¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court’s December 20, 1999 order restoring Norman’s driving privileges terminated his status as an habitual offender. The majority concludes that, because the December 20, 1999 order provided, pursuant to Code § 46.2-360, for the conditional, rather than full, restoration of Norman’s driving privileges, that order did not terminate Norman’s status as an habitual offender. I disagree with the majority’s premise and conclusion.
¶3As the majority notes, “the habitual offender status of [a] person so declared continues until that person successfully petitions the court to have that status removed and his privilege to drive restored.” Varga v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 547, 551, 536 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2000). Here, as reflected in the trial court’s December 20, 1999 order, Norman petitioned the court “for restoration of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Virginia.” The trial court, finding that Norman’s petition to restore his driving privileges “should be granted, subject to the conditions set forth” in the order, ordered that “pursuant to [Code] § 46.2-360 ... the privileges to operate a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth of Virginia should be restored and they are hereby restored to” Norman. The trial court further ordered that Norman (1) report to the Depart*505ment of Motor Vehicles before driving “for such administrative proceedings and payment[s] ... as may be required,” (2) be monitored and supervised by “Dan River ASAP” for one year, and (3) “not possess or use alcohol ... or drugs.” The court further stated that, should Norman “incur any alcohol or drug related offense during the period of supervision as set forth herein, the Court may in its discretion issue process to the petitioner to show cause why his privilege to drive should not be suspended permanently.”
¶4Code § 46.2-360(1), which pertains to petitions to restore driving privileges,
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we examine a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases. When the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. We must determine the General Assembly’s intent from the words appearing in the statute, unless a literal construction of the statute would yield an absurd result.
¶5Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001) (citations omitted).
¶6Applying these principles, I find that the legislature clearly intended that a court acting on a petition for restoration of driving privileges be permitted to take one of three actions under Code § 46.2-360(l):(l) deny the petition; (2) restore the person’s driving privileges, with or without conditions; or (3) *506grant a restricted license. The statute draws no distinction between a “full restoration” and a “conditional restoration.” Hence, an individual’s privilege to drive is either restored or not restored under Code § 46.2-360(1).
¶7Citing Travis v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 410, 415, 457 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1995), Norman acknowledges in his appellate brief that one who has been granted only a restricted license “retains his habitual offender status.” As the majority points out, however, it is undisputed in this case that the trial court did not grant Norman a restricted license but granted him a “restoration” of his privilege to drive.
¶8Accordingly, the conclusion must be reached that, in entering the December 20, 1999 order, the trial court restored Norman’s driving privileges. Based on that order, the Department of Motor Vehicles would have undoubtedly issued Norman a full, unrestricted operator’s license. The fact that the court prescribed certain conditions in restoring Norman’s privilege to drive and, thus, retained authority to enforce those conditions does not alter the conclusion that Norman’s privilege to drive was restored. Indeed, given that the court cannot logically suspend what does not exist, the trial court’s admonition that it might suspend Norman’s “privilege to drive” permanently if he failed to comply with the court’s conditions only buttresses the conclusion that the court intended to restore Norman’s driving privileges on December 20, 1999.
¶9I would hold, therefore, that the trial court’s order of December 20, 1999, terminated Norman’s status as an habitual offender on that date. See Varga, 260 Va. at 552, 536 S.E.2d at 714 (holding that one’s habitual offender status “remains in force until that person actually has his privilege to drive restored”). I would also hold that, because no court declared him an habitual offender subsequent to that date, Norman was not an habitual offender when he drove on August 14, 2001,
¶10*507For these reasons, I would reverse Norman’s conviction for driving as an habitual offender, second or subsequent offense.
¶11. In reciting what it says is the "relevant part” of Code § 46.2-360, the majority includes subsection 2 of that statute in its recitation. That subsection, however, relates only to petitions for the issuance of a restricted license. Thus, because Norman’s petition was for restoration of his privilege to drive rather than for a restricted license. Code § 46.2-360(2) is inapplicable in this case.
¶12. I believe the majority’s reliance on the trial court’s finding that "Norman was aware that he retained habitual offender status” after *507December 20, 1999, is misplaced. Norman’s perceptions and beliefs have no bearing on the issue of whether the trial court’s December 20, 1999 order terminated his status as an habitual offender, the resolution of which is purely a matter of law.