¶1information.
¶2If the presiding judge of a court of common pleas, wilfully prevent an associate from delivering his sentiments to the grand jury, after the president has concluded his charge; it is not an indictable offence, and therefore, not a case in which an information will be granted; but every judge has a right, and it is emphatically his duty, to deliver his sentiments, upon every subject that occurs in court.
¶3The Attorney-General made a motion, for a rule to show cause why an information should not be granted against the defendant, the president of the courts of common pleas, in the fifth circuit ; on the affidavit of J. C. Lucas, an associate judge of the court of common pleas of Allegheny county, stating that he had been wilfully prevented by Mr. Addison, from deliver-*197big his sentiments to the grand jury, after Mr. Addison, as President, had. concluded his charge, &e.
¶4In support of the motion, the attorney-general cited 1 Reeves Hist. Eng. Law, 201, c. 4; 2 Ibid. 2; Jacob’s L. Dict. tit. “ Chapitre;” 4 Bl. Com. 303; Const. Penn. art. V. § 4; 6 Mod. 96. But—
¶6— We are unanimously of opinion, that the case does not present to our consideration an indictable offence; and, of course, it is not a case, in which an information ought to be granted. But we are (with the same unanimity) of opinion, that every judge has a right, and, emphatically, that it is his duty, to deliver his sentiments upon every subject that occurs in court. We add, so far as the expression of our sense of decorum may have weight, that we think, it would be indecent and improper, in any presiding judge, to attempt to prevent his associates from the exercise of this right; from the performance of this duty.