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4 Stew. & P. 91

Robinson v. Hamilton

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided June 15, 1833

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1833-06-15

The plaintiffs in error declared -against the defendant, in assumpsit, as the drawer of a bill of exchange. The bill' was drawn on one Chandler, at ninety days, in favor of the plaintiffs or order, and made negotiable and payable at the Bank of Mobile. The proof was, that at maturity the bill had been regularly protested, for non payment; and notice thereof directed to the drawer at “ Wigginsville,” where the bill was dated, lodged in the post office at Mobile.

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1883

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1833-06-15

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Lipscomb, C. J.

¶1This action was brought, on a bill of exchange, drawn by the defendant, on one N. E. Chandler, in favor of the plaintiffs.

¶2The bill, at its maturity, was protested for nonpayment, and notice to the drawer was lodged in the post office at Mobile, the place of payment, addressed to the maker, at Wigginsville.

¶3There was no evidence, that the holder of the bill was apprised, that Wigginsville was near to any post office ; or that he had any information as to the makers place of residence, other than what was derived from the face of the bill itself.

¶4The Bill is in the following words—

¶5Wigginsville, 27th April, 1827.

¶6Sir — At ninety days sight, pay Messrs. Robinson & Davenport or order, negotiable and payable at the Bank of Mobile, four hundred dollars value received, and charge to account your obedient

¶7W. R. Hamilton.

¶8To N. E. Chandler, Esq., Present.

¶9The judge charged the jury, “ that a letter containing notice addressed and directed to a place where no post office was kept, was not proof of such diligence as the law required, and that if they believed *93there was no post office at Wigginsville, they must find for the defendant, unless they believed, he had actually received notice.”

¶10The drawer of the bill had designated his place of residence, as Wigginsville. It was in his power to have given it a more particular description: his failing to do so, in all probability, misled the plaintiff's. They may well have inferred from the description given, that the place was of sufficient notoriety, to dispense with any other.

¶11If the makers place of residence was not known, to the holder, and he could not ascertain it, by using reasonable diligence, it would relieve him from the necessity of giving notice.a We are, therefore, of the opinion, that the notice was sufficient, unless the knowledge had been brought home to the holder of the bill, that there was no post office at Wb'gginsville, or that the maker resided at or near a post office. If advised of such facts, it would have been incumbent on the plaintiffs to give such direction to the notice as would have ensured the greatest certainty of its reaching the maker. The judgment must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded.

Taylor, >J., not sitting.

¶12 1 Johns. R. 294.

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