Volume 40 — Maryland Reports

This was au action instituted by the appellee against the appellant and one John A. Dushane, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and on the affidavit of the appellant was removed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City. Dushane was returned non est. The declaration contained six counts ; the first was a count in trespass quare clausum fregit.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. First Exception.—Evidence was offered, by the plaintiff to maintain the issue on his part, and testifying in his own behalf, stated that he kept an ice cream saloon, and made cakes and other articles in that line.

This was an action of debt instituted by the appellant, in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, to recover from the appellee the sum of $13,488.10, together with the penalty of ten per cent, thereon, for the tax sought to be imposed by the Act of 1872, eh. 274, of two cents per ton upon the coal alleged to have been mined in the State, and received for transportation over the railroad of the appellee to points within tbe State, and elsewhere, for sale, during the months of…

Cross Appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. Thomas J. Carson was the executor and trustee under the will of Samuel C. Edes, of which the equitable appellees were the beneficiaries. The trusts of the will are fully set forth in Fcviro vs. Oarson’s Admrs., 37 Md., 467, 484. On the 8th of May, 1867, Carson passed his second and. final account as executor, showing a balance in his hands due the estate, of $21,395.20.

<p>When parol Evidence may be admitted to-show the true character and purpose of a Mortgage—Mortgage of Indemnity— What constitutes a sufficient Carrying of Stock by a Broker for a Customer.</p> <p>A mortgage executed by P. and wife, recited that P. stood justly indebted to L. & Co. in the full sum of $30,000, upon his six promissory notes, drawn by him to their order each for $5000, dated the 1st of October, 1851, and payable two of them at six, two at nine, and two at twelve months, and all bearing interest from date, and that the mortgage was executed to secure payment of the said sum of $30,000 and interest, agreeably to the tenor of the said notes. After the usual conveyance and defeasance clauses and assent to a decree for a sale, there was the following: “Memorandum— Whereas the parties hereto of the second part, as copartners aforesaid, are the holders of eleven hundred and fifty shares of the capital stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, which they have agreed to carry for and on account of said P. for the period of twelve months from the first day of October, 185t, at forty-five dollars per share; now it is hereby declared to be the express agreement and understanding of the parties hereto, and one of the considerations for making this mortgage, that in case of a sale of said railroad stock, or any part thereof during said period of twelve months, at an advance over forty-five dollars per share, such advance is to be credited to the said P. on account of the debt secured by this mortgage, and likewise that all dividends received by said parties of the second part on said stock during the period aforesaid is to be credited on account of the said debt hereby secured.” This mortgage being assailed for fraud by a bill in equity, filed by the mortgagors against the mortgagees and the trustee appointed to sell the mortgaged property, it was Held :</p> <p>1st. That parol evidence was admissible for the purpose of showing the true character of the instrument, for what consideration it was given and what purposes the parties to it intended it should subserve.</p> <p>2nd. Thai it was simply a mortgage of indemnity—its sole purpose being to secure L. & Co. against loss in carrying- the eleven hundred and fifty shares of stock to the extent of their sales as low as $<15 per share, they taking upon themselves the risk of all additional loss that might be incurred by a sale at a less rate.</p> <p>Where a broker agrees to carry for and on account of a customer, for the period of twelve months, a certain number of shares of railroad stock, at a specified price per share, he is not bound to retain in his possession during the pendency of the carrying contract, the id entical stock which he agreed to carry; he may sell the whole or any part thereof; all that the law requires of him is, that during the pendency of the contract he should have on hand, in his possession, or under his control, an equal number of other shares of the same stock, ready for delivery when his customer should pay what he owed on account thereof, or to be sold on his account when he should so direct.</p>

In the year 1853, Edward Edelen, of Charles County, died, leaving a will, in which, among other things, he devised as follows: “Item.—I give and devise unto my son, Leonard Edelen, my tract of land which I now live on, containing several pieces or parts of tracts of land, called ‘St. Thomas’ Plague,’ and ‘Woods,’ and ‘Hawkins’ Addition,’ to him and his heirs forever, with this proviso, that my five daughters, Elizabeth, Roberta, Laura, Ann and Maria, shall have a home in the…

