cut off his shoulders before the United States troops at dress parade, and that he be cashiered and dismissed from the service of the United States.”</p> <p>The proceedings were regular and the evidence of record fully sustains the findings.</p> <p>Brigadier General Kelley, commanding the department of West Virginia, approved the sentence August 15,1863. '</p> <p>After his trial, and before the promulgation of the sentence, to wit, May 17,1863, the claimant was ordered by B. B. Hayes, colonel commanding brigade, to “proceed to Ceredo, West Virginia, and there remain under arrest to await the decision of the court-martial in his case.” Afterward, on the 7th of September, 1863, more than three weeks after the sentence of the .court had been confirmed, the claimant was captured at Guyan-dotte, ten miles from Oeredo.</p> <p>This man had been ordered to Oeredo, which is on the Ohio river, opposite Burlington, his place of residence. There is no testimony showing why he did not remain there. General Holt (Bep., p. 88) alludes to an affidavit of the claimant, wherein he stated that he left Ceredo because it became dangerous to remain there any longer, owing to the proximity of rebel troops and the absence of United States troops. If this were proven, it would make no difference. He had the same right to cross the river to his home in Ohio that he had to go anywhere else than to Oeredo. The report of Colonel Enochs, (Bep., p. 76,) and the statement of General Hayes, (p. 84,) show that the true intent and meaning of the order was “ merely to remove him fiom the regiment and direct him to remain at home.” Had he gone home, he would not have violated the spirit of the order, and would have been safe.</p> <p>II. The act of March, 30,1814, does not apply to such a case.</p> <p>By sec. 14 of this act, (5 Stat. L., 115,) it was enacted:</p> <p>“ That every non-commissioned officer and private of the army, or officer, non-commissioned officer, or private of any militia or volunteer corps in the service of the United States, who has been or may be captured by the enemy, shall be entitled to receive during his captivity, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of service, the same pay, subsistence, and allowances to which he may be entitled whilst in the actual service of the United States.”</p> <p>The word “expiration” bere clearly means tlie “end of a limited time;” and the “limited time” referred to is of course the “term of service.”</p>

I. Tbis case is before tbe court by original petition, and is founded upon an api)ointment in tbe army, witb grade of chaplain, giren tbe petitioner. II. Petitioner was appointed chaplain of tbe 5th New Xorlc rolnnteer artillery, and was enrolled as such on tbe 3d day of January, 1862, and was commissioned March 7, 1862, and mustered into service about tbe same time. He served continuously, until finally discharged on tbe 8th day of March, 1865.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>Mrs. Alexander, a widow of a soldier of the revolutionary war, married subsequent to J800. She received a pension under the Act February 3, 1853, (10 Stat. L., 154,) commencing, under a decision of the Secretary of the Interior, on the 3d day of February, 1853. The administrator claims that the pension should have commenced on the ith of March, 1848, in accordance with the provisions of the act of that date (9 Stat. L., 265,) granting pensions to widows of soldiers of the Revolution married prior to 1800.</p> <p>I. The certificate of the Commissioner of Pensions is prima facie evidence of title to a pension and of all ihe facts that make the title.</p> <p>II. A pension granted to a widow of a soldier of the Revolution married subsequent to 1800, by the Act February 3, 1853, (10 Stat. L., 154,) should commence, March 4, 1848, Lydia Clark’s Case (1 C. Cls. R., 179) reaffirmed.</p>

Tbis action is brought to have a decree entered directing tbe Commissioner of Internal Bevenueto credit tbe claimant’s stamp account witb $2,614 02, being tbe amount of revenue stamps stolen from an iron box during tbe prevalence of tbe yellow fever at Galveston, Texas, while be was collector of internal revenue 1st district of Texas, without fault upon bis part, be having taken all tbe care of tbe stamps that it was possible for him to do under tbe surrounding…

This is a claim for $7,054 29, balance unpaid of certain vouchers issued to claimants for subsistence of the 131st regiment Illinois volunteers. The vouchers, ten in number, were signed by the respective captains of the ten companies, and approved by the colonel of the regiment, George W. Neely.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>Forty.five lank-note printers are employed in the National Currency Bureau. They are hired ly the Chief of the Division, and are paid; for their work by the sheet or day. Their pay for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, ranges from, $2,039 to $3,500. The pay of one of them equals the salary of the Comptroller of the Treasury; of three of them exceeds the salary of the Chief of the Division; of all of them exceeds the salary of the Superintendent of Printing under whom they work. They seek to recover in addition the 20 per centum given ly the joint resolution of 28th February, 1867.</p> <p>I. Persons in the employment of the government whose services are special, being rendered to it as a government, and whose salary or pay is directly fixed or indirectly limited hy law, constitute the civil service. Persons in the employment of the government whose services are such as might be rendered to any employer, whose wages come under the restriction of no statute, and who receive for their services whatever they may be worth in the place where they happen to be rendered, are not in the civil service.</p> <p>II. Th & Joint Resolution 28 th February, 1867, (14Stat. L., 569,) which allows to certain “persons now employed in the civil service of the United States at Washington, 8,'C., an additional compensation of 20 per centum on their respective salaries asfixedbylaw, or where no salary is fixed by law upon their pay," is a remedial statute, and to be construed with reference to the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The “old law” is the statutes fixing or limiting the compensation of persons in the civil service ; the “mischief," the inadequacy of the compensation allowed by law to persons in the civil service by reason of the increase in the expenses of life since the compensation was established; the /‘remedy," faithfully extending the joint resolution to all persons within its. letter and spirit, and to none beside.</p> <p>III. Bank-note printers employed in the “ First Division of the National Currency Bureau ” by the Chief of the Division, and paid for their services by the sheet or day, are not persons in the civil service of the United States within the meaning of the Joint Resolution 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., 569.)-They are simply public contractors, not public servants.</p>

