Volume 4 — Puerto Rico Federal Reports

<p>Mr. Henry F. Hard and Mr. Wm. II. Hawkins, attorneys for tbe complainant.</p>

<p>Peksonal Injuries.</p> <p>1. In estimating damages tlie jury may consider the extent of the injuries, expectancy of injured child’s life, suffering he may have to endure through life, physically and mentally, and his impaired ability to earn a living.</p> <p>2. A child four years old cannot be guilty of contributory negligence.</p> <p>3. Street car companies operating cars over crowded streets must exercise greater caution than if operating through less populous districts.</p> <p>4. They must keep a sharp lookout at places where children may be on tracks, and must exercise all reasonable care to avoid accidents.</p> <p>5. A crowded condition of the street by vehicles, etc., imposes on the motorman a greater obligation.</p> <p><3. It is negligence to push a coal car in front of a trolley car without a fender, and with no lookout on the same, nor any way of observing the track from the trolley ear.</p> <p>7. The negligence of the parent cannot, in such cases, be imputed to the child.</p> <p>8. Nevertheless, if the company exercised reasonable care, the negligence of the parent can be imputed to the child.</p> <p>9. If the accident was inevitable, no damages can be recovered.</p>

<p>Account.</p> <p>1, A judicial settlement by “quita y espera” (reduction of the debt and extension of time for payment) must be performed by each of the-parties or the other is not bound thereby; but one party may, by his-conduct ot subsequent agreement, relieve the other from a strict compliance.</p> <p>2. An account stated,-and not impugned, is binding upon the debtors, unless clearly shown to be wrong.</p> <p>3. Book entries only bind the party making them.</p> <p>4. Mexican coin in Porto Rico was worth 95 per cent of provincial money, and the latter 60 per cent of American money.</p>

<p>Personal Injury.</p> <p>1. No presumption of negligence arises from the fact of the injury, under the facts of this case.</p> <p>2. It is negligence for the employees of a street car company to suddenly start a car while a passenger is in the act of alighting.</p> <p>3. A passenger who alights from a street car while it is in motion is negligent, and cannot recover if injured.</p> <p>4. If a passenger alights from a car safely, and afterwards trips and falls, the defendant company is not" responsible for the injuries sustained by him.</p>

<p>1. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the heirs of deceased took his estate without the benefit of inventory.</p> <p>2. Service upon one heir is, in such a case, sufficient to .authorize a judgment against the succession or estate for the whole amount of the claim if the other facts justify it.</p> <p>3. The wrongful acts of the ancestor himself, or his connivance with the officers of the law, must be the basis of'recovery.</p>

<p>A steamship company is not liable for the damages occasioned by the breaking of part of unloading machinery because of a latent defect when it had, within a reasonable time, inspected the machinery, and made reasonably sure that it was in good condition, and able to bear the strain to which it was to be put.</p>

<p>1. Defendant may offset against a liquidated demand for money an un-liquidated claim for damages for the breach of a contract that forms .part of the same transaction between the parties.</p> <p>2. The party injured must reasonably exert himself to minimize his damages or he will be estopped.</p> <p>■3. A contract to grind a cane crop during the months from January to May cannot be construed to allow said grinding to be done within the last few weeks, if that will cause damage to one of the parties.</p> <p>4. Parties contracting with reference to a particular class of business With which they are both familiar will be presumed to have had in mind the necessities of that business.</p> <p>5. When defendant admits plaintiff’s claim and sets up an offset or counterclaim, the burden of proof is on the former.</p> <p>6. Mere acquiescence in conditions does not waive any damages that may have previously accrued.</p>

<p>Plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was> to find a sale for defendants’ land, the latter, however, reserving to themselves the right to know the name of the proposed purchaser, and to finally accept or reject his bid. Held: That plaintiff’s commission was not earned unless defendants accepted the bid.</p> <p>If such bidder agreed to pay the price fixed by defendants, with knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the defendants had already closed with a third party, then plaintiff’s commission was not earned..</p> <p>As long as an unconditional offer is pending, it may be accepted.</p> <p>An issue on which no proof, or not suflicient proof, was presented, will, be withdrawn from the jury.</p>

<p>1. A railroad company which negligently fails to furnish its employees with proper appliances and machinery is responsible in damages to a workman injured because of such failure.</p> <p>2. If plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, he cannot -recover, unless it was slight as compared with the negligence of the defendant.</p> <p>3. The doctrine of comparative negligence applied.</p> <p>4. Defendant would not be responsible if the accident occurred by reason of a latent defect, not discoverable by the use of ordinary diligence on the part of defendant.</p>

<p>1. When plaintiff shows breach of contract of marriage by defendant, and the latter shows nothing in defense, the court will take that question from the jury.</p> <p>2. In actions on breach of promise of marriage contracts the jury are not limited by the rules governing actions upon simple contracts to pay money.</p> <p>3. The amount of damages is within the sound discretion of the court.</p> <p>4. Exemplary damages must be given against one who, without just cause, breaks a contract of marriage.</p> <p>5. In such cases the jury may consider: defendant’s general reputation for ■ wealth or poverty; his social position; the depth of plaintiff’s devotion</p> <p>to him; her lack of independent means; her mortification and injured feelings and affection; and plaintiff’s social position; her loss of time and expenses in preparing for the marriage; injuries to her health; damages to her reputation and to her future prospects of marriage, fi. If defendant, in his answer, has made charges derogatory to plaintiff’s character, and has failed to prove them, that also is an element of damage.</p> <p>7. The animus in breaking the contract may be shown in aggravation or in mitigation of damages.</p>

<p>1. The burden of proving negligence of the defendant and his employees, and care on the part of the deceased, is upon the plaintiffs.</p> <p>2. If the ways, means, machinery, etc., were in reasonably good condition, and not in such condition as to expose the deceased employee to unusual risks, plaintiffs cannot recover.</p> <p>3. It is otherwise if deceased was reasonably prudent and careful, and the ways, etc., were not in a reasonably safe condition.</p> <p>4. It is a question for the jury whether any particular piece of machinery, etc., is reasonably' safe.</p> <p>5. Employers are not insurers nor under obligation to supply the best obtainable machinery. The machinery, etc., must be reasonably good under the circumstances of each case.</p> <p>■6. It is negligence for an employee to use ways and machinery in a manner not intended by his employers, and thus run undue risks.</p> <p>7. The jury, in fixing damages, may consider deceased’s age, earning capacity, health, and life expectancy.</p>

<p>Personal Injury.</p> <p>1. When a railway is placed on a public highway, a greater degree of care must be exercised by the employees of the railway company and by the public than if said railway were not on the public road.</p> <p>■2. The railway company and the public using the highway have equal rights thereon.</p> <p>'3. The company must keep its trains under control by means of first-class appliances.</p> <p>4. The railway trains must be operated with care, and so as not to frighten animals attached to vehicles on the highway, and must be stopped to prevent injury, if that is possible.</p> <p>5. Unless the lack of brakes was the proximate cause of the injury, the lack thereof cannot be considered.</p> <p>6. Actual damages only can be recovered for personal injuries not inflicted maliciously, including in this term the value of destroyed property, wounding and illness of plaintiff, fright, shock, doctor’s bills, and other expenses.</p> <p>7. Future suffering is not an element of damage unless plaintiff continues to suffer from the injuries received.</p> <p>8. A franchise is a law binding on the parties exercising it and the public.</p>

<p>Recovery cannot .be bad upon a contract for services, contingent on success, a part of which services are for lobbying before Congress and the Executive Council of Porto Rico, to secure the passage of a franchise, although the other services contemplated by the contract are such that ordinarily recovery for the same could be had.</p>

<p>An electric light company is not liable for damages occasioned by an ■unavoidable accident caused by the breaking of its wires, which had been inspected within a reasonable time before the accident, and from which the current was cut off as soon as the grounding of the broken wires informed ■ the power house of their breaking. This is ■especially so when deceased, in order to get to where the broken wire w’as, left the public road and went through a fence into a cocoanut grove which was not a public place.</p>