“The Antietam Manufacturing Company of Washington County,” by deed of mortgage, dated the 8th of December, 1868, conveyed all its property, real, personal and mixed, to William T. Hamilton, Peter B. Small, George W. Smith, Sr.,.and Josiah F. Smith, with certain trusts and powers to secure the payment of certain bonds which said Company had resolved to issue to the amount of $65,000, the proceeds of which were designed to pay off the debts of said Company, and to create a…

The bill of complaint in this case filed by the appellee on the 20th of June, 1870, alleged that in the year 1868, and prior thereto, the appellant, Parmenio Marlow, was indebted to the complainant in a large sum of money, and on the 10th day of May, 1869, the complainant obtained a judgment by default against the said Parmenio, which was extended on the 22nd of September, 1869, for $793.97 with interest and costs, and on the 27th a writ of fieri facias was issued on the…

The bill in this case filed by the appellant, charged that on the 20th of November, 1869, a certain Frederick Zumpstein, of Frederick county, in consideration of money loaned him by the appellee, executed with the complainant, their joint and several promissory note, for a thousand dollars, payable sixty days after date, to the appellee or order, with interest from date, the complainant signing said note merely as surety for Zumpstein, and the appellee knowing him to be…

<p>Appeal from the Equity side of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This is an appeal from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint of the appellants for want of equity. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The sections of the Articles of Incorporation referred to in the opinion of the Court, as having been repealed by the Resolutions of the Association of January, 1811, are as follows: Article II, section 2.

AppeIl from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The object of the bill of complaint of the appellant in this case, was to obtain a construction of the will of the late Mary Anne,. Marchioness of Wellesley. The two clauses in the-will which gave rise to the controversy, are set out in the opinion of the Court.

The appeal in this case was taken hy the defendant below from a decree for the sale of certain lands by a trustee appointed by the decree, on a bill filed by the complainant for the specific execution of the following agreement: Articles of agreement entered into this 6th day of April, 1868, between Thomas Johnson, of Frederick county, Maryland, of the one part, and Edwin M. Johnson, of said county and State, of the other part: Witnesseth, that the said Thomas doth hereby…

The hill of complaint in this case, filed on the 1st of May, 1874, charged, substantially, that the complainant was in possession of certain rooms and parts of the building, on the southwest, corner of Calvert street and Bank Lane, in the City of Baltimore, under a lease from Mrs. Henrietta R. Glenn, dated 10th May, 1873, demising the said premises to him for the term of two years from 1st of June, 1873, at the yearly rent of $2,500, and up to the time of filing the hill he…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

The appellee sued the appellant. 1st. Eor money payable for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant. 2nd. Eor goods bargained and sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. 3rd. Eor money received by the defendant for the plaintiff’s use. 4th. Eor money found to be due from the defewiint to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them. v 5th.

e Superior Court of Baltimore City. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

This was an appeal from an order of the Orphans’ Court, passed on the 16th of December, 1873, ratifying a sale of certain leasehold property on Addison street, in the City of Baltimore, made under an order of said Court, by the appellees, as administrators of Richard Brooks, deceased, to the appellant, and directing the appellees to allow the purchaser an abatement of one hundred dollars from the purchase money for a deficiency found to exist after the sale, in the size of…

' On the 4th of March, 1868, Jeremiah P. Bartholow, being at that time indebted to Wm. Pinkney Brooke, gave John B. Brooke, as trustee for Martha G. Brooke, the wife of said Wm. Pinkney Brooke, his promissory notes, in settlement of the said indebtedness, and on the 11th of the same month he and his wife executed a mortgage of real estate in Prince George’s county, to said John B. Brooke, as trustee, to secure the payment of said notes. At the time the • indebtedness to Wm.

