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4 S.C. 45

McAliley v. Barber

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided December 14, 1872

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1872-12-14

<p>Where land is sold under a decree for partition between heirs, and is afterwards sold under a. judgment against the ancestor, the purchaser under the sale for partition has no equity to restrain the purchaser under the judgment from prosecuting an action to recover the possession of the land, upon the mere ground that the fund arising from the sale for partition is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and is under the control of the Court, and that the owner of the judgment stood by and did nothing to prevent the sale for partition.</p> <p>Nor does an allegation that there arc personal assets in the hands of the administrator of the ancestor, which may bo sufficient to satisfy the judgment, give rise to such an equity.</p> <p>A judgment creditor has the right to select what property of his debtor shall be sold under his execution.</p> <p>Where a defendant has an equitable defense the proper practice is, not to bring a cross action in the nature of a bill for injunction, but to allege the matter in the answer as a defense or counter claim.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1902

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The proper practice, when a defendant has rights upon grounds that formerly authorized the filing of a bill to restrain an action at law, which lie desires to oppose to a recovery in an action against him, is to interpose such rights by way of answer or counterclaim. He may in this way not only take advantage of them by way of defeating the plaintiff’s judgment, but may seek and obtain affirmative relief appropriate to the case thus made by him.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n of Syracuse v. Welling

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-12-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Willard, A. J.

¶2This was a complaint in the nature of a bill in equity to restrain the action at law brought by the defendants against the present plaintiff in which judgment has been given. (See next case).

¶3The complaint presents no equity that would warrant an interference with the legal rights of the defendant, as purchaser, under the judgment against H. Macon.

¶4*48The only fact alleged in support of an equity in the plaintiff to restrain the suit to enforce the legal title of the defendants is, that 0. Barber was present at the sale for partition and did not forbid the same. This fact was denied by the answer, and, if material, should have been proved. But it is wholly immaterial, for, standing by itself, it does not warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff seeks to draw from it. This question, as well as all the other questions properly arising on the complaint and answer, are conclusively ruled by Moore vs. Wright, (14 Rich. Eq., 132).

¶5That case holds, distinctly, that a purchaser under a partition among distributees has no equity to restrain a judgment creditor of the ancestor of the distributees from enforcing such judgment against any portion of the estate bound by such judgment, on the mere ground that it can be satisfied out of other assets, without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right, which would otherwise be defeated, and that an allegation that the party stood by and did nothing to prevent this sale did not give rise to such an equity.

¶6The judgment creditor has a right to select as to what property of the judgment debtor shall be sold under his execution. — Long-worth vs. Scriven, (2 Hill, 298.) Unless, therefore, there is a general equity between the parties, or such an abuse of the right of selection as shall amount to a fraud on the rights of third persons, that legal right cannot be restrained on equitable grounds. Whatever equity the plaintiff might have been entitled to before the sale under the judgment, to require the application of the proceeds of the foreclosures to the satisfaction of the execution, he lost, as to the defendants, by his laches in not moving before title vested in him. A question was made below, whether the complaint was properly brought to restrain the action for the recovery of the land. The proper course of practice, where a defendant has rights, upon grounds that formerly authorized the filing of a bill to restrain an action at law, which he desires to oppose to a recovery in an action brought against him, is to interpose such rights by way of answer or counter-claim. He may, in this way, not only take advantage of them by way of defeating the plaintiff’s judgment, but may seek and obtain affirmative relief appropriate to the case thus made by him.

¶7If the Circuit Court should, instead of allowing a defendant to amend his answer, so as to bring forward matters proper for a bill in equity to restrain an action at law, allow the party to prose*49cute a cross action in the nature of such a bill, we are not prepared to say that such subsequent proceeding would be without jurisdiction or liable to reversal on that ground. But as the present suit was dismissed as to the merits, that question does not come before us at present.

¶8The judgment below should be affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Moses, C. J., and Wright, A. J., concurred.
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