The action in this case is for the recovery of the proceeds of three hales of cotton, of the aggregate weight of 1,227 pounds. This cotton was seized in Atlanta, Georgia, soon after the occupation of that city by the United States military forces under the command of General Sherman.

In tbis case there is but one question before the court, and that a mixed question of law and fact. It is not disputed that the contract out of which the claim arises was legally binding upon the United States, nor is it denied that the contractor was ready and willing, during the whole period covered by the agreement, to execute his part of it, and did execute it, except when prevented by the action of the government.

<p> On Demurrer. </p> <p> The claimant’s “right of property” in certain premises in the possession of the government is established, by the judgment of this court, mid the annual value of the occupancy up to the time of the commencement of that action is fixed. (2 C. Gis. R., p. 391.) The government continues the occupancy after the com- ' meneen tent of the former suit. For that continued use and occupation of the premises this suit is brought, and a reappraisement of the annual rent is claimed. </p> <p>I. Ejectment as a possessory action does not lie against tlie government, for tlie government always lias “the right of possession,” founded either on “ a right of property” or on its right of eminent domain. But when, in an action in the nature of ejectment, the claimant’s “right of property” is established, the government will be deemed to have entered as Ms tenant tinder an implied lease, whereof the “just compensation” secured hy the Constitution to those whose property is taken for irablic use is the rent.</p> <p>II. Where the government has entered upon land and holds under an implied lease, the measure of the damages must he limited to the value of the occupancy, as though the claimant had leased and the government had rented the premises, regard being paid to the nature of the occupancy and to the fact that the government holds the option of discontinuing the implied tenancy at any time, or continuing it indefinitely.</p> <p>HI. On “the right of property” in land held hy the government being found to he in a citizen, and the implied rent — i. e. — -the yearly value of the occupancy being judicially established, it will remain fixed, as though the parties had leased and rented the premises on those terms. On the part of the claimant, a second action to obtain a reappraisement of rent accruing since his first action was brought cannot be sustained; on the part of the government it will be the duty of the proper executive department and of Congress to procure and make the needful appropriations for paying the implied yearly rent so long as the government retain possession.</p>

There was due to Frémont $60,000, distributable pro rata among $90,000 of drafts, and so sufficient to pay two-thirds of each draft. Jackson and Munro filed $20,000 of drafts, and received $13,333 33, leaving $46,660 67 to be applied to the remaining $70,000 of drafts. Of these Baker’s administrator holds. $42,000 Frémont. 14,000 Outstanding. 14,000 70,000 Ns to Baleens $42,000. These drafts as they are filed are not endorsed by Frémont, tbe payee.

On tbe 26tb day of February, 1864, an agreement was executed between Daniel Wormer, tbe claimant, and Captain James A. Eldn, tbe Chief Quartermaster of tbe Cavalry Bureau, for and on bebalf of tbe United States, by wbicb Wormer agreed to “ have delivered” at tbe government stables in St. Charles, Illinois, by or before tbe 26th day of March following, twelve hundred cavalry horses of tbe description and quality specified.

The plea of the statute of limitations sets up no facts which, constitute a bar to petitioner’s claim.

Tlie claimant, a native of the State of Connecticut, where he still retains his home, but a resident of Savannah, in the State of Georgia, seeks to recover the net proceeds of 227 hales of cotton, taken from his possession by the authority of the United States after the fall of'that city. Of the cotton claimed, 91 bales were sea-island, and 136 bales upland.