The bill of complaint in this case, filed on the 8th of December, 1871, by the appellee, charged that he, and the appellant about the year 1868, commenced acting as the managers of the Baltimore County Brewing, Malting and Distilling Company, and as such had charge of all the property of the Company, with the control and superintendence, of its affairs ; that they purchased all the goods necessary for the conduct of the business of the company, paid off its debts and…

<p>Attachment on Warrant issued hy a State Court against a National Bank, illegal— Validity of sec. 2 of the Act of Congress, approved March 3, 1873, amending sec. 57 of the Act of Congress approved June 3, 1864.</p> <p>An attachment on warrant issued by a State Court to affect the funds of a National Bank, is illegal and void, being in violation of section 57 of the Act of Congress, ch. 10G, approved June 3, 1864, as amended by section 2 of the Act of Congress, ch. 269, approved March 3, 1873,—the latter section providing, “That no attachment, injunction or execution, shall be issued against such (Banking) association or its property, before final judgment in any such suit, action, or proceeding in any State, county, or municipal Court.’ ’</p> <p>The second section of the Act of Congress, ch. 269, approved March 3, 1873, amending section 57 of the Act of Congress, ch. 106, approved June 3, 1864, is constitutional and valid, being a provision to promote the efficiency of the National Banks in performing the functions by which they ivere designed to serve the government, and to protect them not only against interfering State legislation, but also against suits or proceedings in State Courts, by -which their efficiency would be impaired.</p>

The petition of the appellee, filed, in this case, alleged, that on the 11th of April, lSYl, an Act was passed hy the General Assembly of Maryland, providing for the general valuation and assessment of property in the State, and among other things provided for in the Act, assessors were required to he appointed hy the Governor for each of the assessment districts of the City of Baltimore and counties of the State, to assess and make the valuation hy said Act directed ; that…

The ease is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception.—The plaintiff offered the fallowing prayers : 1.

Gross-Appeals from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, in Equity. The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought by the appellant against the appellee to recover upon a written contract entered into between them.

First Exception.—The plaintiffs to maintain the issues on their behalf offered In evidence the paper-writing in question purporting to be the last will of John Mason, with the affidavit and probate appended thereto, bat did not read said affidavit and probate to the jury. Oral evidence was introduced on both sides, of which so much as was required to elucidate the questions involved in the case, is stated in the opinion of the Court.

Oil the 2nd of July, 1873, the appellant filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City, praying that issues might he made up and sent to a Court of Law for trial, in accordance with Art. 93, sec. 250 of the Code, and tendered the following, which he prayed might be sent: 1st. Whether the land sold in the year 1866, by the petitioners in this case, to Luke T. Williamson, and in reference to which land this controversy arises, was surveyed, and a plat of it made…

On the 7th of June, 1872, The East Baltimore Permanent Land and Building Society, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a mortgage of certain lots situate in said county, from the appellant Coburn, dated the 3rd of November, 1870, by which it appeared that the said Coburn, being a member of the said Society, a body corporate, had received therefrom in accordance with the provisions of its constitution and by-laws, an advance of $4000, on his ten shares of its…

The bill of complaint in tliis case filed by the appellant, charged that, she lived in the family of John P. Wollet and Asseneth his wife, from some time in the year 1842, until their respective deaths, which occurred in 1872, the wife dying in February and the husband in June of that year; that they never had any children, and during the entire period of her residence with them, she was treated in all respects as an adopted child; that from the time she was able to work, no…

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the appellee against the appellant. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The Court below having refused the instructions asked for by the defendant, and the verdict and judgment being against him, he appealed.

On the 27th of February, 1873, John Downey brought suit in the Baltimore City Court, against Isaac Lamberd on two promissory notes, each for the sum of $450.00, dated February 1st, 1871, and payable respectively, eight and twelve months after date, with interest, and drawn by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. On the same day judgment was rendered by confession in favor of the plaintiff for $1010.00, with interest from the 24th of February, 1873, and costs.