<p>1. In passing on the question of negligence by a trolley car company,. the jury must consider the place where the accident occurred, the time of night, and the light or lack of light.</p> <p>2. Electric cars must be under such control that they can be stopped within a reasonable distance after discovery of obstruction on the-track.</p> <p>'3. The ear company and the owner of an automobile have equal rights on a public highway, and each must exercise care not to injure the other.</p> <p>■4. The owner of an automobile stalled on a track must take reasonable precautions to prevent it from being struck by the electric car.</p> <p>The electric car company must keep a lookout, and must have its cars in good condition as to brakes, and not run them at an unreasonable speed.</p>

<p>Plaintiff was employed in cheeking freight being loaded on a steamer, and started to walk across some loose planks covering a hatchway; one of the planks tipped or slipped and plaintiff fell and was injured. Held: An instruction for the defendant was proper.</p>

<p>1. Defendants contracted with plaintiffs to purchase 403 pockets of rice at $3.65 per pocket. When the rice was delivered to them they refused to either accept it or return it, claiming it was not up to sample. Meantime the price of rice had risen to $3.90 per pocket.</p> <p>2. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff at $3.90 for 403 pockets.</p>

<p>COLLECTING FOBGED MONEY CEDER.</p> <p>1. One who, knowing the signature on a postoffice money order to be a forgery, presents it for payment and collects it, is guilty of the offense charged by Revised Statutes, § 5463, TJ. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3688.</p> <p>2. An alibi is a valid defense when established beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>3. The term “reasonable doubt” defined to mean “a doubt that remains in the minds of reasonable men after a full, fair, and impartial consideration of the facts.”</p>

<p>Action foe Damages. Bbeacii of Contract.</p> <p>1. Those dealing with promoters of a corporation which, after its organization, ratifies the promoters’ contracts, may proceed against either the former or the latter for a breach thereof.</p> <p>2. A money judgment in favor of one who alleges nondelivery of capital stock subscribed for, and disclaims as to it, relieves the corporation of the obligation to deliver the stock to him.</p> <p>3. The one who first breaks a contract is liable to the other in damages.</p>

<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>1. Plaintiffs in ejectment must recover on the strength of their own title.</p> <p>2. When three persons own a tract jointly, their title being based on a presumption of a grant, and two of them abandon it, and leave the third one in possession, and she sells it all, her purchaser takes a good title as against the heirs of the other two.</p> <p>3. Per contra, if the descendants of all three continued to live on the land, possessing it in common, then all of them had a right thereto.</p> <p>4. Persons living together as man and wife will be presumed to nave been married unless the contrary be proven.</p> <p>5. Prior to the repeal of the general military order which changed the period of limitation of title to land to six years, possession for six years in good faith and with proper title, i. e., sufficient in form to transfer title, will confer title.</p> <p>6. If, prior to the sale to defendant, the land was partitioned. among the owners thereof, and plaintiffs’ ancestors were in exclusive possession of one third of the tract, that was notice to defendant of the extent of the claim of those in possession of the portions respectively.</p> <p>7. A conveyance by a cotenant out of possession is void as to another eotenant and even as to an outsider in possession.</p> <p>8. Acquiescence by a party in acts of ownership by the other before suit raises a presumption against the former’s claim.</p> <p>9. Minor plaintiffs’ interests go with those of the plaintiffs of age, and if the verdict in ejectment is for defendant on the plea of the statute of limitations, the minors may recover against their guardians, or against the persons whose negligence caused their loss.</p>

<p>TRESPASS.</p> <p>1. Damages caused by water running from one tract down over another, naturally and without ditches, cannot be recovered.</p> <p>2. One who has a lateral ditch to drain off waters from an adjoining tract must keep it in repair; but, if defendants, by ditches or otherwise, caused a greater amount of water to flow down on the lower tract than the lateral ditch could care for, they are liable in damages.</p> <p>3. No one can sit by and see his property suffer damages, and not endeavor to prevent them, and recover. ■</p> <p>4. Plaintiff’s financial inability to market the salt evaporated on his land, and its consequent accumulation, cannot be urged as a measure of damage against one who afterward injured the salt beds by an over- . flow of water.</p> <p>5. Defendants may set up their good faith and license from the plaintiff as a defense to the action.</p>

<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>1. In ejectment, plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title.</p> <p>2. Actual possession of a part of a tract is constructive possession of all of it unless other persons are in actual possession of other parts.</p> <p>3. Constructive possession is with the owner of the fee, never with the disseisor.</p> <p>4. In cases of conflicting boundaries, the party first in possession will be presumed to hold to the limits of his tract.</p> <p>5. Certificates by "the registrar of property are evidence of the statements therein contained.</p> <p>6. An unrecorded conveyance is not constructive notice of its contents.</p> <p>7. Persons “present” and “absent,” in article 1858 of the Civil Code, mean those “in Porto Rico” and those “out of Porto Rico.”</p> <p>8. Ten-year statute of limitations applied.</p>

<p>1. Mere sympathy for the injured person is not a sufficient basis for a judgment in her favor.</p> <p>2. Negligence on the part of a municipality in the care of its streets will make it liable in damages to persons injured because thereof.</p> <p>3. If plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable care, or previous knowledge of the locality, could have avoided the injury, she cannot recover.</p> <p>4. Municipalities are held only to the exercise of reasonable care in the construction, maintenance, and lighting of their streets.</p> <p>-5. Contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, which is the proximate cause of the injury received, will defeat recovery.</p>

<p>1. The Constitution of the United States does not make treaties superior to acts of Congress. They are of equal dignity, and, in cases of conflict, the latest in point of enactment must prevail.</p> <p>2. Such conflicts are matters of diplomacy, for the general governments to settle.</p> <p>3. Courts must follow the enactments of their own government if one of its laws conflicts with a prior treaty.</p> <p>4. The organic act of Porto Rico and the acts amendatory thereof, defining the jurisdiction of this court, control the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, in cases of conflict.</p> <p>5. Article 11 of the treaty, giving Spanish citizens the same rights, in certain cases, “as the citizens of the country to which the courts belong,” must be understood as giving them the same rights, in those eases, as American citizens.</p> <p>6. The court has no power, except, possibly, in very exceptional cases, to deny the right to a writ of error against its judgments. The good faith of the suing out of such a writ is matter for the Supreme Court to settle.</p>

<p>Personal Injuries.</p> <p>An owner of a house which, because of lack of repair, falls and injures-a passer-by, is liable in damages.</p> <p>In estimating damages the jury may consider plaintiff’s age, earning-capacity and loss thereof, medicines, medical attendance, suffering, future expenses, probable duration of injuries and suffering, and loss of' earnings.</p> <p>The owner of a house with projecting eaves must exercise extraordinary care with the same.</p> <p>Punitive damages cannot be recovered in the absence of malice.</p> <p>One who, in his normal condition, would have had reason to believe, because of the noises proceeding from the cracking tiles and timbers, that the roof of a house was liable to fall on him, but who, because of his being intoxicated, did not move when he had time to do so, is guilty of contributory negligence.</p> <p>'6. A pedestrian has a right to be on the sidewalks of a public street at any hour, day or night.</p>

<p>Libel.</p> <p>1. The constitutional right of liberty of the press does not authorize the publication of libels. It simply prevents previous restraints on publications.</p> <p>2. Libel under the Porto Rico law defined.</p> <p>3. The words used concerning a public official, “Certain employees who 'pan make much with little salary are very lucky,” are libelous per si.</p> <p>POETO EICO Siebert v. Vivoni.</p> <p>4. In sueli a case, unless defendants justify or should he shown not to have published the statement, the verdict must be against them; but the jury must determine the amount.</p> <p>5. The verdict may be against all or a part of the defendants, according to the evidence.</p> <p>6. Punitive damages may be given if the publication was maliciously made.</p> <p>7. Political ardor does not justify libelous statements.</p>

<p>Manslaughter.</p> <p>1. Federal courts have jurisdiction to try cases of manslaughter charged to have been committed upon waters within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>2. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied.</p> <p>3. “Justifiable homicide” defined.</p> <p>4. The killing of deceased by defendant in the heat of passion, with the same weapon with which deceased had just tried to kill defendant, would, under the law, be manslaughter or justifiable homicide, as the facts might warrant.</p>

<p>When his authority in that regard is questioned, an attorney will not be allowed to appear and represent nonresident defendants unless authorized to that effect in a manner satisfactory to the court.</p>