<p>On the Proofs.</p> <p> The claimants are clothing merchants doing business in New York and Hobilebefore the rebellion. During the rebellion the Mobile partner turns the partnership stock into cotton and holds it till the end of the war. He is compelled to .do patrol duty in the “home guard” at night. It is in the nature of police duty and not military. </p> <p>I. Partners before tlie rebellion, the one residing in. Now York and the other in Mobile, are joint owners and entitled to the net proceeds of captured cotton bought during the rebellion by the Mobile partner with the partnership funds, within the meaning of the “Abandoned or captured property act,” 12 Stat. p. 820.</p> <p>II. Involuntary patrol dirty in the “home guard” of Mobile, not military but in the nature of police duty, is not “aid or comfort to the rebellion,” in one otherwise shown to be loyal, within the meaning of the “Abandoned or captwed property act,” 12 Stat. L., p. 820.</p>

The first contract, dated May 19, 1851, required the contractors to build the dock within two years. The United States were to designate the site as soon as the material should be prepared. This was of necessity a condition precedent to the completion of the work. A basin or pier was indispensable to the launching, securing, and working of the dock. This was to be built by the United States, and was also necessarily a condition precedent.

In onx brief already filed in tliis cause, we referred to tbe evidence proving— 1. The talcing of the cotton by the military authorities. 2. The shipment and sale under the act of March 12,1863. 3. The amount of proceeds. , 4. The loyalty of the claimants.

The claimant is a colored man, and the evidence of his loyalty to the United States is of a positive character, by acts and deeds for the Union cause and Union men ; and in doing which he risked his life. He was harboring Union prisoners, and aided their escape; he also assisted Union men escaping from serving in the rebel army, and helped them to get through the lines.

In tbis case, tbe petitioner, having been guilty of participating voluntarily in tbe rebellion, received pardon and amnesty from tbe President by virtue of tbe thirteenth section of tbe Act lWi July, 18G2, (12 Stat. L., p. 592,'l and under bis proclamation of amnesty of May 29, 1865. (13 Stat.

<p> Motion for Appeal. </p> <p> In a case under the “Abandoned or captured properly act,” the court decides against the claimant and dismisses his petition. Sé then, files his petition for an appeal, and moves for the allowance required by the rules of the Supreme Court. ■ ■ </p> <p>In oases arising under tlie “Abandoned or captured property aet,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820,) tlie claimant lias no appeal to tlie Supreme Court.</p>

Tbe claimants in this suit by their original petition seek to recover the sum of $2,600, being’ the balance due for sand sold by the claimant Lindsley to the United States, under an agreement made in its behalf by John 0. Crane, an assistant, quartermaster in the United States army.

I. The payment of these duties was a condition to the claimants holding commercial intercourse with persons within the insurrectionary States, under Act 13th July, 1861, (12 Stat. L., p. 257, § 5,) 9 How. B., p. 616; 16 id., p. 161. II. The payment by the claimants in this case was a voluntary payment, and as such they are not entitled to recover it back. ■

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> A Mississippi Biver pilot removes Ids family from Neto Orleans to St. Lords about the beginning of the rebellion. Soon after tlds he is turned bade when ascending the river. He resides involuntarily within the insurrectionary States for about a year. Dwing this time he buys cotton. He then malees his escape to the United States tines amd serves the government hbnorably in a position involving great personal danger. His loyalty after he reaches the United States tines is fully shown for the remaincler of the rebellion, but not before. His cotton is captured and'carried to New Orleans, but is not 1/raced further than in possession of the guartermasier there. Some of the captured cotton of that Department is turned over to Treasury agents at Boston, some to agents in New Yarle, and some is sold by the quartermaster in New Orleans. </p> <p>I. A person, in tire public service during a portion of tlie rebellion as a river pilot,'may show by an honorable discharge, (the certificate of his naval commander,) his loyalty for such length of time as he so served.</p> <p>II. Removing one’s family from an insurrectionary to a loyal State about the beginning of the rebellion, and subsequently escaping from the Confederate to the United States lines, coupled with an excellent loyal record for the remainder of the rebellion, is satisfactory evidence to show that a year’s residence in the insurrectionary States was involuntary.</p> <p>III. Where a claimant under the “Abandoned or capltvi'ed property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820,) shows that his residence within the insurrectionary States during a part of the rebellion was involuntary, and establishes his loyalty for the remainder, a presumption exists in favor of his loyalty during his involuntary residence.</p> <p>W. Where a claimant under, the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820,) traces his cotton into the possession of a quartermaster who sold some cax>tured property and turned other over to the Treasury agents, the presumption is that the claimant’s cotton remained with the quartermaster. The burden is not on the defendants to show that the quartermaster did not turn it over; nor is the claimant entitled to a general average of that turned over with that sold.</p>

The abstract furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury shows upon its face that 10,220 pounds of this cotton was received by Captain Hade and accounted for in his returns; the same being tbe twenty bales receipted for to claimant by Captain Hade. Tbe remaining twenty-seven bales, having been re-baled, are probably included in tbe 447 acknowledged to have been receivd by Captain S. B. Brown, assistant quartermaster at Nashville, from Captain Hade.

