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4 Ind. 128

Dawley v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided May 27, 1853

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1853-05-27

<p>The verdict of a jury against a person indicted for burglary, does not render him infamous, and, therefore, incompetent as a witness; but it is the judgment of the Court which does so.</p> <p>A jury may convict a person of burglary upon the testimony solely of an accomplice.</p> <p>The fact that the prosecuting attorney has refused to enter a nolle prosequi against a person indicted for burglary who has given testimony which led to the conviction of an accomplice under a promise of favor upon the disclosure of the whole truth, cannot affect the judgment against such convicted accomplice.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1853-05-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently November 1944

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Perkins, J.

¶1Dawley was indicted, jointly with three others, in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, for larceny in the stealing of a cow. He was tried separately, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary.

¶2On the trial, one Peltz, who had, at the same term of the Court, been convicted of burglary but not sentenced, and who was charged as an accomplice in the case with Dawley, was made a witness on the part of the state, and testified against Dawley under an assurance that if he disclosed the whole truth he might hope for favor in his own case.

¶3It is objected that Peltz, having been convicted of burglary, was not a competent witness. But judgment and sentence had not passed against him; and it is the judgment of the Court, and not the verdict of the jury, that renders the accused legally infamous, and, hence, incompetent as a witness. It is also urged that his testimony, being that of an accomplice, was not sufficient, uncorroborated, to authorize the jury to find a verdict of guilty. A jury may convict upon the testimony alone of an accomplice. Johnson v. The State, 2 Ind. R. 652. We regard Peltz's testimony, however, as strongly corroborated in this case.

¶4It is further said that the prosecuting attorney refused to enter a nolle prosequi to the indictment against Peltz after he had testified. If such be the fact, it has nothing to do with Dawley's case, and can only be made the ground of an application to the executive for a pardon in that of Peltz. See the United States v. Lee, 4 McLean 103.

Per Curiam.

¶5The judgment is affirmed with costs.

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