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4 Mass. 135

Wallis v. Wallis

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1808-03-15

<p>If one, for a valuable consideration, bargain and sell land with warranty, to hold from the grantor’s death, no action lies, during the grantor’s life, to recover the consideratio i money paid; although an action on the covenant may lie after the death of the grantor, if a title to the land be not made to the grantee or his heirs.</p> <p>If such bargain and sale be made by a father to a son, the law will presume a consideration of natural affection from the consanguinity of the parties, in addition to the valuable consideration expressed in the deed, and construe it a covenant of the grantor to stand seised to his own use during his life, and after his death to the use of the grantee.</p>

Cited in Black's (1910)’s definition of “Benigne faciendae sunt interpretationes chartarum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et quae libet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1808-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently November 1922 · most notably Brown v. Lunt (1854), Goward v. Waters (1868)

25 state decisions — followed in 11 states

701808181018201830184018501860187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The cause was submitted upon this agreement without argument, and being continued nisi, the opinion of the Court was now delivered by

Parsons, C. J

¶2We do not know any legal principles, on which *126this action can be supported. The money was not paid through mistake, being supposed to be due when it was not; it was not obtained by deceit, fraud, imposition, or oppression; nor was it paid upon an executory contract, which has happened to fail, or which has been, or might be, lawfully disaffirmed by either party. The most that can be urged for the plaintiff is, that nothing passed by the deed, as it was intended to convey a freehold in futuro ; but .he voluntarily paid the money for such a conveyance, and took a covenant from the grantor, that, after his death, the grantee and his heirs should have the land; which covenant, at the grantor’s death, may be broken, and the foundation of an action for damages, if a title to the land be not made to the grantee or his heirs.

Hastings and Bigelow for the plaintiff. Dana for the defendant.

¶3But, fortunately for the grantee, he is mistaken in the construction of his deed. For, although it is true that by a common law conveyance a freehold cannot be conveyed in futuro, yet by a covenant to stand seised to uses, such conveyance can be effected, And every deed ought to be construed, if it be legally [ * 137 ] possible, so as to effect the intent of the parties. * In this case, beside the valuable consideration expressed, a consideration of natural affection may be averred as consistent with it, (a) for the consanguinity of the parties, though not mentioned in the deed, is agreed in the case. The intent of the parties is clear, and there is a covenant of the grantor, that after his death the grantee shall have the land. This conveyance is therefore to be considered, in law, as a covenant by the grantor to stand seised of the land, to his own use during his life, and after his decease to the use of the grantee and his heirs. And upon the execution of the deed, the grantor was tenant for life, and a remainder in fee was vested in the grantee.

¶4The plaintiff must be called.

¶5¡XjT Vide Milbourne & Ux. vs. Assignees of Simpson, 2 Wills. 22. Roe ex dem. Wilkinson vs. Tranmer & Al., 2 Wills. 75. — Shep. Touchstone, 82, 83. — Co. Litt. 49, a. — 1 Sid. 25. — 2 Vent. 318.

¶6 [See Phillips's Ev., 8th ed. 762, and note. — Ed.]

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