No doubt can be entertained that Benjamin Tyson was constituted the agent for the Navy Department, for the selection, purchase, and shipment of anthracite coal for the use of the navy, under an appointment and contract with the government of the United States, made through the Hon. J. C. Dobbin, Secretary of the Navy, and for his services' and the expenses of selecting, purchasing, and shipping the coal, was to receive a commission of five per cent, upon tbe aggregate amount…

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The owner of the Union Motel, in Georgetown, D. G., leases it to cm assistant quar- ■ termaster for a hospital at $500 a month. There is no specified term agreed upon. Notice is given to terminate the lease, the premises a/re vacated, and the owner has been three daysin the “actual enjoyment” of them, lohen, liy an order of Brigadier General Wadsworth, military governor of Washington, they are taken possession of, and again used as a military hospital. For this second oeeupmicy the owner is allowed $100 a month by the Quartermaster General. There is a certificate given after the transaction by the assistant quartermaster to the owner, and attached to his deposition offered in the evidence. Also a letter from the Quartermaster General to the owner subsequent to the transaction.</p> <p>I. Tlie official reports and correspondence of public officers made and carried on in the line of their duty are admissible in evidence; hut it is not the business of a public officer to make admissions against the government, nor can such admissions hind the defendants. Hence, a certificate given to a party by one public officer after the transaction, or a letter written to him by another, is not competent evidence.</p> <p>II. Exhibits attached to the deposition of a claimant, and proved in no other way, fall with it, since the Act 25th June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 4.) See SubbelVs Case, p. 37, mite.</p> <p>III. If a tenancy at the will of the parties is terminated by notice from the tenant, and his vacation of the premises is complete, and the landlord enters and is in the actual enjoyment of them, the tenancy must be deemed wholly at an end; a re-entry of the tenant by right of eminent domain must be deemed a new tenancy under an implied lease.</p> <p>IY. The rent under an implied lease, when the government has taken forcible possession of property, like the consideration in all implied contracts, is the fair value of the thing taken.</p> <p>Y. The Act to restrict the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 4th July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 381,) which provides that its jurisdiction shall not extend to claims growing out of the “appropriation” “ of property by the army or navy” “ engaged im the snppi-ession of the rebellion,” seems to imply that property “ talcen for the use of, and used by, the a/rmy,” “ in States not im rebellion,” shall be deemed taken under an implied contract. And where a building in the District of Columbia is taken by the military governor of Washington as a military hosintal, but is treated by the War Dexiartment as held under an implied lease, the court cannot say that it was property appropriated by the army, and will entertain jurisdiction of an action for a balance of the rent.</p>

This is one of the cases chosen by the United States as a representative of a class, and one of the questions sought to be settled is whether an alien residing in the insurrectionary districts, having property taken by the United States military officers under the act of March 12,1863, the proceeds of which are in the Treasury, and who, after the filing of his petition, becomes naturalized as a citizen of the United States, can maintain his status in this court, and recover…

This is an action based upon tbe stipulations of a charter-party entered into between tbe claimants and tbe United States at New Orleans, on tbe 18tb day of March, 1865, under which tbe schooner Montezuma, of Bangor, Maine, was received into tbe military service. Tbe charter took effect at 12 o’clock a. m. (midnight) of said day.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> The claimant furnishes hoard and rations to volunteers before muster-in. Some of the soldiers so subsisted are subsequently mustered into the service as enlisted men; others are not mustered in; others are mustered in as officers. He produces and offers in evidence vouchers, signed by persons claiming to be officers, but whose official character is not shown, and is disputed. </p> <p>I. Under tlie general orders of the AVar Department, issued at the beginning of the rebellion, one who furnished subsistence to volunteer soldiers Refore muster-in is entitled to recover for such as were ultimately mustered into the service as enlisted men, but not for those who were never mustered in, or who were mustered in as officers.</p> <p>II. Vouchers given by persons claiming to bo military officers, but whose official character is disputed, and is not shown, are not competent evidence. The official character of an officer cannot be assumed by the court. Bule XXII imints out the evidence that will be required to estab- , lish it.</p>