<p>1. A parent may recover ior tire wrongful death of her minor son.</p> <p>2. The elements of damage in such a case are lack of support and care and mental anguish.</p> <p>3. Racing a horse across the track in front of an approaching train, so close to it that the injuries to deceased could not be avoided, is contributory negligence which will prevent his mother from recovering.</p> <p>4. But, if the engine seared the horse, and it ran away and across the track, and defendant’s employees could have prevented the injuries by the exercise of reasonable diligence, defendant would be liable.</p> <p>5. If, because of the great speed of the train, brought about by its racing ■with deceased, it could not be stopped in time to prevent the accident, defendant would be liable. . #</p>

<p>RArE on tiie High Seas.</p> <p>1. Penetration, accompanied by lack of consent by the woman and force or intimidation by the man, is necessary to constitute the efime of rape.</p> <p>2. Federal courts have jurisdiction of cases of rape on the high seas or otherwise within the maritime jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>3. Previous uneliastity of the woman is not a defense, and affects her credibility only.</p> <p>4. “Reasonable doubt” defined.</p>

<p>Action for Personal Injuries.</p> <p>1. If the' person injured by a street car was herself guilty of contributory negligence, she eannot recover, although defendant was also guilty of negligence.</p> <p>2. If plaintiff was injured by the joint fault of the defendant and of the driver of the public automobile in which she was riding, she can recover against either separately.</p> <p>3. The negligence of a driver of a public conveyance cannot be imputed to a passenger having no control over said conveyance beyond telling the driver thereof where to take her. •</p> <p>4. Such a passenger may be guilty of contributory negligence if she affirmatively does an act which is negligent, or if she sees the danger, and does not advise the driver of it.</p> <p>5. Plaintiff may sue for and recover for reasonable compensation for loss of time and earnings, pain, physical and mental suffering, past, present, ■ and future.</p> <p>6. All persons about to cross a railway at a crossing must exercise all proper precaution, and failure in that particular will defeat a recovery.</p> <p>7. The negligence of the father of a minor riding with her may be imputed to the minor.</p> <p>8. The motorman could presume that the automobile would stop before crossing, and the latter could presume that the car was being operated under proper conditions.</p>

<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>1. By the treaty of Paris all public lands belonging to Spain passed to the United States.</p> <p>2. Change of sovereignty does not affect vested rights, but the law will not enforce after cession what it could not enforce before.</p> <p>3. If a grant is inclioate at the time of the cession, whatever remains to be done thereafter must be done in accordance with the laws of the new government.</p> <p>4. A grant which, before the treaty, was discretionary with the Spanish government, and had been refused by it, cannot, after the treaty, be enforced against the United States government.</p>

<p>1. One born in Porto Rico, and of age and a resident here when the treaty of peace was ratified, is a citizen of Porto Rico, and, as long as he continues to reside in Porto Rico, lie cannot, as the law now stands, acquire a different nationality.</p> <p>2. As far, at least, as the jurisdiction of this court is concerned, Spain cannot, by her own ex parte act, vary the terms of the treaty of Paris, and. a Royal decree admitting one to Spanish citizenship who is and continues to be a resident and a citizen of Porto Rico under existing laws is a nullity here.</p> <p>3. This is so despite the fact that such a person wishes to be a Spanish citizen, and is registered as such in that country’s consulates.</p>

<p>PAX.SB IMPRISONMENT.</p> <p>1. When a police officer arrests a man without undue violence, and, without assaulting him, brings him, within a reasonable time, before a. magistrate, and the arrested man is convicted, that is prima facie evidence of the fact that his arrest was rightfully made; and, in a. suit for false imprisonment, that presumption can only be overcome by evidence of conspiracy to bring about the conviction.</p> <p>2. “False imprisonment” defined. ■</p> <p>3. Punitive damages may be recovered in cases of false imprisonment.</p>

<p>1. One on a train, whether traveling on a pass given him for a consideration, or with a ticket, or intending to pay his fare to the conductor, is a passenger.</p> <p>2. In estimating damages for personal injury, the jury may consider pain and suffering, medical attendance, loss of time, past, present, and future, and of salary.</p> <p>3. The front trucks of defendant’s ear ran on one track, but the rear trucks were switched over on another, injuring plaintiff, who was a passenger. Held: Negligence.</p>

<p>1. An electric light company may make reasonable regulations under which it will supply patrons, and may cut off their current if they do not pay their bills promptly.</p> <p>2. It must supply the public, and may not arbitrarily refuse to do so, and failure in this regard makes it responsible for at least nominal damages.</p> <p>3. Whether twenty-four hours is a reasonable notice to a customer to pay his bill is a question for the jury.</p> <p>4. One who, having paid his light bill, is dunned a second time, and wil-fully fails to so advise the company, the latter acting in good faith, cannot recover damages for being' deprived of light, and consequent damages to business and reputation.</p>

<p>1. Tlie United States district court for Porto Rico lias no jurisdiction over a. habeas corpus proceeding to recover the custody of children.</p> <p>2. Such a proceeding is not a controversy within the meaning of the laws. defining the jurisdiction of this court.</p> <p>3. Such a proceeding, removed from the insular district court, will, on motion, be remanded to that court.</p>

<p>Opinion Ovekkuling Plea in Abatement.</p> <p>1. A Spanish-born minor residing in Porto Rico when the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was ratified, and who continues to reside therein thereafter until arriving of age and for three years thereafter, but who has no guardian or parents in Porto Rico, does not come within the provisions of article 9 of the treaty, nor § 7 of the organic act.</p> <p>2. Such a person retains his Spanish citizenship without the necessity of declaring such to be his intention, as required by the treaty.</p>

<p>1. In a bill quia timet, the court will decree the cancelation of liens and mortgages, and make such other orders as may be necessary to have the same canceled of record.</p> <p>2. When it appears from old records that a party did not (in Spanish times) have his day in court, this court will give him or his heirs or assigns that right.</p> <p>3. Liens forty or fifty years old should be presumed to have been discharged unless the contrary positively appears.</p>

<p>A court of bankruptcy can administer on the estate of an individual partner who has not personally been adjudicated to be a bankrupt, and require him to file schedules of his individual property.</p>

<p>1. Wlien the proof shows a bankrupt to be in possession of money or property belonging to the bankrupt estate, and he disobeys an order to deliver the same to the trustee, he may be imprisoned as for a contempt of court.</p> <p>2. Such an imprisonment is not one for debt.</p> <p>3. The giving of false, vague, and misleading testimony is a contempt of court.</p> <p>4. Courts of bankruptcy have no broader powers to punish for contempt than other Federal courts.</p> <p>5. There is no specific provision in the Constitution of the United States against imprisonment for debt. It seems that it is the state Constitutions that usually contain it.</p>

<p>When, in a hearing to vacate a final decree already entered, the facts showed, a conspiracy on the part of defendants to defraud plaintiff of his rights, and did not otherwise show a meritorious defense, the application will be denied.</p>

<p>1. A “sociedad anónima” (commercial association), although it has no seal, is a corporation.</p> <p>2. Such a corporation, organized in Porto Rico prior to the time of the American intervention, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a Spanish citizen,</p> <p>3. The stockholders of such a corporation are presumed to be Spanish subjects.</p>

<p>Statement: M. & K. had a first mortgage on A.’s land; B. had a second unsatisfied mortgage. By a private agreement with A., M. & K. agreed to foreclose their mortgage, buy in all of the property, and transfer it back to A., except one tract, which they kept to satisfy their debt. A subsequent judicial sale of the other tracts produced a fund in court. R. was a judgment creditor of A. L. & Co. rvere mortgage creditors of A., and had foreclosed and had a deficiency decree against him. P. was A.’s lawyer in the litigation, and had a claim for professional services.</p> <p>Held: That B. had the best right to the fund in court, but subject to the payment of P.’s claim for fees.</p>

<p>1. As between the vendor and vendee of land in Porto Rico, water rights-for irrigation purposes, if they exist, run with the land, and pass to the vendee unless specifically reserved by the vendor.</p> <p>2. The court refuses to hold that either of the parties to this suit has any title to the water or water right in question, as against the people of Porto Rico.</p> <p>3. In the absence of positive law to the contrary, the court holds to the doctrine of § 8 of the national reclamation act, “that the right to the use of water . . . shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and. beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.” 32 Stat. at L. 390, chap. 1093, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 515.</p>