<p>Deed fraudulent and void under the Statute of the 13 th of Elizabeth—Deed fraudulent under the Act of 1864, ch. 306. When an intent to defraud Creditors, will be imputed to the Debtor.</p> <p>A deed conveying to trustees all the property, -and estate of every kind belonging to the grantors individually, and as partners, in trust for the benefit of their creditors who shall within the period of sixty days from the date of the deed, accept the benefit of the instrument, and release the grantors from their claims and demands, but which makes no disposition of the surplus that may remain in the hands of the trustees after paying the creditors who may execute releases within the time prescribed, is fraudulent and void as against ci’editors under the Statute of the 13th of Elizabeth, as such surplus results by implication to the grantors.</p> <p>Such deed is also fraudulent within the meaning of the Act of 1864, ch. 306, and the proceeds of the property in the hands of the trustees, is liable to attachment by the creditors of the grantors.</p> <p>Where a conveyance by its terms, operates to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, the intent to do so, is imputed to the parties. The fraudulent character of the instrument is a presumption of law, not depending upon extrinsic evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal—Inquisition for the Condemnation of land for the Construction of a Railroad—Power of the Circuit Court to direct another Inquisition to be taken, after the first has been set aside—Notice to Land-owner of the application for an Inquisition, not required— Warrant for an Inquisition.</p> <p>No appeal lies from an order of the Circuit Court confirming an inquisition condemning lands for the construction of a railroad, unless the Court exceeds its jurisdiction in passing such order.</p> <p>Where an inquisition for the condemnation of land for the construction of a railroad, returned pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Assembly relating thereto, is set aside, the Court may direct another to be taken in the manner prescribed by the Act; and the power to so direct continues and remains in the Court until the company seeking the condemnation may choose to call for its exercise. It may be exerted at the term at which the first inquisition is set aside, or at any subsequent term, so long as the power to condemn under the company’s charter, exists.</p> <p>Under the provisions of the Act of Assembly regulating the condemnation of land for the construction of a railroad, no notice is required to be given to the land-owner, either of the original application to the justice of the peace by the company seeking the condemnation, or of that to the Court for a new inquisition, when the first has been set aside.-</p> <p>A warrant issued in pursuance of an order of the Circuit Court, by the Clerk to the sheriff, directing a second inquisition for the condemnation of land for the use of a railroad, to be taken, the first having been set aside, is not one of the regular writs known under the head of process, and is not essential to the validity of the inquisition. The power of the Court under the statute to “direct another inquisition to be taken” after the first has been set aside, may be carried out by an order addressed directly to the sheriff commanding him to proceed and take a new inquisition.</p>

<p>Payment and satisfaction of Judgments—Certain acts held not to constitute a Fraudulent intent in procuring the Assignment of a Judgment. The rights and powers of an Assignee of a Judgment as Collateral security, in regard to assigning the same under Art. 9, secs. 1, 2, 3 and 4, of the Code.</p> <p>A judgment was recovered against certain joint and several makers of a promissory note. During tlie progress of the action the note was assigned in writing, and the action was entered to the use of the assignee, who after the judgment was rendered, but on the same day, assigned the judgment, and on the following day an order was filed by the plaintiff’s attorney, directing the judgment to be .entered for the use of the second assignee. The latter bought the judgment as an accommodation for his uncle, who was one of the defendants in the judgment, and paid for it with money borrowed from Bank, upon a discounted note, signed by all but one of the defendants in the judgment as sureties. The remaining defendant after the date of the judgment, conveyed away certain real estate which was after-wards taken in execution to satisfy the judgment. On a bill filed by 'a ■grantee of the land for an injunction to restrain the execution, it was Heed :</p> <p>■1st. That payment by the assignee to the assignor of the judgment, was not a payment by the defendants therein, by reason of the note upon which the money to pay for the judgment was procured, being signed by them as sureties; and did not operate to extinguish or satisfy the judgment.</p> <p>2nd. That the assignee was a stranger to the judgment, under no obligation to pay the debt, and the payment by him to his assignor would not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment, unless such was his manifest intention.</p> <p>3rd. That it could not operate as a payment because the proof showed an express contract to the contrary.</p> <p>4th. That the purchase of the judgment by the assignee at the instance of the said defendants, to relieve them from the necessity of paying the judgment, (il appearing that they were only sureties in the original transaction,) and their signing the discounted note to enable him to raise the money with which to make the purchase, and proof that their intention in the transaction was to enforce the judgment against the property of the other defendant in the judgment, who was the- principal debtor therein, in order to protect themselves, was no evidence of fraud or injustice on their part in procuring the purchase of the judgment for that purpose.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff in an action assigns the debt sued on as collateral security for a contingent liability aud dies, the judgment ought to be returned among the speráte debts of his estate, with the statement of the manner in which the same had been assigned. Still, until such contingent liability . was discharged, the right to the judgment remained in the assignee, with 'the right to enforce its payment by execution or otherwise, and the right to assign it to any one for value.</p> <p>Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4 of Art. 9 of the Code, authorize such assignments to be made, not only by the original plaintiff in the judgment, but also by any one who holds as bona fide assignee.</p>

This was an action of replevin brought ‘by the appellee, to recover certain goods in the possession of the appellants, and withheld by them. The appellants avowed the taking of the goods under distress for rent in arrear for the months of April, May and June, lS^, the amount so due and in arrear being $195. The appellee pleaded to the avowry, 1st. That the said sum of $195, at the time the distraint was laid, was not in arrear and unpaid to the avowants. 2nd.