Under agreement Camp Dennison was surveyed and its limits marked out, including- 250.51 acres of land belonging to John Kugler. This land was taken possession of by tbe State of Ohio, and witbiu a month thereafter turned over to the United States, and occupied by the United States as a military camp till the first day of June, 1866, when possession was abandoned to the proprietor.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>A dUeen residing in Charleston, though a native of Bhocle Islamd, is a photographer before the rebellion. Se is known among all classes as a leading Union man, and makes great sacrifices for United States prisoners and for loyal citizens. Though often in great perplexity and peril he bears true allegiance to the United States nor gives aid nor comfort to the rebellion, except — first, after having been thrown into jail for refusing to bear arms, he serves in the fire patrol, an organization intended for police purposes but liable to be called into the military service, and which does relieve the military from provost guard duty; second, he co-operates in running out a vessel through the blockade for the exclusive purpose of placing property beyond the control of the Confederate authorities, and u-ifh the intent that she shall not return; third, he imports through the blockade andgoays duties in the Confederate custom-house upon certain merchandise not designed for general traffic, but to be used egually in the prisoners’ hospital, in his own family, and in trade among loyal friends. During the rebellion and until the recapture of Charleston he buys large quantities of cotton from persons ivhose loyalty is unknown.</p> <p>I. Eor a citizen of unquestionable loyalty, resident through the rebellion in an insurrectionary State, who has been thrown into jail for refusing to bear arms against the United States, and who is threatened with being forced into the rebel army, to serve in an organization intended for police irarposes, and regarded by loyal persons as a resort for evading military service, but which is liable to be called into the military service and which does relieve the military of provost guard duty in Charleston, is not to give “ aid or comfort to the rebellion” within the moaning of the “Abandoned or capimed property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820.)</p> <p>H. For a citizen of unquestionable loyalty, resident through the rebellion in an insurrectionary State, to unite with others in running a vessel through the blockade, the purpose being to convey property beyond the control of the Confederate authorities, and the expectation that she will not return, is not to give “aid or comfort to the rebellion” within the meaning of the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820.)</p> <p>III. For a citizen of unquestionable loyalty, resident through the rebellion in an insurrectionary State, to import through the blockade and pay duties in the Confederate custom-house upon merchandise not designed for general traffic, but to be used equally in the United States prisoners’ hospital, in his own family, and in trade among loyal Mends, is not to give “aid or comfort to the rebellion” within the meaning of the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820.)</p> <p>IV. The purchase of large quantities of cotton during the rebellion and until near its close from persons whose loyalty is unknown, by a loyal citizen residing in Charleston, wlio was a photographer before the war, is not a purchase in fraud of the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. Lp. 820,) the xmrchases being- in open market, at current rates; and the object, to hold till therecapture of the city by the United States.</p> <p>Y. The tax of two cents a pound imx>osed by the Act 7th March, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 15, § 4,) on “ all cotton produced or sold and removed for consumption, and upon which no duty has been levied, paid, or collected,” does not extend to captured cotton sold by the government, and is not to be deducted from the net proceeds thereof due to loyal owners under the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820.)</p>

<p>Action is brought in this case to recover tbe proceeds of 209 bales of cotton- weighing’ 105,178 pounds. This cotton was purchased by claimant in small lots directly from planters, except one lot purchased from a merchant and cotton dealer in the town of Montezuma, Georgia, and was shipped from Macon and Montezuma, in June, 1864, to Savannah, and consigned to" Messrs. Brigham, Baldwin & Co., commission merchants, in that city, to be kept and stored for account of claimant.</p> <p>The places and dates of purchase, -together with the names of • the original owners and vendors, the marks and weights of the bales, are given with so much particularity and minuteness in the testimony of Mr. Cutter, the claimant’s bookkeeper, that no question can well be raised as to the ownership of the cotton.</p> <p>The fact of seizure by the Federal authorities is proved with equal distinctness.</p> <p>The only fact brought out, by direct or cross-examination of the long list of witnesses, tending to throw even a doubt or cast a shadow upon the loyalty of claimant is,, that he was a member of a company of borne guards in tbe city of Macon, organized and raised for police duty, and on tbe occasion of General Stoneman’s attack upon tbat city called out for its defence.</p> <p>Tbe evidence shows tbat every member of tbe community capable of bearing arms — and among tbe rest tbis company of borne guards — was compelled, by order of tbe Confederate authorities, to go out on tbat occasion, and there was no mode by which that order cotdd be resisted. If any aid or comfort was rendered to the rebellion by tbe claimant by tbat act, it was not voluntary aid, and therefore does not fall within the prohibition of the statute.</p> <p>The claimant is a northern man by birth, and tbe presumption, in absence of proof to tbe contrary, would be in favor of his loyalty.</p> <p>I. The claimant was, throughout the war, a resident of Macon ; was a man of property, actively engaged in business. The presumption of disloyalty established by tbe statute of 25th June, 1868, as well as by the former decisions of tbe court, must be rebutted to entitle him to recover.</p> <p>1st. There is not one word of proof to tbe effect tbat claimant gave no aid or comfort to persons engaged in tbe rebellion. .</p> <p>2d. Tbe proof looking towards tbe establishment of tbe fact tbat be gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion directly is insufficient, vague, often evasive, and abounding in “ negatives pregnant,” implying unmistakably that he did give such aid. And it will be noted tbat tbe defence seems to have suffered here under its very frequent embarrassment of being represented by counsel apparently more active in behalf of the claimant than his own counsel.</p> <p>3d. The fact appears tbat claimant had a son in tbe Confederate army. This increases and intensifies tbe presumption of the statute, that he did give aid and comfort to persons engaged in tbe rebellion.</p> <p>II. Tbe claimant proves by Scofield his own admission tbat he had occasionally contributed to soldiers and other objects during the war; and it is proved by abundant evidence tbat he was not only a member of tbe borne guards at Macon, but tbat be actually went out in arms witb tbat guard to figbt tbe Union troops under General Stoneman. And tbis guard was organized as well to oppose Federal raiders as thieves, robbers, and incendiaries. It was beyond question an organization in aid of tbe rebellion. Tbe men engaged in it were serving tbe purposes of tbe rebel government in tbeir own sphere of action as effectually as tbe soldiers in tbe field.</p> <p>III. Tbe pretense tbat these services rendered by claimant were not voluntary, but compulsory, and tbat be is thereby taken out of tbe effect of tbe statute, is utterly unsupported by tbe evidence. It will be noted tbat neither tbis statute of 12th March, 1863, nor tbat of 25th June, 1868, qualifies tbe words “ aid or comfort” by tbe word “voluntary.” Tbe statute makes tbe giving of aid or comfort a bar to maintaining tbe action. It may be conceded tbat a person acting under present, actual, forcible duress, compulsion by'present violence, or even by immediate threats involving personal danger, and within reach of sufficient force to execute those threats, may, perhaps, avoid tbe responsibility for bis own acts even within tbis statute ; but tbis is on tbe ground tbat tbe act is not bis. It is not shown, or pretended to be shown, tbat bis entry into or service in tbe home guards was compulsory; and there is no evidence to sustain tbe claim tbat Ms going out to fight General Stoneman was compulsory. True, there was an order, general, perhaps, sweeping and universal in its terms, requiring every one to serve. There is no evidence tbat tbis order was ever brought to bear personally upon tbe claimant ; tbat a military force was detailed to compel bis obedience; tbat any threats even were used to terrify him into compliance.</p>