<p>1.. The joint counsel of several persons may afterward testify against the-interests of one of his clients, since deceased, in a controversy between the other and the representatives of the deceased person.</p> <p>2. One partner of a firm held a perpetual lease of a certain tract of land. He was also the assignee of a mortgagee of the same tract. An agreement between the partners, executed before the mortgage was foreclosed,, that th? lease should have priority over the mortgage, is not against good conscience, and will be upheld.</p> <p>3. Nevertheless, when the facts show that, as between the partners, it was not intended that the agreement should be effective, it will not be given consideration in the settlement of partnership accounts.</p> <p>4. The mortgage was foreclosed and the firm purchased at the sale. It subsequently secured a release from the mortgagor. Held, that the lease was partnership property and became merged in the superior-title.</p>

<p>Although the parties are not identical with those m a former suit, yet* when they plead the same action, with the same object, invoke the same rights, and base their pretentions on the same titles, so that their judicial situation is identical in both eases, a plea of res judicata is good.</p>

<p>Plaintiff contracted with defendant to construct for the latter a short pidce of railroad under the former’s franchise, at actual cost, that azr rangement, under the facts, being mutually advantageous. In addition to actual cost, plaintiff sought to recover for subcontractor’s profits. Held: That plaintiff could not recover; but a new trial was granted on the ground that some amount was due to plaintiff.*</p>

<p>1. A complaint setting out the existence of a partnership and the voluntary action of the partners in incorporating it, its subsequent dissolution, and damage to plaintiff (a minority stockholder) because of a loss' of future profits, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>2. Promises made without a consideration are void.</p>

<p>1. If a person injured knew nothing about his actual employer being an independent contractor, he is not chargeable with notice, and may sue the principal.</p> <p>Note. — Master and servant; independent contractor. — Por exhaustive-notes on independent contractors, see Richmond v. Sitterding, 65 L.R.A. 445, and Knieely.v. West Virginia Midland R. Co. 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 371; as to liability of master to servant for failure to provide independent contractor with safe appliances, see note to Miller v. Moran Bros.’ Co. I L.R.A. (N.S.) 283.</p> <p>2. When the ways, works, machinery, or plant belong to the principal, he cannot avoid responsibility by employing an independent contractor.</p> <p>3. Illegitimate children may sue through their mother as their natural guardian.</p> <p>4. See a case in which the court apportioned the damages between the minor plaintiffs.</p>

<p>1. The legislature of Porto Rico, in the exercise of its police powers of legislation, may regulate the manufacture and sale of ice, etc., but this must be done subject to strict regard for property rights, and with reference to the respect due to courts having property in custodia legis.</p> <p>2. A municipal health office, acting under the authority of local statutes and regulations and instructions from the superior board of health, cannot directly interfere with the manufacture and sale of ice by a receiver of a court.</p> <p>3. The health office should apply to the court for an order against its receiver, and failure to do so, followed by interference with such receiver, is contempt of court, and may be punished as such. And that, punishment may properly be that he pay the costs of the contempt proceeding, and a reasonable fee to the attorney of the relator.</p>

<p>Opinion op the Court on Certificate prom Referee.</p> <p>1. Chattel mortgages, as the same are understood in the different states of the Union, are unknown to the law of Porto Rico, and constitute no lien under the national bankruptcy act.</p> <p>2. Such a mortgage, given to secure an antecedent debt, is not one given "for a present consideration,” under said act.</p> <p>5. A fee of $500 to bankrupt’s attorney is excessive when the total value of estate is only $810, and the attorney may be ordered to return the excess over a reasonable fee.</p>

<p>1. A Spanish corporation has the right to sue in the courts of Porto Rico.</p> <p>%. Under article 13 of the treaty of peace with Spain, dramatic works copyrighted there at the time of the ratification of the treaty of Paris are protected in Porto Rico.</p>

<p>1. A city which so constructs its sewerage system as to be a nuisance to the owners of property adjoining the outlet of the sewers may be compelled to pay the damages occasioned thereby.</p> <p>2. Such damages are the difference between the value of the property before and after the creation of the nuisance.</p> <p>Note. — Municipal corporation; drains and sewers. — The authorities dealing with the duty and liability of municipality with respect to drainage are gathered in a note to Georgetown v. Com. 61 L.R.A. 673.</p>

<p>1. Congress, through the executive council of Porto Rico, having fixed the salaries of the official interpreter and the official stenographer of this court, their compensation cannot be increased for the performance of their ordinary duties by rule or order of court.</p> <p>■2. It is not within the power of the court to force litigants to pay a per diem, to be charged as costs in the case, for the benefit of the official interpreter or the official stenographer. The services of such officials, while in the performance of their ordinary duties, are free to the litigants, the same as those of other court officials.</p> <p>3. See the opinion for a discussion of the subject generally.</p>

<p>1. When an employer procures proper machinery from a manufacturer of recognized standing, and makes reasonable tests and examinations of it from time to time, and an accident occurs to some employee by reason of a latent defect in such machinery, that could not be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, the employer is not responsible in damages.</p> <p>2. The facts having been fairly submitted to the jury, and there being no error in the charge of the court, and no evidence that the jury were influenced by passion or prejudice, a motion for a new trial should be denied.</p>

<p>1. Defendants having, within plaintiff’s knowledge, been in actual exclusive pedal possession of the land in controversy for more than ten years, under a conveyance valid in form, and plaintiff having resided in Porto Rico during all of said time, his action to recover the land is barred.</p> <p>2. In such actions plaintiffs must recover on the strength of their own title or not at all.</p>

<p>A cross complaint for unliquidated damages (in tort) can be made to tha original demand for damages for breach of contract.</p>

<p>¿Plaintiff having sued for land, defendants plead: (1) To the jurisdiction of the court, that the proceeding was an incident to a probate matter; (2) res judicata; and (3) estoppel. Held: That plaintiff must amend her complaint to_show the untruth of the pleas or the suit will stand dismissed.</p>

<p>1. No attorney’s fee will tie allowed under § 573, Rev. Stat. of Porto Rico,. in a suit on three counts, one for damages to business and two for libel, when it is uncertain from the verdict that any damages were-given on the libel counts.</p> <p>2. See a reference to cases in which the recovery was less than $500, yet the court refused to make plaintiff pay her own costs.</p>

<p>A "speaking” demurrer is not proper pleading, and will be overruled. An answer is the proper pleading when all the facts do not appear on the face of the bill.</p>

<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>1. Plaintiff brought suit for 138 cuerdas of land. He had previously mortgaged to defendant’s decedent 400 cuerdas at or near the same place, and the same were sold at execution sale to mortgagee. Held: That if the 138 cuerdas were part of the 400, then plaintiff was estopped from claiming them.</p> <p>2. The jury must consider the descriptions contained in the mortgage and the other documentary proof and the surrounding facts and situation of the parties.</p> <p>3. The parties to a mortgage or conveyance are bound by the recitals-thereof; but ambiguities therein may be explained by evidence aliunde.</p> <p>4. Verbal testimony cannot be used to vary the contents of a written instrument when these are plainly expressed.</p> <p>•5. If plaintiff was in possession of the land mortgaged when he mortgaged it, other land of his cannot be appropriated by mortgagee, vendee at the execution sale, to make up for parts of the mortgaged premises appropriated by strangers.</p> <p>•6. If, when plaintiff mortgaged the land, he did not own the number of cuerdas called for within the boundaries set out in his mortgage, then after-acquired title by plaintiff, to other lands within the same boundaries, inured to the benefit of the mortgagee to the extent of the land mortgaged.</p> <p>'.7. Plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title.</p>

<p>Ejectment.</p> <p>1. The heirs of one who has sold land are estopped from claiming it from. the vendee and his successors in interest, independently of the fact that defendant has a “posesorio” or “dominio” title.</p> <p>2. The above is true whether or not the original vendor executed a written conveyance of the land.</p> <p>3. Possession for ten years under a written conveyance gives title as against one living in Porto Rico.</p> <p>4. One who stands silently by and sees an innocent third party buy land and pay a consideration for it is estopped from asserting title to it.</p> <p>5. There is a presumption of title in one who has been in possession of land for many years, and the presumption holds until rebutted by proof’ of a sale.</p> <p>G. One who claims land registered in the name of another must prove that he has purchased it.</p>

