40 Wash. App. 91 - State v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 26 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently June 2023 · most notably 105 Wash. 2d 632 - State v. Terrovona (1986), State v. Carson (1996)
2 federal appellate · 26 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 103 Wash. 2d 1 - State v. Campbell · 89 Wash. 2d 788 - State v. MacK · 77 Wash. 2d 593 - State v. Miles · 98 Wash. 2d 53 - State v. Sherman · 40 Wash. 2d 92 - State v. Rousseau
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Any driver of a motor vehicle who wilfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The term "indicating" does initially establish an objective inquiry. Generally speaking, a wanton and willful disregard[ 1 ] will only be established by circumstantial evidence of the way a defendant drives. . . . The language "drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton and wilful disregard" expresses the State's interest in proscribing conduct exhibiting a certain disposition. This does not mean the above language establishes solely an objective element of the crime. It establishes only that the State is proscribing both the "conduct" and the "disposition", and that "disposition" invariably is proven by inference from circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may "indicate" a wanton and willful disregard, but the defendant may rebut that inference from circumstantial evidence. For instance, the defendant may have had a seizure while driving. While his manner of driving would indicate wanton and willful disregard, the defendant would not actually have wanton and willful disregard for others.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“according to taste as to the word used, is that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences. . . . (Footnotes omitted.) Prosser and Keeton on Torts, at 213. In its oral decision, the trial court below stated that the State presented insufficient evidence that”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.