The claimant is a colored man, a resident of Savannah. The oppressed condition in which, he was held prior to and during the rebellion is presumptive evidence of his loyalty to the United States. The official return of the War Department shows that the military authorities took possession of 33 (9 & 4) bales of cotton (upland) belonging to claimant, but that 17 bales of it, which were subsequently stored in Warner’s building, were partly burned.

This case is brought to recover tbe proceeds of fourteen bales of upland cotton, seized or “ captured” by tbe United States military authorities at Savannah in December, 1865. Tbe official return from tbe War Department shows that fourteen bales of upland cotton, and four hundred and seventy-five pounds upland, and one hundred and fifty-five pounds sea-island loose samples, registered in tbe name of tbe claimant, were “ captured” by Lieutenant Colonel EL 0.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>No question arises in Ms case which has not been discussed cmd decided in other • cases.</p>

Tbe plaintiff is one of tbe old bardy pioneers of Eastern Tennessee and Northern Georgia, so justly celebrated for tbeir devotion to tbe Union during tbe dark days of tbe republic. He was a Baptist preacher; was stopped preaching because be would talk Union sentiments. He was attacked by Confederate soldiers, shot in tbe thigh, was taken up by tbe vigilance committee and put in jail, and then sent to Atlanta in chains, with a gang of fourteen other Union men.

This is a claim brought by the claimants as assignees of an invention for post-marking and stamp canceling letters, for the use thereof by the government.

This is an action brought to recover compensation for the use and occupation of lots 48 and 49 in the old navy yard, at Memphis, Tennessee, since the close of the rebellion. The title to this property was granted by the United States to the city of Memphis, Aet August 5th, 1854, (10 Stat. L., p. 587.) Lot 48 was leased by the city to Samuel McKenna on the 15th of June, 1858, for 28 years, 7 months, and 2 days. On the 12th of October, 1861, McKenna assigned the lease to 0.

. This suit is brought against tbe United States, under tbe 3d section of tbe act of March, 1863, for tbe recovery of tbe net proceeds of one hundred and ninety-six and one-balf bales of cotton, seized by tbe military authorities of tbe United States, in October, 1863, in Concordia Parish, Louisiana.

The report of Lieutenant H. C. Alford proves the taking from the claimant of the following property: twelve hundred pounds cotton warp, one hundred and twenty yards unbleached cotton, four hundred pounds wool, seventy yards blanket flannel, forty yards fulled cloth, four yards homespun. General Augur reports that this property was toned over to an agent of the Treasury Department at Alexandria.

Claimant, a tree man of color, by occupation a drayman and cotton-sampler, being possessed of personal and real property, in tbe early part of tbe war, and before tbe bombardment of Charleston, purchased of Daniel F. Fleming’ from fifteen to twenty bales of cotton, in a loose and damaged condition, which be removed to Dr. North’s farm, near tbe race-course, where it was dried, assorted, and rebaled, making ten or more bales of good cotton j and in September, 1864, and within…

Plaintiff is a colored man, a citizen of tbe United States, born free,’ lived in Charleston for many years; dining tbe war lived on a farm just outside tbe city limits. He was tbe owner of twelve bales of cotton stored on tbat farm. It was taken in common witb all other cotton at tbe capture of Charleston. In this case tbe loyalty of the plaintiff is proved by other witnesses.