<p>1. An indictment in a lottery case which charges the defendant with bringing, and causing to be brought, tickets into the United States, is not duplicitous.</p> <p>2. Surplusage in an information may be rejected, and, if the bill still alleges violation of law in proper language, it will be upheld.</p>

<p>1. In ejectment, plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title.</p> <p>2. Possession under a registered conveyance for thirty years is good against all persons except those claiming under such owner. In such cases the title' is presumed to be in such grantee.</p> <p>3. No right to land prescribes in less than thirty years except when the person in possession holds under a just title and in good faith, for ten years uninterruptedly, as against.persons in Porto Rico, or twenty against those absent from the same.</p> <p>4. A “just title” means one in writing, which the party has good reason to believe, and does believe, conveys him the title.</p> <p>5. In “good faith” means that the grantee has no knowledge of any other title or of bad faith in the persons who sold to him.</p> <p>6. A “posesorio” title is only notice to the world of the claim of the person who holds it.</p> <p>7. A “dominio” title is not good against a previously inscribed title except, perhaps, in the hands of innocent third parties.</p> <p>8. In ejectment a judgment for one cotenant will enure to the benefit of all the plaintiffs in interest.</p> <p>9. Plaintiff must identify the land sued for.</p> <p>10. One who'claims under a purchase of a “posesorio” title at a judicial sale, and who afterward converts his “posesorio” title into a “do-minio,” with knowledge that the judgment ordering the sale has been annulled, is not a possessor in good faith and with a proper (just) title.</p> <p>11. Records of conveyances in the books of the old registry (anotadurfa de hipotecas) cannot affect the title of property secured by others before they 'were transferred to the new registry books.</p>

<p>Damages.</p> <p>1. An electric light company is bound to exercise diligence proportionate to the peculiar character and danger of its business.</p> <p>2. Such a company must take such reasonable precautions as are known to science to prevent a dangerous amount of current from entering a citizen’s premises, even though the cause which brought about the dangerous intensity should not be clearly established, if the dangerous current came over the wires of defendant.</p> <p>3. If deceased was without fault, the presumption is that the electric company was negligent, and it devolves on it to rebut this presumption.</p> <p>4. Deceased had a right to presume that the company would not expose him to unusual danger, and, if defendant did so expose him, and he was killed, it is liable.</p> <p>5. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that deceased was killed by an electric shock by current generated by the defendant company.</p> <p>6. In estimating damages the jury may take into consideration the expectancy of life which deceased had and his earning capacity.</p> <p>7. In the absence of malice, only compensatory damages may be recovered.</p> <p>8. If deceased was guilty of negligence which contributed to his death, plaintiff cannot recover even if defendant was also negligent.</p>

<p>1. In Porto Rico tlie right of a parent to recover damages for death,, through the negligent act of a defendant, of a minor child, is, under the law, based upon the lack of support of the parent by the minor, and because of being deprived of the society and companionship of the child. To this, of course, can be added the cost and expense of the-medical treatment, if any, before the death. Mental anguish of the parent, as such, is not an element of damage.</p> <p>■2. Where the view in front and to the right and left of a residence is obstructed by the fence, trees, and shrubbery, and a street car track is located immediately outside the fence, where the sidewalk would ordinarily be, both the plaintiff and the defendant street car company are bound to exercise extraordinary care to avoid accidents.</p> <p>•3. Contributory negligence being the proximate cause of an injury defeats the right of recovery.</p> <p>4. He that has the last clear chance to avoid an accident that results in personal injury, and fails to do so, is guilty of negligence that is the proximate cause thereof.</p> <p>■5. When a plaintiff is riding in a hired public carriage, with its own driver, but which is under the complete control and direction of such plaintiff, the negligence of such driver can be imputed to such plaintiff; but per conira, when the carriage is not under plaintiff's complete control.</p> <p>'6, A plaintiff sitting on the front seat of a public hack with the driver, and having equal opportunity to know or to see danger, is, equally bound with the driver to exercise all proper care and prudence to avoid the same.</p> <p>*1. Where the track of an electric car line runs along the side of a street close to the fences, trees, and shrubbery in front of residences, the owners of such car line are bound to exercise extraordinary care to avoid injuring people that might suddenly come out through the gateways in front of such cars, and must keep proper brakes and other appliances on such cars, so as to be able to stop them within a roo sonable distance.</p>

<p>Libel.</p> <p>1. Newspapers have no more right to publish libelous statements than have individuals.</p> <p>2. An article in a newspaper which charges (as a rumor) that plaintiff was dishonorably discharged from the police force, had committed suicide, and confessed to having committed murder, is libelous per se.</p> <p>3. Proofs of actual damages may be received in such ease, but are not necessary.</p> <p>4. Defendant may only prove in mitigation of damages general facts bearing upon plaintiff’s character, standing, etc.</p> <p>5. Punitive damages can be given only in cases of malice or gross carelessness in ascertaining the truth before making the publication.</p> <p>6. Elements of damage in such a ease are: suffering by reason of the publication, injury to feelings, loss of business, effect upon social standing, and such other damages as may have been proved.</p> <p>7. Newspapers are put upon inquiry as to the truth of the articles they publish, and must exercise reasonable diligence in the matter.</p> <p>8. A retraction by the defendant may be considered in mitigation of damages, but, to be a retraction, it must be an absolute and unambiguous denial of the material portions of the libel.</p> <p>9. Pacts not known to defendant at the time of the publication cannot be used in mitigation of damages.</p> <p>10.All the owners and publishers of a newspaper are equally liable for a libel published in their paper.</p>

<p>Libel.</p> <p>1. The district court of the United States -for Porto Rico, while not a, national court in the constitutional sense, yet is one of the courts of the Federal territorial system, as distinguished from the local territorial or insular courts.</p> <p>2. The United States District Attorney of the court may practise in civil cases, and such practice involves no moral turpitude nor any legal wrong.</p> <p>.3. The local law prohibiting district attorneys from practising in civil cases has no application to the Federal court.</p> <p>•4. No person has a right to libel another for doing something, not prohibited by law, about the morals of which they disagree.</p> <p>5. While the truth may be pleaded in justification of an alleged libel of a public official, this means that defendant must prove that the acts which he criticized are contrary to law. fi. When defendant justifies and fails to prove his allegations, the attempted justification is an aggravation of the libel.</p> <p>'7. One who has been libeled may defend himself by like publications, if he does so within a reasonable time, and does not exceed proper limits.</p> <p>8. That plaintiff was removed from office by the President cannot he taken into account in a libel suit, nor the motives of the President inquired into.</p> <p>9. The legislative bodies of Porto Rico are supreme within their respective spheres, and no inquiry can, in a suit for libel, be made as to their motives.</p> <p>10. Congress or the President can alone make such inquiry, and no court can interfere when such bodies act within the scope of their legislative functions.</p> <p>11. A publisher of a newpaper has no greater liberty than an individual to publish statements concerning others.</p> <p>12. Criticism of public officials must be inspired by good motives, and must be reasonable.</p> <p>13. Articles in a newspaper held to be libelous per se.</p> <p>14. Punitive damages should be given when the publication was maliciously made and without good motive, or for the public good, but with intent to injure, and per contra.</p> <p>15. Allegations contained in court proceedings are usually privileged, and are presumed to be the allegations of the party who makes the same, and not of the attorney or solicitor.</p> <p>16. Reports to superior officers, even though containing libelous matter, are also privileged; but publications of them, by the person making them, after the matter is over, and unnecessarily, and with direct intent to injure, and with malice toward the person against whom directed, are actionable.</p> <p>17. The burden of proving these facts is on the person against whom the libel is directed.</p> <p>18. Malice is not presumed in any privileged statement, although the same should afterward be published unnecessarily; as to whether there was malice in the after-publication is matter for the jury.</p>

<p>1. The court has jurisdiction of a suit against a partnership, sued as such, when all the partners are Spanish subjects.</p> <p>;2. Complainants, who are not in possession of the land sued for, may maintain a bill in equity to annul a “dominio” title alleged to have been obtained by fraud of which defendants had notice, and to recover the land.</p> <p>3. The person claiming under a “dominio” title has the legal title to the land in question.</p>

