Edwards v. Intergraph Services Co., Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
9
cited by 9 later decisions
1
states following
November 2016
most recently cited
8 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 547 So. 2d 870 - West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Florida · Lee v. City of Gadsden · Lamson & Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty · Quillen v. Quillen · 361 So. 2d 1051 - Tice v. Tice
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A premises owner owes his invitees a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn them of any ‘defects and dangers that are known to the landowner but are unknoim or hidden to the invitee[s].’ Prentiss v. Evergreen Presbyterian Church, 644 So.2d [475] at 477 [ (Ala.1994) ] (emphasis added); and Howard v. Andy’s Store for Men, 757 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). A premises owner, however, owes no duty to protect invitees from all conceivable dangers they might face while on the premises because ‘“[t]he owner of a premises ... is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees ... and the principle of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. There is no presumption of negligence which arises from the mere fact of an injury to an invitee.” ’ Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., 769 So.2d 313, 314 (Ala.2000) (quoting Tice v. Tice, 361 So.2d [1051] at 1052 [ (Ala.1978) ]). See also Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282 , 286 n. 4 (Ala.2000) (holding that the principle of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to premises-liability claims). “Instead, ‘“[t]he entire basis of an invitor’s liability rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger which causes the invitee’s injuries. Therefore, if that superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be held liable.”’ Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So.2d 355, 363 (Ala.2006) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985, 989 (Ala.1980)). See also Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So.2”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“‘“[T]he duty owed by the landowner to a person injured on his premises because of a condition on the land is dependent upon the status of the injured party in relation to the land.’ Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So.2d 408, 410 (Ala.1995). ““‘The three classifications of persons coming onto the land are trespasser, licensee, and invitee.... In order to be considered an invitee, the plaintiff must have been on the premises for some purpose that materially or commercially benefited the owner or occupier of the premises.” ’ “Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 699 So.2d 158, 161 (Ala.1997) (quoting Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Ala.1994)). ‘The distinction between a visitor who is a licensee and one who is an invitee turns largely on the nature of the visit which brings the visitor on the premises rather than the acts of the owner which precedes the visitor’s coming.’ Nelson v. Gatlin, 288 Ala. 151, 154 , 258 So.2d 730, 733 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 436 , 282 So.2d 261, 263 (1973). ‘One who enters the land of another, with the landowner’s consent, to bestow some material or commercial benefit upon the landowner is deemed an invitee of the landowner.’ Davidson v. Highlands United Methodist Church, 673 So.2d 765, 767 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965): “ ‘(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. “ ‘(2) A public invitee is a person who is i”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Freeman v. Freeman““[I]n cases where the alleged defect is a part of the premises (in this case, a loose threshold in the main entrance of a restaurant), once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that a defect in a part of the premises has caused an injury, then the question whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect will go to the jury, regardless of whether the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant had or should have had notice of the defect at the time of the accident.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.