The claimants in this case are naturalized citizens of the United States, and seek in this proceeding to recover the net proceeds of fourteen bales of cotton of which they claim to have been the owners, and which were taken from their possession at the time of the capture of Charleston, S. C., by the United States military authorities, in February, A. D. 1865. The return from the War Department is as follows: “March 10.

We submit that tbe testimony clearly establishes, first, that the claimant was the owner and in possession of the one hundred and eighty-seven bales of cotton; secondly, that said cotton was taken possession of by the officers of the army of the United States; and thirdly, that this cotton was regularly turned ■ over to the agents of the Treasury of the United States, by whom it was sold, and the proceeds paid into said Treasury.

Claimant, a naturalized citizen, on tbe 12th of December, 1863, through tbe agency of bis wife, purchased of S. M. Elliot ten bales of sea-island cotton, paying therefor four dollars per pound.

The claimant is a planter, residing in the county of Monroe, Georgia. In the fall of 1865, the claimant caused his crop of the year 1865, together with the cotton of previous crops left unginned, to be ginned and packed in hales, amounting in all to forty-two bales, and marked B. H. Z., and in the month of November the claimant caused the said lot of cotton to be hauled to Macon, Georgia, and stored in the warehouse of Harris & Ross.

<p> On Motion. </p> <p> Several claimants bring thevr separate actions to recover the net proceeds of the saute parcel of captured cotton. The defendants procure an order of interpleader. Three of the junior claimants avail themselves of the order. When the'first suit is reached the claimant therein insists that it shall proceed notwithstanding the interpleader. The other claimants insist that he he required to recall his witnesses for oross-examinaiion. </p> <p>I. Interpleader can lie allowed to a defendant sued by two adverse plaintiffs, only where he is a stakeholder having no conflicting interest of his own. and being ready to deposit the stake and withdraw from the controversy. Under the “ Ahandonded or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820,) the government does have a certain conflicting interest as against two adverse claimants seeking the proceeds of the same cotton, yet at the same time does in effect say to the true owner, “Prove your loyalty and take your proceeds.”</p> <p>II. Where several adverse claimants seeking the same proceeds under the “Abandoned or captured property act,” (12 Stat. L., p. 820,) have inter-pleaded, their several suits will be heard together. But the first claimant being earlier in time is to that intent stronger in equity. If he make out a case against the defendants, the junior claimants must overthrow it.</p> <p>HI. Testimony cannot bo used against a party who has had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. But the court cannot interfere before the hearing and order the first of several adverse claimants who have inter-pleaded, to recall his witnesses for cross-examination.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> Thirty-six barrels of turpentine belonging to the claimant aire seised in Charleston and shipped to New Yorlc. Se proves that a greater quantity is sold by the Treasury agent in New York, but fails to identify his own turpentine as a part of that sold. </p> <p>Where the evidence does not show that the identical property of the claimant was sold hy the agents of the Treasury, hut does show that it was captured and shipped to New York from Charleston, and that a larger quantity of the same kind of property was sold in New York, it is sufficient to satisfy the court that the claimant's property formed a part of that sold under the Abandoned or captured property act. (12 Stat. L., p. 820.)</p>

The action in this case is to recover the proceeds of seventy-seven bales of cotton, of the average weight of five hundred pounds each, making in the aggregate thirty-eight thousand five hundred pounds. This cotton was seized in September, 1864, after the occupation of Atlanta by the United States military forces.

This action is based upon a bill for services rendered the Navy Department by the claimant as an architect in making drawings, plans, and specifications for contemplated improvements to the Naval Academy at Annapolis in the years 1864-’65.

The plaintiff in this case is a paymaster of the United States army. While in the execution of an order of his immediate superior, Senior Paymaster Francis, dated Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory, August 13,1866, directing him to proceed to the military district of Fort Boise and pay the United States troops in that district, he was robbed of his money-box at Fort Boise, in Idaho Territory.

Tlie claimant, a loyal citizen of the United States, who gave no aid or encouragement to the rebellion, and resided within the loyal States during the full period of the war, filed his petition in this court the 28th day of March, A. D. 1868, to recover from the United States the sum of $47,673 60, being the proceeds of two hundred and sixty bales of cotton, seized and taken by the military authorities of the United States, from the store of N. W. Perry & Co., of Mobile,…

The claimant in this case is the administrator of Jacob Red-wine, deceased, and brings action to recover the proceeds of two bales of cotton, weighing 695 pounds, belonging to his decedent, seized, with cotton belonging to many other persons, shortly after the occupation of Atlanta by the military forces of the United States.

This is an action for bay delivered to tbe Dnited States under a contract executed by Captain D. O. De Wolf, assistant quartermaster, for and on bebalf of tbe Dnited States, and William T. Pate; said bay to be delivered at points on tbe Oblo Diver, between Bising Sun, Indiana, and Louisville, Kentucky, wbicb was furnished to and received by tbe quartermaster aforesaid, and all paid for except tbe quantity or balance of $6,904 38, as claimed in tbe petition fded.