<p>1. Negligence is contributory when, without the doing of the act charged to be negligent, the accident could not have happened.</p> <p>2. Save in rare instances, it is negligence to board a moving train.</p> <p>3. A passenger about to board a moving train must look ahead, and will be-presumed to have- seen anything that was in plain view.</p> <p>Note. — Passenger; contributory negligence. — In the following editorial' notes the various questions on the subject of the negligence of passengers are fully presented: Passenger’s negligent exposure of person at car window, note to Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Scott, 16 L.R.A. 91; Boarding moving train, note to Carr v. Eel River & E. R. Co. 21 L.R.A. 356; Negligence of passenger in passing from one car to another, note to McAfee v. Huide-koper, 34 L.R.A. 720; Negligence in getting on or off moving street car, note to Jagger v. People’s Street R. Co. 38 L.R.A. 786; Contributory negligence of passenger in riding or standing on running board of street car, notes to Burns y. Johnstown Pass. R. Co. 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1191, and Harding v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 352; Exposure by passenger inside of street car of part of his body beyond side of ear, note to Georgetown & T. R. Co. v. Smith, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 274; Riding on platform of street car as negligence, note to Capital Traction Co. v. Brown, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 831; Contributory negligence of persons about to take trains, note to Warner v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 42 L. ed. U. S. 491.</p> <p>4. It is nearly always negligence for a passenger to ride on the platform of a moving oar; especially so when there is room for him inside of the car.</p> <p>5. It is negligence per se for a passenger to allow any portion of his body to extend outside of the line of the ear.</p>

<p>Plaintiff, a railroad corporation, contracted with defendant, a sugar company, to build for the latter a short piece of railway over the route covered by the former’s franchise, at actual cost, that being, under the circumstances, mutually advantageous. The contract did not authorize plaintiff to sublet the work, but it nevertheless did so. Held: That defendant is not bound for anything above actual cost, and that the subcontractor’s profit was no part of such .cost.</p>

<p>1. A partial decree will be entered in equity, settling the rights of some of the parties, and the trial continued for an accounting as to others.</p> <p>2. An agent who has practised fraud on his principals will be compelled to-make restitution, and a fraudulent conveyance to him will be set aside.</p>

<p>1. When two persons enter into partnership as selling agents for wholesale houses, and possess no property in common save the commissions on the sales, and one of the partners, who had this business established before he entered into partnership with the other, ascertains that the latter misrepresented his capacity as a salesman to him, the former may break a time contract of partnership without being obliged thereafter to divide the profits accruing from his own subsequent labor up to the end of the time of the contract of partnership.</p> <p>'2. Eor the peculiar facts of the ease, see the following opinion.</p>

<p>1. As heretofore several times held, the employers’ liability act of March the 1st, 1902 (Rev. Stat. of Porto Rico, pages 150 et seq.), being special, is not affected by §§ 60 and 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure-of Porto Rico of 1904, and therefore, Held: That damages for injury resulting in death of an employee are limited to $3,000 under the former special act.</p> <p>2. See the memorandum showing the facts.</p>

<p>1. It is probably the law in Porto Rieo, under the decision of this same case, Romeu v. Todd, 206 U. S. 358, 51 L. ed. 1093, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724, that an intending purchaser is not bound by any equities or rights of others regarding real property, save where a cautionary notice thereof is actually inscribed in the registry of property, especially under facts as in the case at bar.</p> <p>2. See the memorandum of the court’s views for the facts.</p>

<p>1. Whenever the court can see, even though a hill in equity is ingeniously framed so as to try to show jurisdiction and equity, that in fact the whole subject-matter of the litigation was settled in the Spanish courts years before American occupation of Porto Rico, a plea of res judi-cata may be considered in the nature'of a demurrer and the bill dismissed for want of equity.</p> <p>2. See the memorandum giving court’s reasons for dismissing the case for want of equity.</p>

<p>1. A “Federal question” for jurisdictional purposes is one which goes to the foundation of the suit, and is not merely incidental.</p> <p>2. Prior to the act of Congress of March 2d, 1901, increasing the jurisdiction of the court, it had no jurisdiction of a case between nonresident foreigners and resident Porto Eicans.</p>

<p>1. Under § 36 of the act of Congress approved April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap 191), providing a civil government for Porto Rico, commonly known as the Foraker law, the salaries and expenses of the district court of the United States for Porto Rico are payable on the warrant of the auditor, countersigned by the governor of the island, and the duty of at least the auditor in that regard is purely ministerial.</p> <p>2. It is not within the power of the legislative assembly of the island of Porto Rico to pass any law contrary to such organic act, that will hamper that court or its officers in the exercise of the judicial functions conferred upon it by national authority.</p> <p>3. The district court of the United States for Porto Rico is, by said act of Congress, vested with power to appoint all its own necessary officials other than those otherwise provided for in said act, and it is not within the power of the local assembly to appoint the insular paymaster as an official of said court.</p> <p>4. All courts, when legally created, have power inherent in themselves to issue all writs necessary to preserve their existence, independent of the question as to whether direct power is given to them to issue writs of mandamus; and hence they can issue such writs where the same becomes necessary for such purpose, in order to oblige officials over whom they have jurisdiction to perform a ministerial duty affecting the existence of the court.</p> <p>5. Where a duly and legally created court is in the regular performance of its functions, and issues a peremptory writ of mandamus to enforce the performance of a ministerial act by an official, and where the refusal to perform such ministerial act threatens the existence of the court, the respondent is not entitled to supersedeas on taking an appeal, and the appeal should not be granted until after the performance of the duty commanded by the writ.</p>

<p>Where it is apparent from the prayer of a bill in equity that the matter in controversy is strictly a probate matter, the district court of the United States for Porto Rico has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, no matter what the citizenship of ,the parties or the amount involved may be.</p>

<p>This court will not, at the request of plaintiffs, issue a mandatory injunction to an insular court, requiring it to dismiss a suit filed there by defendants against plaintiffs. Courts of concurrent jurisdiction never proceed in that way. In a proper ease this court might restrain defendants from proceeding in any other court, but it would be wholly improper to attempt to issue process against the court itself.</p>

<p>1. Where a party, being part owner thereof, has been in possession of real estate, naanaging the whole thereof for many years, a strict account of such management must be rendered to the other owners, especially when they are not residents of the country.</p> <p>2. In such a case, where an accounting filed against such other owners shows a balance due greater than the value of their entire interest in the estate, so that they would have lost the entire estate without ever having been in possession of the same, and the account on its face is largely illegal and unintelligible, the whole of the same will be disallowed, and the absent owners given their entire estate free of such claim of such manager, as the burden is on him to show his right to make such charges against the other owners, when it appears that the use of the property sufficiently paid him for his trouble.</p>

