40 Or. App. 33 - Senn v. Bunick’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Although this court has on occasion indulged in the dictum that punitive damages are not `favored in the law,' it has, nevertheless, uniformly sanctioned the recovery of punitive damages whenever there was evidence of a wrongful act done intentionally, with knowledge that it would cause harm to a particular person or persons. * * * Malice is the term most frequently used in our decisions to define a state of mind that will justify the imposition of punitive damages. Malice, as a basis for punitive damages, signifies nothing more than a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. * * * The intentional disregard of the interest of another is the equivalent of legal malice, and justifies punitive damages for trespass. * * * Where there is proof of an intentional, unjustifiable infliction of harm with deliberate disregard of the social consequences, the question of award of punitive damages is for the jury. * * *." (Citations omitted.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Or. App. 53 - Schumann v. Crofoot · Sears v. Summit, Inc.

2. “"* * * More succinctly, it has been stated that `it is proper to use the sanction of punitive damages where there has been a particularly aggravated disregard' of the rights of others and `where the violation of societal interests is sufficiently great and of a kind that sanctions would tend to prevent * * *.' Noe v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 248 Or. 420, 425 , 435 P.2d 306 (1967), 27 A.L.R.3d 1268 (1969). The impact of punitive damages is supposed to be a `civilizing influence.' Douglas v. Humble Oil, supra, 251 Or. 310 at 316 , 445 P.2d 590 . "It is not necessary for plaintiffs to show actual malice or ill will on the part of defendants. It is enough if the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to conclude the defendants' conduct amounted to an intentional disregard of the plaintiffs' rights. [Footnote omitted.] At the heart of all the punitive damages cases is the idea that in some instances deliberate or careless conduct is so much in disregard of the rights of another that it should lay the actor open to monetary punishment that would tend to deter that sort of conduct in the future. See Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44 Or.L.Rev. 175, 183-86 (1965). The term `smart money' is ancient and apt."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Or. App. 53 - Schumann v. Crofoot