This suit is brought to recover compensation for rent of buildings situated in the city of» Wheeling, West Virginia, known as the “ Old Dominion Pork-house and Distillery,” from 6th March till 6th September, 1865, at the rate of $125 per month, $750; also for injuries to building and machinery, and for lumber, &c., used, $600; total amount claimed, $1,350.

The cotton was seized in April and May, 1865, by Lieutenant Young, taken to Charleston custom-house, and from there shipped to New York, sold by Simeon Draper, and the proceeds of sale paid into the Treasury of the Dnited States. The claimant was, and is, a loyal alien) gave no aid or encouragement to the rebellion) sympathized with the United States, and gave aid thereto, by contributing to the relief of the Federal soldiers in prison.

Action is brought in this case by claimant for the proceeds of seventy-five bales of cotton, of the aggregate weight of 37,500 pounds, seized in Atlanta, Georgia, by agents of Captain B. M. Hade, assistant quartermaster of the United States Army, a short time before the evacuation of that city by the military forces of the United States, under the command of General Sherman. This cotton was stored in three different lots in the city of Atlanta.

This claim is founded on a written contract entered into by the claimant and George B. Hibbard, captain and assistant quartermaster, on the part of the United States, on the 24th day of December, 1864, for the breach of which the claimant has brought his suit in this court by original petition.

Tbe case comes np under a general demurrer to tbe plaintiffs petition. Tbe petition, in addition to tbe formal facts necessary, states: 1. Tbat, on July 13,1854, tbe petitioner, Marie Louise Per-rin, was tbe wife of ber co-petitioner, and now is. 2. Tbat, on July 13,1854, tbe petitioners were subjects of tbe Emperor of tbe French, but tbat at tbe time of filing tbis petition tbey were naturalized citizens of tbe United States. 3.

Petitioner claims pay for 3,60S railroad ties, at 35 cents per tie, 1,425 ties at 25 cents per tie, 831 ties at 30 cents per tie, 45 picks and 91 shovels, furnished tbe government in tbe construetion. of tbe Nashville and North Western Bailroad, amounting in all to $1,823 95. Having furnished the ties, shovels, and picks, under this contract, the prices being reasonable, there is no excuse for denying payment.

Petitioner claims pay for thirteen days’ hire of twenty-three teams, to wit: nine two-horse teams, two four-horse teams, and two three-horse teams, and drivers — self as wagomnaster, and horse. The account, as contained in the petition, being, as I conceive, fully proven, and there being no apparent defence, judgment is claimed for the amount thereof, to wit, seven hundred and thirty-nine dollars.. The contract (if there was one) was illegal and void.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>This case teas heard at the last term of the court, and the law applicable to it was then settled, (Z C. Cls. R., p. 265, J without fixing the amount to be recovered by the claimant for the leant of evidence. Thai deficiency has now been in part supplied, and the following is the final judgment in damages.</p>

This cause arises on an express contract, and was brought into this court by original petition. Colonel William A. Bars-tow was authorized in September, 1861, by the War Department to raise, mount, and equip a regiment of cavalry to aid in suppressing the southern rebellion. He appointed a board of inspectors of horses (in pursuance of orders to that effect) to inspect the horses designed for the said regiment.

Ownership of the cotton is required to he proven “ to the satisfaction of the court.” We adopt the construction given to this provision of the act of Congress in Bond v. The United States, (2 C. Cls. B., p. 532,) where it is said: “ The evidence of the ownership of the property required is, at least, equal to-that necessary to sustain an action of trespass or trover.

This claimant, who is a native-born citizen of the United States, seeks to recover in this proceeding the net proceeds ” of eighty-two bales of upland cotton, of which he was the owner, at the time of the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, by the United States military authorities in February, A. D. 1865. This claim is made under the provisions of the 3d section of the act of Congress approved March Í2, 1863. The claimant has shown his ownership of the cotton.

The claimant seeks by this suit, which he brings as trustee for the late firm of Hanford & Browning, of New York, to recover the proceeds of forty-six hales of cotton, worth about $12,000, which were seized by the United States military forces at Mobile, Alabama, in May, 1865, and from thence shipped to New York and sold by the officers of the United States Treasury Department.

This is a small claim for cotton taken at Charleston. Keturn from War Department credits him with nine hales, the amount claimed. Claimant’s own account is a straightforward, clear, plain statement of his condition and conduct during the war. No evidence has been, or, we believe, can be found by the government to invalidate this claim.

This case is brought into court under the third section of the act of March 12,1863, to recover the proceeds of sale of twenty-four bales of upland cotton, the property of the claimant, seized or “ captured” by the United States military autborities at Savannah, upon the occupation of the city by General Sherman’s army in December, 1865.

The claimant is a colored man, residing at Savannah; his loyalty to the United States is clearly established. The official records of the War Department show that three bales of upland cotton were reported in claimant’s name, and that the same were taken in the name of the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury reports that the net proceeds of the cotton amount to $176 56 per bale.