<p>1. It is a contempt of court for attorneys to go before a committee of a local legislature, and there comment upon, and criticize the court regarding its rulings in cases that are still pending before it, especially ivhen such attorneys are of counsel in some of the cases referred to.</p> <p>Note. — Contempt.—For cases dealing with criticism of decision or opinion after case has been determined, as contempt, see note to Re Breen, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 572; as to personal criticism of, or insult to, court, because of decision, after determination of cause, as ground for contempt, see note to Re Hart, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 585; failure to appear or tardiness of attorney as contempt of court, see note to Ex parte Clark, 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 389; as to want of due respect towards court in legal papers as ground for disbarment, see note to Re Robinson, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 525.</p> <p>2. Notwithstanding § 725, U. S. Rev. Stat.'U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 583, it is a contempt of court for attorneys to testify and criticize the court for its rulings in pending cases, before a legislative committee, especially when it is manifest that such action is intended to intimidate the court.</p> <p>3. Quiere: Whether or not the legislative privilege of attorneys who happen to be members of a legislative body protects them against citation for contempt or for unprofessional conduct for slanderously criticizing the court for its rulings in cases still pending before it, and in some of which they themselves are of counsel?</p> <p>4. Since the enactment of § 725, U. S. Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 583, courts of the United States, or courts having similar jurisdiction, are much more restricted as to their powers to punish for contempt than are local or state courts. In many instances judges of courts are left to their remedy by personal action for criminal or civil libel or slander like other citizens, where a jury trial can be had by the defendant.</p> <p>5. Under our system of government, the three co-ordinate branches thereof —-(the axecutive, the legislative, and the juidcial — are each supremo and independent within their own respective spheres; neither has any right to encroach upon the duties or prerogatives of either of the others, but each owes to the other proper courtesy and respect. Therefore: The intermeddling of the local house of delegates in the affairs of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico in the way of slanderous criticism of its judge for his action in cases still pending before the court is an inexcusable impertinence.</p> <p>6. Attorneys owe to the court proper respect, and they owe this because of being officers of the court, in a higher degree, probably, than citizens at large. Under their oath of office, all lawyers must maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, because judges are not wholly free to defend themselves, and are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor.</p> <p>As to liability of publisher, as for contempt of court, for publishing an inaccurate report of a court decision, see note to Re Providence Journal Co. 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 583.</p> <p>7. A so-called joint resolution passed by a bare majority of the house of delegates of Porto Rico, and which was never transmitted to the executive council or upper house of the assembly, is not a joint resolution of the assembly, and has no force or effect in law.</p> <p>8. Quare: Whether, since the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States in White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 291, 11 L. ed. 602, members of n local legislature, who, by their acts, insult and slander a Pederá 1 judge, or one having such jurisdiction, may not be liable to citation for contempt, or subject to actions at the hands of the judge individually for libels or slanders uttered in course of debate, or published in their reports?</p> <p>9. In contempt proceedings the court is not a party; there is nothing in or about the issue that effects the judge in his own person, even though the attack is directed at him individually; and his only concern is that the law should be obeyed and enforced.</p> <p>Note. — The court imposed a suspension from practice of six months and a fine of $150 on respondent Mott; a suspension from practice of thirty days and a fine of $100 on respondent Hord; a suspension of thirty days without any fine on respondent Dexter; and discharged respondent Sarmi-ento.</p> <p>A reading of the foregoing statement and opinion probably does not convey sufficient information to the reader regarding this very unique matter. Therefore the following additional information is given. Two members in particular from among the members of the house of delegates appeared td be the chief movers in the proceedings in the house, and in the advertising for and the taking of “testimony.” They were Herminio Diaz Navarro and _Cayetano Coll y Cuchi, both members of the bar of this court. It cannot be ascertained what caused them to act, save that it is believed they were friends of several of the parties — attorneys, editors, and politicians — who claimed they had cause for personal spite against the court. The only case in which it is known that Diaz and Coll y Cuchi were dissatisfied was one entitled, United States v. Soeiété Anonyme des Suereries de Saint Jean, where the court imposed the minimum fine of a thousand dollars on their client, under the United States statute, after a jury had found the defendant guilty of importing contract labor to the island. The cause is still pending on appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States.</p> <p>The other parties who appeared before this legislative committee and testified were Vicente Baibas, editor of the Heraldo Español. His enmity was founded on his pretended dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling and the jury’s verdict in and about a libel suit against his newspaper, entitled, Calderin v. Heraldo Español, ante, 376; Juan Vias Ochoteco, head of the insular consolidated department (sanitary board of the island). His feeling against the court, it appears, was caused because of the punishing for contempt of his subordinate, Dr. Martinez, in the case of Commercial Invest. Co. v. Mayaguez L. & P. Co. ante, 267, because said subordinate had interfered with a receiver of the court, and had attempted to put the receiver in jail twice. Ochoteeo appeared also to have been dissatisfied with the court’s ruling in the matter of the distribution of a fund that was in the registry of the court in the matter of Rodriguez y Pujáis v. Argueso y Flores, ante, 216.</p> <p>Mr. Laureano Sarria also testified before the committee. His dissatisfaction was based on the court’s decision in LeBrun v. Romero, 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 225, and on its decision in LeBrun v. Sixto, 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 492, which former decision was made necessary by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Sixto v. Sarria, 196 U. S. 175, 49 L. ed. 436, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186.</p> <p>Respondent Mott’s dissatisfaction was based principally upon the fact that, owing to his annoying manner in the conduct of trials, the court had spoken crossly to him five or six times within the previous two and a half years. He also claimed to be dissatisfied with the rulings in Rivera v. Sun Life Assur. Co. 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 351, and 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 455; and with the ruling in Gonzalez v. Buist, ante 243; and with the ruling in the three trials of Herrera v. Valdes, ante, 409, although the new trial, as requested, had been granted when he testified.</p> <p>Respondent Hord did not express his dissatisfaction with the court’s action in more than one or two cases, the principal one being Pettingill v. Gandía, ante, 383.</p> <p>Respondent Dexter’s complaint appeared to be that the court did not decide several cases in which he was interested with sufficient promptness to suit him, particularly one of his personal cases, entitled Dexter v. Arzuaga, ante, 344, and the cases entitled Blanco v. Fernandez y Perez, ante, 428, and Marini v. De la Baume, ante, 472.</p> <p>The case with the rulings in which respondent Sarmiento claimed to be dissatisfied was the Dexter v. Arzuaga Case, supra.</p>

<p>Where plaintiff in ejectment recovered two tracts of land and $4,000 for their wrongful detention, it is proper for the court, on motion for a new trial, under penalty of having the new trial granted for failure to do so, to require plaintiff to disclaim as to one of the tracts of land and the proper portion of the damages, when the proofs, on reexamination, are found to be insufficient to warrant recovery of such tract and the corresponding damages.</p>

<p>1. The law of tlie road in Porto Rico is practically the same as it is in the different states of the Union, users of bicycles and automobiles have exactly equal rights thereon.</p> <p>2. Where both parties involved in an occurrence not criminal, that results in the death of one of them, are not guilty of any negligence, the occurrence is what is known in law as an inevitable accident, for which no one is liable.</p> <p>3. Where both parties to an occurrence resulting in personal injuries that cause death are equally guilty of negligence, no recovery can be had for the death; but, even though, deceased may have been guilty of negligence, yet, if defendant was also guilty of negligence, and, in addition, had the last clear chance, notwithstanding deceased’s negligence, to avoid injuring him, and failed to do so, then defendant is liable.</p> <p>4. The negligence of a chauffeur in charge of an automobile, committed while in the exercise of his ordinary duties, is chargeable to his employer, especially when such employer is occupying a seat in the automobile with him.</p> <p>5. A mere guest, riding in an automobile at the invitation of its owner, and who takes no part in conducting the same, cannot have the negligence of the chauffeur or the owner thereof imputed to him.</p> <p>6. Whether or not the whole or only one or more of the persons riding in an automobile at the time of the occurrence of an accident are the owners of such automobile is matter for the jury on an issue raised regarding the same.</p> <p>7. Much greater care and caution are to be exercised by those using automobiles and bicycles in a crowded and crooked street, even within the prescribed speed limits, than would be required in places where the traffic or travel along the street is not great.</p> <p>8. In determining whether or not defendants are liable for an accident resulting in death, caused by a collision of their automobile with deceased, who was riding a bicycle, the jury must take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as the amount of traffic on the street, the speed of each of the parties, the obstructions to view and to travel, the weather conditions, and the position of each of the parties along the road, and whether such position was right or wrong at that particular time, under the local regulations.</p> <p>9. In civil actions for injuries causing death, the fact that the jury finds for the plaintiff, as a usual thing, fixes liability. But where, in the judgment of the court, the verdict ought to have been against the prevailing party, and it appears that the same was given for little more than nominal damages only because the jury thought there was no liability^ the verdict will not be disturbed at the instance of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Under tlie decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Martinez v. La Asociación De Señoras Damas, 213 U. S. 20, 53 L. ed. ■ — , 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327, on appeal from our decision in 2 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 369, a hanking concern with capital stock, a common sea], and the usual corporate attributes and powers, organized in Spanish times in Porto Rico, to do business solely in that island, and continuing so to do business there since the change of sovereignty up to the present time, even though it has not done anything to organize under the laws of any American state or under the present laws of Porto Rico, is at least not now a Spanish corporation for purposes of jurisdiction in this court.</p>

<p>In personal injury cases where it is doubtful, under the wording of the complaint, as to whether, when the proofs are in, a cause of action will have been made out, the court may, in its discretion, overrule a demurrer to the complaint, reserving its right to sustain a demurrer to the evidence at the trial.</p>

<p>When a defendant removes a ease from the insular court to the district court of the United States for Porto Rico, and fails within the legal period to docket it in the latter court, ordinarily the remedy of the opposite party is to make a showing in the insular court to that effect, and proceed there for damages on the bond given to obtain the removal.</p>