The hill in this case was filed by Edward Otis Hinkley, executor of the will of Edward Evatt deceased, against the persons in interest, for the settlement of questions of construction growing out of the renunciation by the widow of all benefits under the will, and her election to take dower and distribution under the law. So much of the will as bears upon the questions raised is as follows : 1.

To the case as stated in the opinion of this Court, it may be added that after the Circuit Court passed the order of the 19th of July, 1873, the appellee moved for an attachment against the appellant for not obeying said order.

The appellee on the 31st of May, 1813, sued out an attachment on warrant against the appellant as an absconding debtor. The affidavit of the plaintiff stated that he knew and believed that John Stouffer, Jr., had absconded. On the 11th of November, 1813, the defendant appeared and moved to quash the attachment for the following reasons: 1. That the defendant was a citizen and resident of the State of Maryland at the time of the issuing of the attachment. 2.

This was an action brought by the appellee to recover an amount awarded by arbitrators, to be paid to him by the appellant. To the declaration the defendant demurred, and the Court overruled the demurrer. The defendant thereupon filed eight pleas. Upon the first, second, third and sixth pleas issue was joined. The plaintiff' replied to the eighth plea and issue was joined thereon. To the fourth, fifth and seventh pleas, as follows, the plaintiff demurred : 4th.

This was an action on an appeal bond brought by the appellees against the appellants. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.

The hill in this case was filed hy the appellant against his co-partner for an account of the partnership transactions, and for an injunction. The injunction was granted as prayed, and during the progress of the cause certain creditors of the partnership filed their claims under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the Court. The appeal in this case is taken from a decree of the Court below, (Pistiir'ey, J.,) allowing these claims as against the partnership assets.

This action was brought by the appellee against the appellant, to recover the purchase money of a parcel of land agreed to be purchased by the defendant. Among other defences the defendant pleaded a fraudulent misrepresentation by the plaintiff in regard to the value of the land.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of tbe Court below, upon a bill filed by the appellee, charging that the appellant had not filed her renunciation of the bequests contained in the will of her late husband, Lewis Pindell, deceased, within six months after the first grant of administration upon his estate, as required by section 285- of Article 93 of the Code. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

The suit in which this appeal is taken, was brought by the appellee against the appellant on an accommodation promissory note. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. .First Exception. Stated in the opinion of the Court. Second, Exception.. The plaintiff offered the following prayers : 1.

