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40 N.Y. 543

Mills v. . Mills

New York Court of Appeals

Decided June 11, 1869

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1869-06-11

This was an action to compel the specific performance of an agreement to convey certain real estate in the city of Brooklyn. By an agreement of the 8th June, 1853, the defendant, David S. Mills, covenanted to convey to the plaintiff, by deed, with full covenants, certain lots of land, thirty-four in number, situate upon Myrtle avenue and Witherspoon street, in the city of Brooklyn.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““It is not suggested that the plaintiff was a professional man, whose calling it was to address legislative committees. It is not suggested that he had any claim of right, which he proposed to advocate, and which right or debt he proposed to transfer to the defendant. He had simply asked of the legislature the privilege or favor to be granted to him of building and operating a railroad upon certain streets of the City of Brooklyn. This privilege may be assumed to be of pecuniary value. To procure the passage of such a law for the benefit of the defendant, he undertook to use his utmost influence and exertions. This contract is void as against public policy. It is a contract leading to secret, improper and corrupt tampering with legislative action.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co.

““It is not necessary to adjudge that the parties stipulated for corrupt action, or that they intended that secret and improper resorts should be had. It is enough that the contract tends directly to those results. It furnishes a temptation to the plaintiff, to resort to corrupt means or improper devices, to influence legislative action. It tends to subject the Legislature to influences destructive of its character, and fatal to public confidence in its action.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Graves & Houtchens v. Diamond Hill Independent School Dist.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-06-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 1968 · most notably Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (1880), Hazelton v. Sheckells (1906)

27 state decisions

9018691870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hunt, Oh. J.

¶1 The question of the effect of agreements of this character has been recently considered in this court. (Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. R., 235.) See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Gboveb, at page 682. The agreement in question is founded upon an undertaking on the part of the plaintiff, reciting that a bill was pending in the senate, which granted unto the plaintiff a certain railroad franchise in the city of Brooklyn, and promising “to give all the aid in hip, *546 power, spend such reasonable time as may be necessary, and generally to use his utmost influence and exertions to procure the passage into a law of the bill heretofore introduced into the senate of the State of Hew York.” It was further agreed that the said bill should be so amended as to limit the grant therein to the parties to this agreement; or that it should be amended as, from time to time, should be agreed by the said parties; and, when passed, the right should be transferred to David S. The plaintiff further agreed that he would not “ co-operate or conspire” with any other person, or give any aid or countenance to the introduction into the legislature by any other person of a similar proposition.

¶2 It is not suggested that the plaintiff was a professional man, whose calling it was to address legislative committees. It is not suggested that he had any claim of right, which he proposed to advocate, and which right or debt he proposed to transfer to the defendant. He had simply asked of the legislature the privilege or favor to be granted to him of building and operating a railroad, upon certain streets of the city of Brooklyn. This privilege may be assumed to be of pecuniary value. To procure the passage of such a law for the benefit of the defendant, he undertook to use his utmost influence and exertions. This contract is void as against public policy. It is a contract leading to secret, improper, and corrupt tampering with legislative action. See Lyon v. Mitchell (supra), and cases cited. See, also, Fuller v. Dame (18 Pick. R., 479); Sedgwick v. Staunton (14 N. Y., 289); Frost v. Belmont (6 Allen R., 159); Powers v. Skinner (34 Vt. R., 281). It is not necessary to adjudge that the parties stipulated for corrupt action, or that they intended that secret and improper resorts should be had. It is enough that the contract tends directly to those results. It furnishes a temptation to the plaintiff, to resort to corrupt means or improper devices, to influence legislative action. It tends to subject the legislature to influences destructive of its character, and fatal to public confidence in its action. (Clippayn v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S., 315; Fuller v. Dame, supra)

¶3*547 The ease was correctly decided, and the judgment should be affirmed.

¶4 All the judges concurred in the result. Mason, J., thought it the duty of the court to construe a contract as innocent unless it appears affirmatively that it was for a corrupt purpose.

¶5 Judgment affirmed.

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