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← 4 Wash. App. 243 - State v. Cashaw

4 Wash. App. 243 - State v. Cashaw’s Empirical Analysis

1971

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
4
states following
May 2011
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently May 2011

2 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

15019711980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · United States v. James Griggs Raines · Witherspoon v. Illinois · Wright v. State of Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The word “intelligently”, however, does not mean that the accused must be aware of the incriminating nature of the answers he gives in the course of custodial interrogation; nor is it required that the accused be aware of the law relating to the crime, possible defenses, and the precise nature of the risks of talking without the aid of counsel. State v. Aiken, 72 Wn.2d 306 , 434 P.2d 10 (1967). As stated in State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 55 , 243 A.2d 240, 251-52 (1968): Hence if a defendant was given the Miranda warnings, if the coercion of custodial interrogation was thus dissipated, his “waiver” was no less “voluntary” and “knowing” and “intelligent” because he misconceived the inculpatory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because he thought that what he said could not be used because it was only oral or because he had his fingers crossed, or because he could well have used a lawyer. A man need not have the understanding of a lawyer to waive one. Such matters, irrelevant when the defendant volunteers his confession to a friend or to a policeman passing on his beat, are equally irrelevant when the confession is made in custody after the coercion of custodial interrogation has been dispelled by the Miranda warnings. With such warnings, the essential fact remains that defendant understood he had the right to remain silent and thereby to avoid the risk of self-incrimination. That is what the Fifth Amendment privilege is about.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “the term “voluntarily” is used in the due process sense to assure the absence of physical or psychological compulsion. . . . the use of the word “knowingly” was intended to make clear the necessity for express Miranda warnings in every case of custodial interrogation as a condition precedent to the admissibility of answers obtained from such interrogation. . . . The court recognized that an accused might not by reason of physical or mental impairment understand the warnings. The word “intelligently” made it clear that such capacity to understand was a prerequisite to the existence of waiver.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “No legislation requires that a trial court accept the testimony of a witness regardless of whether such testimony is believed. Accordingly, whether a defendant waives his constitutional rights must be determined on the basis of testimony accepted as correct by the trial court. [Citations omitted.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.