<p>Under §§ 1803 and 1804 of the Civil Code of 1902, and § 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904 of Porto Rico, in personal-injury cases resulting in death, the adult nondependent children of the deceased can, at most, recover but little more than nominal damages without showing special circumstances, and alleging and proving actual pecuniary loss.</p>

<p>1. The matter as to whether a foreigner or a citizen of the United States, resident in Porto Rico, when sued in an insular court by a Porto Rican or by - foreigners, or even by other citizens of the United States, can remove the case to this court, is stare decisis against the right to remove, under authority of Wenar v. Pohl, 1 Porto Rico Fed. Rep, 37.</p> <p>2. In a case where the insular court, on application of such resident defendant, sends a case here by a proper order, and the same being a case wherein, under the law, this court would have had jurisdiction as to all the parties impleaded had the cause been filed here in the first instance, it is discretionary with the court as to whether or not it will remand the cause on motion of the plaintiff; and where it appears, as in the case at bar, that other phases of the subject-matter of the litigation are already pending in this court, which took jurisdiction in the first instance, the motion to remove the case will be denied.</p> <p>3. Quwre: Whether the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 71-73, 51 L. ed. 375, 376, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, is a sufficient intimation that the opinion of that court would be against the ruling in Wenar v. Pohl, supra.</p>

<p>1. Neither under §§ 1803 and 1804 of the Civil Code of 1902, or under §§ 60 and 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904, can an outside collateral relative or heir, even when such persons are permitted to sue, recover damages in a civil suit for negligent injury causing death, save for actual pecuniary loss, which must be alleged and proved.</p> <p>2. When a guardian sues under § 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904 of Porto Rico, recovery can he had only for the pecuniary loss sustained by such guardian, or the pecuniary loss sustained by the estate of the ward.</p> <p>3. In Porto Rico, as well as in most of the states of the Union, and also in every common and Civil-Law country, statutes or codes enabling non-dependent collateral relatives or heirs to sue for negligent injuries causing death appear, in most instances, to be intended as compensatory only; and such statutes or codes, as a general rule, exhibit no intention to permit exemplary damages to be recovered, or damages in the nature of punishment for a possible crime involved in the negligence. These matters are for the state, and not for private prosecutors.</p> <p>4. But the rule permitting recovery by nondependent collateral relatives, heirs, or personal representatives of only compensatory damages for negligent injuries resulting in death cannot be strictly applied in cases where the suit is by the surviving husband, or wife and children, or either or both, or by other direct ascending or descending heirs or relatives. In such cases the measure of damages may be quite different, and the loss of the society as well as the kindly demeanor of the deceased toward the person suing, and other considerations, may enter into the equation.</p>

<p>The question as to whether local statutes requiring an attorney’s fee, in addition to the other costs and expenses, to he allowed to the prevailing party, is applicable to this court, is stare decisis against the proposition, under Barbosa v. Bird, 1 Porto Rico Red. Rep. 79.</p>

<p>1. In personal-injury cases in Porto Rico, when the person injured is the one suing, and the physical injury is of a permanent nature, actual pecuniary loss need not he alleged or proved to entitle plaintiff to recover for the physical injury.</p> <p>2. Where it is shown by the evidence that a plaintiff had two physicians attending her for a permanent physical injury, in a suit for negligence in causing the accident that resulted in such injury, recovery can be had even though plaintiff has not shown that she has paid the physicians for their services; and the jury may take into consideration the physicial deformity and the effect it may have on her chances to get married or become settled in life, and the manner in which it may impair her earning capacity in the future as an element in measuring the damages.</p> <p>3. “The last clear chance” rule, to avoid an injury, and failing to do so, as creating liability, adhered to.</p> <p>4. Where the evidence is conflicting as to which of the parties was guilty of the negligence that was the actual proximate cause of the injury, a verdict for the plaintiff will not be disturbed.</p> <p>Note. — Por exhaustive note on the subject of the doctrine of last clear chance, see note to Bogan v. Carolina C. R. Co. 55 L.R.A. 418, also note to Neary v. Northern P. R. Co. 19 L.R.A. (N.S.l 446.</p> <p>As to doctrine of last clear chance as affected by question whether negligence of plaintiff or deceased and of defendant was concurrent, see nota to Dyerson v. Union P. R. Co. 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 132.</p>

<p>1. In a contest between private parties claiming to be tbe owners of certain marshy lands, and the insular authorities of the island, claiming the same as public property, upon which the island’s concessionees are extending a drainage system, a restraining order pending the litigation will not be issued against the defendants, especially where it is manifest that no irreparable damage is being done.</p> <p>2. Under the peculiar land laws of Porto Rico, a bill to remove clouds from and quiet a title to real estate, and to have registered titles canceled and others inscribed, and often, incidentally to get possession of the land, is the only adequate remedy. In such a case the ordinary action of ejectment is often wholly inadequate.</p>

<p>One Rodriguez, years ago, owned a large tract of land in Porto Rico. He had obtained 105 cuerdas of it from certain poor people who had secured an expediente posesorio therefor, and 94% cuerdas of it from another set of poor people who bad also secured an expediente posesorio for the latter quantity. Certain of his creditors executed on the 105-cuerda tract, and there was evidence tending to show that Rodriguez put them in-possession of it with the officers. These creditors sold this 105-euerda tract to defendants. Plaintiff thereafter became possessed of some 440 additional cuerdas of Rodriguezs land. Defendants and plaintiff became involved in a dispute over the location of their respective boundary lines. Plaintiff, when examining the registry of property, found that the 94% cuerdas- were still in the name of Rodriguez, and were being assessed for taxes to him, or else plaintiff himself secured such tract to be so assessed. Plaintiff then bought the 94%-cuerda tract at tax sale, and claiming that defendants were in possession of the land described in his tax deed, instead of the 105 cuerdas which they bought, brought suit to eject them. After the cause was partially tried before a jury, the latter was discharged, and by stipulation the case was finished before the court. Held: That where the evidence is conflicting, and the descriptions in the deeds of both paties indefinite, and where the remedy is sought is not only to eject defendants, but to cancel their title, and assert that of plaintiff to the same land, it being claimed that both titles are inscribed, the proper procedure is a suit in equity for such purpose, and to quiet the title, or else the cause should be relegated to the insular court that put defendants in possession of the 105 cuerdas, so that the matter may be finished there.</p>

<p>1. There.is no law in Porto Rico specifically giving an attorney a lien for his fees, but, where a contract exists between the parties for such a lien,-a court of equity will enforce its specific performance the same as any other proper contract where such relief is granted.</p> <p>Note. — The authorities bearing upon various questions relating to liens of attorney are discussed in the following notes: As to lien of attorney for compensation, see note to Texas v. White, 19 L. ed. U. S. 992; as to right of attorney to recover upon quantum meruit for services rendered under illegal or champertous contract, note to Barngrover v. Petti-grew, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 261; priority of claim for services of attorney against property in hands of receiver over recorded liens, note to First Nat. Bank v. Cook, 2/L.R.A.(N.S.) 1036; dismissal of suit, to defeat attorney’s lien or claims to compensation, note to Jackson v. Stearns, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 390; attorney’s lien on client’s cause of action for tort, note to Boogren v. St. Paul City R. Co. 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 379; attorney’s lien on fund in bastardy-proceedings, note to Costigan v. Stewart, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 630.</p> <p>2. Qucere: And not decided whether the proper procedure is-to decree that a lien exists, and enforce its registration, or to oblige the respondents to execute a mortgage or a lien in accordance with this contract under the local law.</p> <p>3. Even in Porto Rico, under the Civil-Law' rule, it is not the universal rule that a purchaser of lands is not bound by the equities between the registered owners and other regarding the same, not appearing on the record.</p> <p>4. A court such as the district court of the United States for Porto Rico, having chancery jurisdiction, can, even under the Civil Law in Porto Rico, enforce the specific performance of a contract for attorneys’ fees to the extent of making the same a lien upon real estate, and can do this even against parties who purchased the land with full knowledge of complainant’s rights. Such purchasers cannot, either at the common law or under the Civil Law, be held to be “terceros,” or innocent purchasers for value without notice.</p> <p>5. Federal courts recognize no. common-law lien for attorneys’ fees, especially on real estate, and will enforce the same only where the local law permits it, or equity and good conscience otherwise require it.</p>