<p>IAfe^Policy—When evidence of Usage is inadmissible—Admissibility of Evidence of the extent of the Authority of an Agent— Extent of Agents authority— What does not constitute a Waiver of Forfeiture—Principal and Agent.</p> <p>A life policy was issued for the benefit of the wife of the assured, by an insurance company located and doing business in the city of New York, having a branch office in the city of Baltimore. The branch office was in charge of a general agent who had no authority to issue policies in the name of the company, but he received applications for policies, and received from the home office in New York, executed policies to be delivered to the assured; and he was authorized to receive premiums upon delivery of policies, and renewal premiums upon delivery of receipts executed and furnished from the home office. The contract between the wife of the insured and the company was made directly between the parties thereto, without reference to the authority of the agent. Among the terms and stipulations of the policy, and with reference to which the contract was made, were the following: “And it is also understood and agreed by the assured, that in case the said premium shall not be paid on or before the date hereinbefore mentioned for the payment thereof, then, and in every such case, the said company shall not be liable for the payment of the sum assured or any part thereof, and this policy shall cease and determine.’ ’ ‘ ‘The premiums are always due on the several days stipulated in the policy, and all risk to the company commences at the time of the actual payment of the first premium, without regard to the date of the policy, (unless otherwise stipulated in the policy,) and continues until the day named in the policy for the payment of the premium, at 12 o’clock, noon ,(or within thirty days thereafter) and no longer. No premium will be received by the company, continuing any risk, after the day named in the policy for the payment of such premium; or within thirty days thereof, unless the insured is in perfect health, and the risk continued at the entire option of the company ; and no payment of premium is binding on the company unless the same is acknowledged by a printed receipt signed by an officer of the company. All receipts of the company at any time for premiums past due, except as above, are received by the parties in interest as acts of courtesy of the company, and in no case to be considered a precedent, or a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy, according, to the conditions expressed therein.” A premium due on the 20th of June, 1812, was paid to the agent in Baltimore on the 28th of the same month, and at the same time a receipt signed by the proper officer of the company and counter-signed by the agent in Baltimore, in the usual form, was given as of the 21st of June, 1812. The amount of the premium thus received by the agent was remitted by him to the insurance company on or about the 1st of July following, in the regular course of business, without any communication of the fact that it had been received after the time when it was due. The husband, on whose life the policy was issued, died on the 14th of July, 1812. It was admitted that by the non-payment of the premium at the time it was due, the policy lapsed and became forfeited. In an action by the widow, on the policy, it was, Held :</p> <p>1st. That the plaintiff could not show that there existed an usage among the general agents of foreign insurance companies doing business in the city of Baltimore, and in the State generally, and among domestic insurance companies, to accept premiums after the time when they became due and payable by the terms of the policies, and to deliver to the policy holders the receipts of the companies therefor as of the date when the premiums were due.</p> <p>2nd. That the plaintiff could not give evidence to show that it had been the usage of the defendant for more than ten years past, to authorize by parol license its general agents in the State of Missouri, to receive after they became due, premiums and renewal premiums, on its policies issued to parties in. that State, and to furnish such agents with receipts to be delivered to the policy holders, dated as of the time when the premiums became due, and that such usage was general and universal with the , defendant’s agents in that State, with the knowledge and approval of the defendant.</p> <p>3rd. That it was proper for the defendant to read in evidence to the jury the contract between the defendant and its agent in Baltimore, whereby the powers and duties of the latter were defined, for the purpose of showing the extent of his authority, although the plaintiff was in no manner concluded by such contrapt—she being at liberty to rely either upon the express delegation of authority, or upon the authority as it might be inferred from the habit and course of dealing between the parties, or upon the subsequent ratification and adoption of the act of the agent by the principal.</p> <p>4th. That upon the facts of the case, the agent of the defendant had no authority, by receiving the over-due premium from the plaintiff, after the lapse of the policy, to revive the same so as to bind the defendant.</p> <p>5th. That the receipt of the premium by the agent, and its transmission by him to the defendant, and its retention without knowledge of any of the circumstances under which it was paid, was not a ratification by the defendant of the act of its agent so as to waive the forfeiture and revive the policy.</p> <p>Where the authority of an agent of a life insurance company does not extend to making a new contract of insurance, he cannot waive a forfeiture and revive a policy which has lapsed and become void.</p>

<p> Voluntary deed valid as against Subsequent creditors of Grantor. </p> <p>A deed fraudulent and void as against the grantor's antecedent creditors, is valid, if recorded, as against subsequent creditors, when there is nothing in the deed itself, and no evidence to show any intent or design to defraud such creditors.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.</p> <p>The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This was an appeal from a judgment against the appellant as surety on a replevin bond given on behalf of Tracy, Irwin & Co., of New fork, in a replevin suit instituted by them against the appellees… Held: as proven by Yan Schaick. 3. The tender of Pippey, the assignee, to surrender the notes and release, or procure to be released, the said notes and mortgages. 4. The tender of Seldner to Smith, to procure and return to him the said notes and mortgages.

This suit was brought by the appellant against the appellee upon a policy of insurance effected upon buildings which had been used as a distillery, and upon the boilers, engines and other machinery fixed and moveable, &c., contained in the buildings. The property was located in the county of Pittsylvania in the State of Virginia.

Susan Hays and John McCauley were indicted under the Act of 1868, ch. 179, as follows: State oe Maryland, Washington County, to wit: The jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of Washington County, do, on their oath, present that Susan Hays, late of Washington County aforesaid, white woman, and John McCauley, late of the county aforesaid, yeoman, on the first day of August, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, at Washington County aforesaid,…